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I. INTRODUCTION

It took only an instant to reverse centuries of diplomatic practice and unsettle
the deepest foundations of international law. With the arrest of former Chilean
President Augusto Pinochet in London's exclusive Marylebone district in October 1998, the law seemed to lunge forward rather than advance at its more usual
plodding pace.' For centuries, international law and the practice of states had
affirmed a bedrock principle of mutual restraint among nations: courts of one
state would not judge the sovereign acts of another. Now, a former Chilean head
of state had been arrested by British authorities at the request of a Spanish
magistrate on charges that were, at their core, about how the accused had

1. See Clifford Krauss, Britain Arrests Pinochet to Face Charges by Spain, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18,
1998, at 1.
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governed Chile a quarter of a century before. Defying the predictions of
seasoned experts, Pinochet's arrest was upheld by England's highest court.2
In this way, an obscure concept with an ungainly name-universal jurisdiction-ended its long exile in the precincts of legal arcana, where it had
languished largely unnoticed since Israel's prosecution of Adolf Eichmann in
1961.? In brief, the principle of universality allows any state to prosecute certain
offenses, even when the prosecuting state has no link to the alleged perpetrator,
his victims, or the actual crime. Until recently, states rarely exercised this
extraordinary jurisdiction; when they did, the target was usually a suspected
Nazi-era war criminal.
In the years since Pinochet's arrest, a raft of countries have walked through
the door the Pinochetcase opened.4 Inspired by the Pinochet precedent, victims
of human rights violations in Chad instituted criminal proceedings against
former leader Hissine Habr6 in Senegal and Belgium. 5 In June 2001, a Belgian
jury broke new ground when it convicted four Rwandans for their roles in the
1994 genocide in Rwanda in a case that relied on universal jurisdiction.6 In the
past decade, criminal complaints or investigations have been instituted before
courts in Austria,7 Canada,8 Denmark,9 France,'o Germany," the Netherlands,12
2. See infra text accompanying notes 111-51.
3. In addition to the principle of universality, Israel's prosecution of Eichmann relied on two further
grounds of jurisdiction. See infra note 93.
4. See Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands, Introduction to JUSTICE FOR CRIMEs AGAINST HUMANITY 1, 9
(Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003); see also Mark Lattimer, Enforcing Human Rights
through InternationalCriminalLaw, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra 387, 412.
5. Victims and their advocates filed a criminal complaint against Habr6 in Senegal in late January
1999. One week later, a Senegalese investigating judge indicted Habr6. Although this case was later
dismissed, proceedings against Habr6 have gone forward in Belgium. See Stephen P. Marks, The
Hisshne Habr6 Case: The Lw and Politics of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 131
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2004); Human Rights Watch, The Case Against Hiss&ne Habrd, an "African
Pinochet", at http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
6. See Keith B. Richburg, Rwandan Nuns Jailed in Genocide; Belgian Jury Also Sentences Two
Others, WASH. PosT, June 9, 2001, at Al. The trial reportedly was the first in which "a jury of ordinary
citizens was asked to sit in judgment" of international crimes committed in another country. Marlise
Simons, Mother SuperiorGuilty in Rwanda Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2001, at A4.
7. See FIONA McKAY, REDRESS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE 16-18 (1999), available at
http://www.redress.org/documents/unijeur.html [hereinafter REDRESS REPORT].
8. See In re Imre Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
9. See REDRESS REPORT, supra note 7, at 22-23 for discussion of the prosecution of Refik Saric. In
November 2002, Danish police arrested General Nizar al-Khazraji, the former Chief of Staff of the
Iraqi army. Relying on universal jurisdiction, Danish authorities brought war crimes charges against
Khazraji, who commanded the Iraqi Armed Forces when they used chemical weapons against Iranian
troops and Kurdish civilians. See Richard Beeston, War Crimes Arrest Blow to Iraqi Opposition, TIMES
(London), Nov. 20, 2002, at 17. Khazraji disappeared from Denmark in March 2003 and was
subsequently reported to be living in the United Arab Emirates. See Rawya Rageh, Iraqi ExCommander Who Fled Denmark Found, Assoc. PREss, Oct. 28, 2003. More recent reports indicate that
Al-Khazraji has returned to Iraq, where he is serving as a military advisor to the country's interim
government. See Iraqi General Formerly Living in Denmark Now Advising Iraqi Government, BBC
MONITORING EUR., Nov. 9, 2004.
10. See In re Munyeshyaka, 1998 Bull. Crim., No. 2. For a brief summary of more recent cases in
France, see REDRESS AND FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, UNIVERSAL
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Senegal,13 Spain,14 Switzerland,15 and the United Kingdoml 6 for atrocities in
Europe, Africa and South America. And while the United States has been
reluctant to institute prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction, its courts have
seen a surge in civil litigation based on this principle.' 7 More controversially,
criminal complaints have been filed in Belgium-until recently, the world
capital of universal jurisdiction-against current or former leaders of Chad, 8
Cuba,' 9 Iraq, 20 Iran, 2 the Democratic Republic of Congo,2 2 the Ivory Coast, 2 3
the Palestinian Authority, 24 Israel, 2 5 the United States, 2 6 and other countries. 2 7
JURISDICTION INTHE EUROPEAN UNION 12-14 (2003), available at http://www.fidh.org/justice/rapport/2003/
countriesUJ EUa.pdf [hereinafter REDRESS & FIDH REPORT].
11. See REDRESS & FIDH REPORT, supra note 10, at 17; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, ch. 4, pt. A, 96-101, Al INDEX: IOR 43/002 - 018/2001, SEPT. 2001, AVAILABLE AT
HTTP://WEB.AMNESTY.ORG/WEB/WEB.NSF/PAGES/LEGAL MEMORANDUM [HEREINAFTER AMNESTY REPORT].

12. See Bouterse Case, CW 2323 (Sept. 18, 2001); Dutch Court Charges Congolese Colonel, Assoc.
PRESS, Sept. 30, 2003; Dutch Court Jails Congolese Man, BBC News, Apr. 7, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/3608027.stm; Marlise Simons, Dutch Arrest 2 Africans Suspected of
War Crimes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 2004.
13. See supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre el caso Guatemala por genocidio [Judgment of
the Spanish Supreme Court Concerning the Guatemala Genocide Case], STS, Feb. 25, 2003 (No.
327/2003) (Spain), translated in 42 I.L.M. 686 (2003); Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre el caso
Peni por genocidio [Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court Concerning the Peruvian Genocide Case],
STS, May 20, 2003 (No. 712) (Spain), translated in 42 I.L.M. 1200 (2003). In a more recent decision,
the Supreme Court of Spain upheld jurisdiction for claims of torture of Spanish nationals allegedly
committed by a former Chilean defense minister. See Bruce Zagaris, Spanish Supreme Court Uphold
Jurisdiction over Chilean Former Defense Minister, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 268, 268-69 (2004).
Earlier Spanish criminal proceedings against Chilean and Argentine suspects are described below in
Part II.A.
15. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 11, ch. 4, pt. B, at 80-83.
16. See id. at 92.
17. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, has been the principal
vehicle for these law suits since the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980). The incorporation of international human rights law into the ATCA in Filartiga and its
progeny was challenged in a case that came before the Supreme Court during its 2004 Term, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). The Court effectively affirmed Filartega but indicated that
the ATCA could open the door to enforcement of comparatively new human rights norms only when
they fall within "a narrow class of international norms." Id. at 2764.
18. See supra note 5.
19. See Exiles Seek Castro's Indictment in Belgium, REUTERS, Oct. 4, 2001.
20. See Bart Crols, Belgian Magistrate Launches Probe Against Saddam, REUTERS, June 29, 2001.
21. See Steven R. Ratner, Editorial Comment, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 890 (2003).
22. Belgium's issuance of an international arrest warrant against the incumbent Foreign Minister of
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) led the DRC to institute a case against Belgium before the
International Court of Justice. The Court ruled that Belgium's action violated international legal
principles concerning official immunity. See infra note 129.

23. See Crols, supra note 20.
24. See Arafat Faces Genocide Trial, BBC NEws, Mar. 3, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/
hi/middle east/2816357.stm.
25. In June 2001, twenty-three survivors of the 1982 massacres in the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps in Lebanon filed a criminal complaint in Belgium against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

and several others for their roles in the massacres. In June 2002, a Belgian appeals court ruled that the
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For some, these trends herald a long-overdue era of enforcement of the law
derived from Nuremberg. In their view, the task ahead is to dismantle remaining
barriers to the use of universal jurisdiction. States must be lobbied to enact laws
granting their courts a global remit, governments must be pressed to enforce
laws already on the books, and concerted efforts should be made to track down
potential defendants and bring them before the bar of justice. But for others,
recent trends raise troubling questions. Do courts of bystander states have either
the wisdom or standing to pass judgment on crimes committed a world awaycrimes that affect the deepest interests of the nation where they occurred? 28 In
the view of some critics, prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction are
politically imprudent, if not downright dangerous. They warn that universal
jurisdiction may "provoke domestic unrest or international conflict." 29
While these worries are surely overblown,o several recent attempts to invoke
universal jurisdiction have provoked a diplomatic tempest. When a Belgian
court ruled that a criminal investigation of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
case against Sharon and other Israeli and Lebanese suspects could not go forward because the accused
were not present in Belgium. "If a person is not found on the territory," the court ruled, "we find it
inadmissible." Belgium Bars Sharon War Crimes Trial, BBC NEWS, June 26, 2002, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilworld/europe/2066808.stm; Yossi Melman, Belgium Amending Law to Enable
Sharon Trial, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 16, 2003. The Court of Cassation later ruled that the presence of the
accused in Belgium was not necessary for prosecution of grave violations of international law but
suspended the case against Sharon on grounds of official immunity. H.S.A. v. S.A., No. P.02.1139.F/1,
at 6-8 (Belg. Cour de Cassation Feb. 12, 2003) (ruling on the indictment of defendant Ariel Sharon,
Amos Yaron and others), available at http://www.indictsharon.net/12feb2003dectrans.pdf; Marlise
Simons, Sharon Faces Belgian Trial After Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, § A, at 12. The case
was dismissed in September 2003 as a result of amendments to Belgian law. See Glenn Frankel,
Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its GlobalReach; Cases Against PoliticalFiguresSparked Crises,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 30, 2003, at Al.
26. On March 18, 2003, relatives of Iraqi civilians killed by American bombs in 1991 filed a
criminal complaint against former U.S. President George H.W. Bush, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (and current Secretary of State) Colin Powell, and former U.S. Defense Secretary (and
current Vice President) Richard Cheney. See Belgian Senate Guts "Genocide Lw", GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 6, 2003. In May 2003, a separate complaint was filed against retired U.S. General Tommy
Franks, who had recently commanded U.S. forces during the 2003 war in Iraq. Both cases were
dismissed. See Frankel, supra note 25.
27. Under Belgian criminal procedure, private parties can initiate cases before an investigating
judge. See Ratner, supra note 21, at 890. As noted below, the Belgian Parliament has virtually
eliminated universal jurisdiction since these cases were filed. See infra note 35 and text accompanying
notes 33-35.
28. For a thoughtful exposition of these concerns, see Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and
Judicial Reluctance: A New "Fourteen Points", in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 5, at 240,

246-48.
29. Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, DEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, 51.
30. Human rights advocates note that it is difficult to identify a situation in which a country has been
destabilized by prosecutions for human rights crimes. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE FOR IRAQ
(Dec. 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraql217bg.htm ("Human Rights
Watch knows of no single transition process that has collapsed due to demands for justice."). On the
salutary effects of recent efforts to exercise universal jurisdiction in the countries where the crimes
concerned took place, see Richard Dicker & Elise Keppler, Beyond The Hague: The Challenges of
International Justice, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED
CONFLICT 194 (Jan. 2004), availableat http://hrw.org/wr2k4/10.htm.
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could proceed once he left office, Israeli authorities denounced the decision as a
"blood libel" and recalled the new Israeli Ambassador to Belgium. 3 ' The
American response to a complaint filed in Belgium against senior U.S. officials
was even more forceful. Secretary of State Colin Powell, one of the officials
named in the complaint, warned that Belgium risked losing its status as the
headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 32 The Belgian
response was swift. The government rushed through Parliament legislation that
radically reduced the reach of Belgium's law on universal jurisdiction.3 3 In the
view of the incumbent U.S. administration, the amendments did not go far
enough. In June 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld warned that
the United States would withhold further funding for a new NATO headquarters
building in Brussels and that senior U.S. officials may stop visiting Belgium
unless it repealed its already diminished law on universal jurisdiction.34 Bowing
to U.S. pressure, the Belgian Parliament amended its law once again, this time
leaving scant scope for universal jurisdiction.
It is not hard to fathom why many government officials opposed Belgium's
previously expansive law.3 6 After all, victims with ready access to Belgian
courts had set their sights on national leaders the world over.37 Yet it is not only
senior officials who entertain misgivings about the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
The most trenchant challenge to universal jurisdiction-and the subject of
this article-has been framed in terms of democratic principles. The central
31. James Bennet, IsraelRejects Belgian Court Ruling on Sharon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at A4;
Marc Perelman, Israel Seeks to Counter Belgian "War Crimes" Ruling, FORWARD (New York), Feb. 20,
2003, at 6; Conol Urquhart, Israel Scorns "Anti-Semitic Little Belgium "; FuriousBacklash After Court
Rules Against Sharon, GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 2003, at 17. Israel's ambassador returned to Belgium after its
universal jurisdiction law was amended. See Ratner, supra note 21, at 891.
32. See Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks Its ProsecutorialZeal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at A8.
33. See Frankel, supra note 25, at Al.
34. See Vernon Loeb, Rumsfeld Says Belgian Law Could Imperil Fundsfor NATO, WASH. PosT, June
13, 2003, at A24; Craig S. Smith, NATO Agrees to U.S. Proposalsto Revamp Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2003, at A3.
35. See Frankel, supra note 25, at Al. Under the amended law, which entered into force in early
August 2003, Belgian courts can exercise jurisdiction over three international crimes previously subject
to universal jurisdiction in Belgium-war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide-when
committed outside Belgium only if either the defendant or victim is a Belgian national or resident.
Thus, the new law has generally been described as eliminating universal jurisdiction, whose exercise
does not depend upon either the victim's or perpetrator's link of nationality to the forum state. But the
amended law allows Belgian courts to exercise jurisdiction over other crimes if Belgium has an
obligation under treaty or customary law to submit cases to its authorities for prosecution. See Loi
relative aux violations graves du droit international humanitaire [Law on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law], 5 ao(It 2003 (Beig.), Moniteur Belge, Aug. 7, 2003, at 40506, translatedin
42 I.L.M. 1258, 1267-68 (2003). This provision has not been seen as a gateway to universal
jurisdiction, see Ratner, supra note 21, at 891-92, presumably because it does not encompass prosecutions for three categories of offense that would or might otherwise be covered by the provision-war
crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity.
36. See Smith, supra note 34 (reporting that "[a]ll NATO countries are concerned about the threat"
posed by the subsequently repealed Belgian law on universal jurisdiction).
37. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
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claim of this critique is that, in exercising universal jurisdiction, courts and
prosecutors "are completely unaccountable to the citizens of the nation whose
fate they are ruling upon."3 8 In consequence, it is said, courts exercising
universal jurisdiction "will invariably be less disciplined and prudent than
would otherwise be the case." 39
In the view of critics, two features of the body of international law supporting
universal jurisdiction compound this risk. First, while classic international law
regulated relations between states, contemporary international law intrudes
deeply into matters of internal governance. 4 0 This transformation has special
significance for the law establishing universal jurisdiction: In an earlier age, the
principle of universality was confined to piracy and the slave trade--conduct
that by its nature transpires beyond any nation's exclusive province. Since
World War II, however, the principle of universality has expanded to include
crimes, like genocide, that usually occur within the boundaries of sovereign
states. 4 1 When a court exercises universal jurisdiction over these crimes, it
judges conduct that took place within another country in light of law that was
developed through processes that transcend both states' lawmaking institutions.
Second, skeptics charge that since there is no consensus about what crimes are
subject to universal jurisdiction 4 2 and how they are defined, courts exercising
universal jurisdiction are not even constrained by widely-accepted legal interpre-

38. Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 29, at 51.
39. Id.
40. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critiqueof the Modem Position, I 10 HARV. L. REv. 815, 840-41 (1997).
41. See Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 Tx. L. REv. 785,
800-15 (1988).
42. See Kirby, supra note 28, at 250. Fresh evidence in support of this concern can be found in the
decisions of judges who addressed the scope of universal jurisdiction in separate opinions in Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 ICJ 194 (Feb. 14) (Merits),
available at http://www.icj-zij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgmenticobe-ijudgment_20020214.
PDF. In the view of one judge, "international law does not accept universal jurisdiction" except in
respect of piracy and, on a subsidiary basis, in respect of certain offenses proscribed by various treaties.
Id. 1 16 (separate opinion of Judge Gilbert Guillaume). In the view of another, "universal jurisdiction is
available for certain crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the slave trade
and genocide," as well as piracy. Id. 9 (separate opinion of Judge Abdul G. Koroma). Three more
judges concluded that "state practice . . . is neutral as to [the] exercise of universal jurisdiction." They
made clear, however, that in their view international law allows the exercise of universal jurisdiction
over piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Id. 45 (separate joint opinion of Judges Rosalyn
Higgins, Pieter Kooijmans, and Thomas Buergenthal). Another judge, who believed that "[i]nternational law clearly permits universal jurisdiction for war crimes and crimes against humanity," nonetheless noted the confusion in which the very subject of universal jurisdiction is shrouded. In her words,
"[t]here is no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction in conventional or customary
international law." Id. 59 (dissenting opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert). The majority
opinion did not address the validity of Belgium's attempted exercise of universal jurisdiction per se
(though it did condemn Belgium's violation of official immunities), but a case now pending before the
International Court of Justice, Certain Criminal Proceedingsin France (Congo v. France), is likely to
address issues concerning the legality of universal jurisdiction.
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tations.43
For the most part these challenges have been advanced by writers whose
views on universal jurisdiction are shaped by a deeper antipathy toward international law and multilateral institutions that constrain unilateral action." Invoking many of the same arguments they have deployed against universal
jurisdiction, leading critics have also challenged direct enforcement of customary international law by federal courts in the United States 45 and opposed the
recently-established International Criminal Court." Their views on universal
jurisdiction thus can be seen as one facet of a broader conservative critique of
international legal regimes.4 7 Perhaps in consequence, their views have not been
seriously engaged by other leading voices, including professional human rights
advocates, in the public debate over bystander justice.
Yet human rights professionals above all should take these claims seriously.
The conservative critique lays bare but does not resolve a paradox at the heart
of human rights law itself:49 on the one hand, postwar law inscribes Nuremberg's lesson that some acts cannot be shielded from global scrutiny behind the
mantle of sovereign prerogative. If that lesson is to be more than a barren
bromide, it must be backed by the credible threat of enforcement.o On the other
side of the paradox, international human rights law upholds the right of all
societies to govern themselves.5 ' And questions of self-government are deeply
engaged by the question, what should be done about past atrocities? 5 2 Thus
while the conservative critique of universal jurisdiction has not been framed in
terms of international human rights, its core concern finds significant support in
that body of law. The central aim of this article is to develop a framework for

43. See Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 29, at 50-51; see also Jeremy Rabkin, InternationalLaw
vs. the American Constitution-Something's Got to Give, NATIONAL INrEREST, Spring 1999, at 30,

33-34; cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2177-2179 (1999) (arguing that the United States should not directly
incorporate international human rights law into domestic law because of the vagueness of the former).
44. An exception can be found in Kirby, supra note 28.
45. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 40, at 857-59.
46. See, e.g., Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
2001, at 86, 90; Rabkin, supra note 43, at 30.
47. For this reason I will refer to their critique as the "conservative critique." As my analysis
suggests, the critique could also be described as a democratic critique. Since, however, I use the latter
term in a specialized context in Part IV, I use the phrase "conservative critique" to refer to the set of
objections, summarized above, advanced by prominent conservative writers.
48. An exception is a project sponsored by Princeton University's Program in Law and Public
Affairs, the Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, in which this author participated. Under its
auspices, a group of international jurists and scholars drafted the Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction, which seek to constrain the exercise of universal jurisdiction through principled guidelines. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, reprinted in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra

note 5, at 18, 18-25.
49. This point is developed below in Part V.
50. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 69-73.
52. This point is developed below in Part V.A.
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resolving the justice/democracy paradox presented by recent trends in the use of
universal jurisdiction.
Two recent developments make it necessary to identify principles for assessing and ensuring the democratic legitimacy of transnational lawmaking processes, including but not limited to those at play in the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. First, in recent years states have evinced an unprecedented commitment to democratic principles. Second, a large and growing dimension of
lawmaking transcends the province of state politics-and this trend is irreversible.5 3 The second development has substantial implications for how we resolve
the justice/democracy paradox presented by universal jurisdiction: It is no
longer possible to revert to lawmaking processes that transpire within the
exclusive domain of sovereign states. In a globalized world, a retreat inward
would fail the test of plausibility. Instead, the task today is to identify democratic principles appropriate to transnational lawmaking phenomena.
Using the Pinochet case as an analytic lens, I deepen and refine the conservative critique of universal jurisdiction in Parts II and III of this article. Through
an analysis of key judicial rulings in Europe, Part II shows how the Pinochet
case provides some basis for critics' charge that significant ambiguities surround
the law of universal jurisdiction. I nonetheless reject the stark conclusion
reached by leading proponents of the conservative critique-that the law underlying universal jurisdiction is inherently vague and incurably undemocratic.
There is no reason to suppose that treaties are more susceptible to vagueness
than domestic legislation. Excessively vague text is avoidable in both.
A deeper challenge to the democratic legitimacy of universal jurisdiction
stems from the prominent role of judicial interpretation in its exercise. Part IHl
of this article develops the claim that bystander justice challenges democratic
principles because a court that exercises universal jurisdiction is not nested in
the political and legal culture of the country most directly affected by its
rulings. But if this challenge is significant, it too is surmountable. Drawing upon
processes of democratic legitimation that operate in purely domestic settings,
Part III concludes by identifying three benchmarks for assessing the legitimacy
of adjudication by foreign courts, particularly those exercising universal jurisdiction.

The first is general acknowledgment of the authority of relevant lawmaking
processes, including adjudication, by those who are subject to the law that is
generated. This measure of legitimacy follows from the principle of consent
underlying democratic theory and thus rests upon a fundamentally normative
claim. A second benchmark of democratic legitimacy is more descriptive than
normative, although it links up to the principle of consent: The lawmaking role
of judges is more likely to be accepted as democratically legitimate when the
courts on which they sit have earned institutional respect through their performance. In a national setting, this type of respect is facilitated by a judge's ability
53. These developments and their implications are explored in Part II.

1066

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 92:1057

to craft judgments that resonate with the deepest values of her own political
community. The third benchmark of democratic legitimation is the perception
by those who may be subject to judge-made law that the lawmakers are
accountable to them. In well-functioning democracies, this perception is sustained by a continuous colloquy between courts and society.
In Part IV, I bring these observations to bear in assessing transnational
lawmaking processes, focusing on those underlying the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. The first benchmark derived from the inquiry undertaken in Part
III-general acknowledgment of the authority of relevant lawmaking processes
by those who are subject to the law they generate-is readily satisfied when an
individual is prosecuted before a foreign court whose jurisdiction has been
accepted by his own country. Still, in view of the peculiar challenges to
democratic values posed by the lawmaking role of extra-territorial courts, it is
worth emphasizing that states' decision to delegate substantial new authority to
such courts should be based upon informed public deliberation.
Ensuring the ongoing accountability of courts that operate at a distance from
communities directly affected by their rulings presents more elusive challenges.
Yet relatively straightforward measures that ensure transparency in foreign
courts' operations can help meet these challenges. Emergent features of the
contemporary transnational lawmaking system already operate as a further and
significant constraint on the exercise of universal jurisdiction. For example, a
transnational professional community of jurists disciplines decision-making by
courts exercising universal jurisdiction in much the same way that domestic
judges constrain each other's interpretive performance.
Part V explores another key plank of the conservative critique of universal
jurisdiction: the charge that its exercise undermines nascent democracies that
have emerged from the ashes of dictatorship. Questions concerning punishment
of those responsible for atrocious crimes belong specially (but not exclusively)
to the communities that endured their depredations. By reckoning with past
abuses, societies recently ravaged by mass atrocity define their core values and
reconstitute their civic body based upon a common commitment to human
decency. Even so, the conservative critique misses a crucial point: societies
confronting these challenges do not deliberate in isolation. A fundamental
feature of contemporary law- and norm-generating activities is the participation
of national communities in transnational processes. Nowhere is the point more
relevant than in respect of the Pinochet case itself. Chileans were actively
engaged in the proceedings against General Pinochet in Europe. Those proceedings, in turn, had a catalytic effect in Chile, revitalizing national processes of
reckoning with past abuses. Perhaps most important-and overlooked by proponents of the conservative critique-societies emerging from periods of systemic
violence have been the first to accept treaty-based regimes aimed at enforcing
human rights.
And so universal jurisdiction presents a paradox: In theory, at least, its
exercise may threaten to displace democratic deliberations in societies that have
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endured atrocious crimes. In practice, however, it has fortified and energized
those processes. Drawing upon the model for legitimate transnational lawmaking developed in previous sections, Part V concludes by identifying principles
aimed at ensuring that bystander justice is exercised in a manner likely to enhance
rather than usurp national processes of reckoning with crimes of the past.
II.

DEMOCRACY ACROSS BORDERS

A. TRANSNATIONAL LAWMAKING PROCESSES

A fundamental feature of the lawmaking processes at play in the Pinochet
case is their transnational nature. As the term is used in this article, transnational law is made by more than one state, typically with the participation of
non-state actors,5 4 and is constituted at least in part by national law. As this
working definition implies, a hallmark of transnational law is that it typically
comprises elements of both national and international law, dissolving traditional
dichotomies between the two.5 5
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,56 which proved crucial to the proceedings against
General Pinochet in Spain and England, exemplifies this phenomenon. As a
multilateral treaty, the Convention Against Torture is an instrument of international law; 5 8 its text was developed and adopted at the international level,5 9 and
it is binding under international law. 60 But the law associated with this treaty
also comprises domestic law, both legislative and judicial. States Parties are
required to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures"61 to prevent torture. Inevitably, then, crucial terms of the convention are
left to be clarified by national courts, which embroider onto the treaty text their
own interpretive meanings. Thus the law of the convention is "made" at both
international and national levels.
Further complicating the legal landscape, the convention also establishes a

54. See infra text accompanying notes 260-62.
55. Cf Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2349 n.9
(1991) (following Judge Philip Jessup's definition of "transnational law" as "all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers" and including "[b]oth public and private international law. . . [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories" (alterations in
original) (quoting PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 2 (1956)).

56. Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture].
57. See discussion infra Part II.
58. Cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l)(a), 59 Stat. 1031, 1060,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans, 1153, 1179 (including "international conventions" in enumeration of sources of
international law that Court may apply).
59. The drafting history of the Convention Against Torture is summarized in J. HERMAN BURGERS &
HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (1988).

60. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339
("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
61. Convention Against Torture, supra note 56, art. 2(1).
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transnational architecture of enforcement. Articles 5(2) and 7(1) require States
Parties either to institute criminal proceedings against persons suspected of
having committed torture who are present in their territory or to extradite the
alleged torturers for trial in another country.62
The transnational nature of the Convention Against Torture is even wider and
deeper than this account suggests. Judicial interpretations of this treaty, summarized in Part III, have drawn upon case law from an eclectic range of international, regional, and national courts. For example, the key British decision
judging Pinochet extraditable to Spain to face torture charges cites decisions of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 3 the European
Commission of Human Rights,64 and courts of countries ranging from the
United StateS65 to Germany" and Israel. 67 Thus, states that adhere to the Convention
Against Torture sign on to a diffuse and decentralized system of lawmaking.
B. SHOULD TRANSNATIONAL LAWMAKING PROCESSES BE DEMOCRATIC?

It is not hard to see that this brand of lawmaking challenges traditional
notions of self-government, for we have long understood democracy to be
inseparable from a bounded political community. Joseph Weiler has summarized this deeply entrenched understanding in terms that are helpful here:
"Democracy.. . is premised on the existence of a polity with members-the
demos-by whom and for whom democratic discourse with its many variants
takes place. The authority and legitimacy of a majority to compel a minority
exists only within political boundaries defined by a demos."6
Focusing on the lawmaking processes associated with universal jurisdiction,
this Article examines challenges to democratic principles presented by emerging
patterns of transnational lawmaking, which by their nature transcend traditional
boundaries of self-government. And so a preliminary question merits brief
consideration: Should transnational lawmaking processes be democratic? The
first point to be made here is that international law itself is now deeply
committed to democratic principles. Thus the question whether transnational
lawmaking processes are democratically legitimate is in part an inquiry into the
internal coherence of international law.
Postwar international human rights instruments affirm a universal right to

62. To the extent that these provisions require prosecution of persons whose only connection to the
forum state is presence at the time of their apprehension, their implementation raises special questions
of democratic legitimacy, which are the focus of Part IV.
63. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C.
147, 198, (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581, 589 (1999) [hereinafter Pinochet III] (opinion of
Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
64. See id. at 220 (opinion of Lord Goff).
65. See, e.g., id. at 241 (opinion of Lord Hope).
66. See, e.g., id. at 255-57 (opinion of Lord Hutton).
67. See, e.g., id. at 198 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
68. J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht
Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219, 222 (1995).
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self-government' and various regional treaties affirm similar rights. 70 Although
states' commitment to promote and enforce these guarantees was shallow until
recently, efforts in support of democracy gained powerful momentum in the
final decade of the twentieth century.7 ' By 1992, Thomas Franck proclaimed:
"Democracy ... is on the way to becoming a global entitlement." 72 The "emerging 'law,"' he wrote, "requires democracy to validate governance." 73 What this
meant for Franck and others was that international law could now concern itself
with broad questions of governance within states, matters long deemed offlimits to global scrutiny notwithstanding formal pledges by states to respect
principles of self-government.74
Only lately has it become clear that democratic principles may also have
significant implications for how supra-national law is made. The change results
from an unprecedented shift in the locus and nature of lawmaking activities.
Today there is an extensive global dimension to regulation of economic, environmental, telecommunications, labor, health, criminal and other matters that have
long been committed to processes of self-governance in democratic states. More
than ever before, matters touching on how we conduct our daily affairs are
regulated at least in part through law that transcends the province of state
governance.
While these phenomena challenge traditional notions of democracy, they are
not inherently undemocratic. For the most part, transnational lawmaking has
emerged to advance the welfare of discrete political communities-to perform,
that is, one of the core functions entrusted to governments by self-governing
societies. At a time when states' economies, cultures and ecosystems are
extensively integrated, self-governance would be drastically diminished if na69. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg., at 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
70. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13, June 26, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); American Convention on Human Rights, art.
23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by Protocol No. I1), art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213
U.N.T.S. 262.
71. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992).
72. Id. at 46; see also Gregory H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLw, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); Diane F. Orentlicher, Democratic Principles and Separatist Claims: A
Response and Further Inquiry, in XLV NOMOS: SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION 77 (Stephen J.
Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds., 2003).
73. Franck, supra note 71, at 47.
74. Cf W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867 (1990) (early international law "insulat[ed] from legal scrutiny and competence a broad category of events that were later enshrined as 'matters solely within the domestic
jurisdiction"' of states (citing LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 15, para. 8)). In striking contrast, the
new "democratic entitlement" has supported highly intrusive forms of intervention in support of
democracy, including military intervention. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 3413th mtg., U.N.
Doc. SIRES/940, T 4 (1994) (authorizing military intervention in Haiti for the express purpose of
restoring "the legitimately elected President," who had been deposed in a coup).
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tional communities were unable to participate effectively in transnational lawmaking processes. And so, as I take up the democratic challenges presented by
transnational lawmaking processes, I will assume that democratic societies can
and often do benefit from participation in those processes and that informed and
engaged polities may and often do choose to participate in international legal
regimes. The question, then, is how democratic societies can meaningfully
participate in choosing the terms of their participation-and then assure the
accountability of lawmaking processes that unfold in significant part beyond
their national borders.
III.

RECASTING INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PINOCHET PROCEEDINGS IN EUROPE

A central pillar of the democratic critique of universal jurisdiction is the
claim that its exercise imposes foreign law on citizens of the state most directly
affected by the judicial proceedings. In support of this charge, critics assert that
the substantive law supporting the exercise of universal jurisdiction is illdefined, leaving the task of interpretation to judges who operate outside the
country most affected by their judgments.
The proceedings against General Pinochet in Europe, the leading contemporary case involving the use of universal jurisdiction, provide some support for
this claim. Two laws that were central to the prosecution of General Pinochet,
including a treaty establishing a regime of mandatory universal jurisdiction,
contained significant ambiguities. Yet far from dooming the legitimacy of
universal jurisdiction, this problem can be alleviated in a straightforward fashion-through concerted efforts to draft clear text in legal instruments establishing universal jurisdiction.
A. THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GENERAL PINOCHET: FROM SPAIN TO CHILE

On July 9, 2001, an appeals court in Santiago ruled that Augusto Pinochet,
then 85 years old, was mentally unfit to stand trial.7 6 One year later, the ruling
was reaffirmed by Chile's highest court.77 These developments appeared-at
least for a while-to doom further efforts to bring the former leader to trial.78 It

75. As elaborated in Part IV, no text can eliminate ambiguity altogether. But as the Pinochet
proceedings described in this Part remind us, legal texts can suffer from avoidably problematic
vagueness.
76. See Clifford Krauss, Chile Court Bars Trial of Pinocher, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2001, at Al.
77. Frederico Quilodran, Chile's Supreme Court Rules FormerDictator Unfit to Stand Trial, Assoc.
PRESS, July 2, 2002. In separate proceedings, a Chilean appeals court ruled against stripping Pinochet of
his immunity in an August 2003 decision. See REUTERS, Chile: Court Bars PinochetRights Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at A8.
78. Pinochet's condition has been diagnosed as dementia, which is irreversible. See Quilodran,supra
note 77. In late May 2004, however, an appeals court in Santiago ruled in favor of removing the former
president's immunity from prosecution in a case involving disappearances in the 1970s. See Pinochet
Loses Legal Immunity, REUTERS, May 29, 2004. Its decision was upheld by Chile's Supreme Court in
August 2004, and Pinochet was questioned by an investigative judge one month later. See Antonio de la
Jara, Chile's Pinochet Questioned by Investigative Judge, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 2004.
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nonetheless remains established fact that government-sponsored brutality was a
fundamental feature of the Pinochet period in Chile. 7 9 The most severe repression occurred in the years following the military putsch that brought General
Pinochet to power on September 11, 1973. During the mid-1970s, thousands of
individuals suspected of political opposition to the Pinochet regime were killed
or disappeared while in official custody. Thousands were forced into exile8 o and
many more were tortured.8 1
During Pinochet's tenure as president, Chile's military government took
several measures to ensure that its members would never face legal judgment
for their crimes. In April 1978 the junta decreed an amnesty for all those who,
"as principals or accessories, committed criminal offenses" from September 11,
1973 to March 10, 1978, the period of the most severe repression. 8 2 The terms
of the 1980 constitution drafted under Pinochet's direction sought to hobble
Chile's democratic institutions for a protracted period of transition. For example, nine seats in the forty-seven-member national parliament are still appointed by various branches of the government; four of these are reserved for
former military commanders.83 More to the present point, Pinochet himself was
guaranteed lifetime tenure in the Chilean Senate-a position that purported to
clothe him with state immunity as Senator-for-Life. 8 4
Against the backdrop of the former president's immunity in Chile, victims of

79. See Rabkin, supra note 43, at 33.
80. See THOMAS C. WRIGHT & RODY ONATE, FLIGHT FROM CHILE iX (1998) ("Between 1973 and 1988,
an estimated 200,000 men, women and children-nearly 2 percent of Chile's population-were forced
out of their country for political reasons."). See also SIMoN COLLIER & WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF
CHILE, 1808-1994, at 360 (1st ed. 1996) ("By the middle of 1978 there were nearly 30,000 Chileans in
exile in Western Europe alone. By the end of the decade exiles could be counted in the hundreds of
thousands.").
81. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Al Doc. AMR 22/010/1999, TORTURE: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME, at
3 (1999).
82. See AMERICAS WATCH, CHILE SINCE THE CoUp: TEN YEARS OF REPRESSION 11 (1983); Jorge Mera,
Chile: Truth and Justice under the Democratic Government, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 171, 179 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (both describing Decree
Law 2,191 of Apr. 18, 1978). The sole exception to this sweeping amnesty was the September 1976 car
bombing in Washington, D.C. of a senior official of the government ousted by Pinochet's coup, Orlando
Letelier, and his colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt. Almost fifteen years after the assassination, two
intelligence officials, Manuel Contreras and Pedro Espinoza, were convicted in Chile for their roles in
the crime.
83. The President appoints two members; the Supreme Court appoints three; and the National
Security Council designates four Senators, each of whom must be a former commander of one of the
four branches of the armed forces. See PETER M. SIAVELIs, THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS INPOSTAUTHORITARIAN CHILE 39 (2000). Reforms that would abolish the positions of non-elected senators were
approved by Chile's Senate in October 2003 and are expected to receive support from the lower house
of Congress. See Chile's New Constitution: Untying the Knot, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2004, at 36.
84. Immediately after Chile's Supreme Court declared Pinochet mentally unfit to stand trial, he
resigned his Senate seat. Larry Rohter, Chile: Pinochet Quits Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2002, at A 10.
More than two years before that, a Chilean court ruled for the first time that his immunity as
Senator-for-Life was not a bar to the indictment of General Pinochet in connection with crimes
investigated by Judge Juan Guzmdn. See Clifford Krauss, Ruling on Immunity Puts Chile Closer to
Trial of Pinochet, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2000, at A4. The Chilean Supreme Court upheld this ruling in
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serious human rights violations sought justice in Spain. On July 1, 1996, an
association of Spanish prosecutors filed criminal charges against General Pinochet and other Chilean military junta leaders on behalf of seven victims of
Spanish descent who had been killed or disappeared in Chile. Initially filed
before Spanish magistrate Judge Manuel Garcia-Castell6n, the case was transferred in October 1998 to Judge Baltasar Garz6n, who had been conducting an
investigation into similar charges against Argentine military figures.86 Judge
Garz6n triggered General Pinochet's arrest by British police and, soon after,
submitted a request for Pinochet's extradition to Spain.87
But while the Spanish case is publicly associated with the magistrate who
avidly pursued the inquiry, private parties activated and later played a key role
in carrying out the investigation. As Richard Wilson explains:
The group responsible for the filing of [the action] was the Association of
Progressive Prosecutors of Spain. The prosecutors were not acting as agents
of the State, but as private complainants with particular expertise to judge the
merits of the cases. The prosecutors' action set the criminal process in motion,
after which lawyers for the victims themselves, using a procedural device
known in Spanish law as the accidn popular,or popular action, took over the
private prosecution of these claims.
Popular actions may be brought by any Spanish citizen, regardless of injury
or other standing, in the public's interest.88
In the case against Pinochet, the victim-complainants, who at first included
seven individuals possessing dual Spanish and Chilean citizenship, apparently
relied as well upon a "1958 Spanish-Chilean convention on dual citizenship
[that] permits any Chilean," whether or not resident in Spain, the same right that
other Spanish citizens possess to file suit in Spanish court. 89 Although public
prosecutors in Spain at first approved the case against General Pinochet, they
filed a series of legal actions challenging the magistrates' investigations after
General Pinochet's arrest in England, apparently fearing the destabilizing effects on Spanish-Chilean relations. 90
August 2000. See Clifford Krauss, Pinochet Ruled No Longer Immune from Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2000, at A3.
85. See Richard J. Wilson, ProsecutingPinochet: InternationalCrimes in Spanish Domestic Law, 21
HUM. RTS. Q. 927, 933-34 (1999) [hereinafter Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet]; Richard J. Wilson, The
Spanish Proceedings,in THE PINOCHET PAPERs 23, 23-24 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Wilson, The Spanish Proceedings].
86. See Marlise Simons, Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer: Magistrate of Explosive Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1998, at Al. With the transfer of the Chile case to Judge Garz6n, the Chilean and Argentine
investigations were consolidated. See Wilson, The Spanish Proceedings,supra note 85, at 25.
87. Judge Garz6n's initial request to British authorities was based upon General Pinochet's alleged
responsibility for ordering crimes to be committed in Argentina. See Wilson, The Spanish Proceedings,
supra note 85, at 25.
88. Wilson, ProsecutingPinochet, supra note 85, at 934-35.
89. Id. at 935.
90. Id. at 935-36.
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The Spanish proceedings explicitly relied upon universal jurisdiction, the
doctrine of international law that allows any state to prosecute certain crimes
regardless of where they occurred even if the prosecuting state has no link to the
crime. 9' Traditionally associated with the crime of piracy, universal jurisdiction
was given broader application through postwar jurisprudence. At least in principle, states could rely upon universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against
humanity, wherever they occurred and whatever the nationality of the alleged
perpetrators and victims. 9 2
But until the 1990s, the principle of universality was invoked almost exclusively in the context of prosecutions stemming from World War II atrocities.93
Even here, universal jurisdiction was exercised sparingly and was rarely, if ever,
invoked as the sole basis for prosecution; the vast majority of prosecutions for
World War II atrocities have relied upon more traditional forms of jurisdiction,
such as the territorial principle.9 4 Thus if universal jurisdiction for certain
atrocious crimes was well established at law, it was just as well understood that
it had scant relevance to the practice of states outside the special context of
Nazi-era crimes.9 5
Against this background, the Spanish magistrates' reliance on universal
jurisdiction seemed nearly as radical as if they had invented the concept out of
whole cloth. In fact, however, the foundation for the investigation by Judges
Garcia-Castell6n and Garz6n had already been prepared. Article 23.4 of the
Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, enacted in 1985, authorizes Spanish courts
91. Opinion is divided on the question whether or to what extent a state may exercise universal
jurisdiction with respect to defendants who are not present its territory. See ANToNIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 285-291 (2003).
92. See Randall, supra note 41, at 800.
93. A noted instance of the exercise of universal jurisdiction was Israel's prosecution of Nazi war
criminal Adolf Eichmann in 1961 after Israeli agents abducted the defendant from Argentina. The
Israeli courts justified their exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of passive personality
and the protective principle as well as universal jurisdiction. Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36
I.L.R. 18, 26 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jm. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962). The principle of passive
personality (also known as passive nationality) recognizes that countries may exercise criminal
jurisdiction over certain crimes committed outside their territory against their nationals. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 402 cmt. g (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENTI.The protective principle recognizes that states may prosecute certain conduct committed
outside their territory on the basis that it threatens their national security and a limited class of other
state interests. See id. §402 cmt. f.
94. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 272 (H.L. 1998) (opinion of Lord Millett)
(asserting that, following World War II, "[tihe great majority of war criminals were tried in the
territories where the crimes were committed"); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of UniversalJurisdiction and Its Placein InternationalLaw, in UNIVERSAL JURISDIcTION, supra note 5, at 44, 277 n.25 (noting
that the author has been unable to locate any post-World War II prosecutions relying solely on universal
jurisdiction). Contra AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 11, ch. 2, § III.A, at 26 (asserting that "some of the
more than 1,000 trials conducted by Allied national tribunals after the Second World War . .. were
based, at least in part, on universal jurisdiction").
95. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Legal Regime, Remarks
at the Conference on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Early Warning and Prevention (December 8-10, 1998), availableat http://www.house.gov/lantos/caucus/index/documents/articles/orentlicher 128-98.htm.
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to exercise "criminal jurisdiction over offenses 'committed by Spanish or
foreign persons outside of national territory and capable of being proven under
Spanish law, such as some of the following crimes: a) Genocide [,] b) Terrorism ... g) and any other [crime] which, under international treaties or conventions, should be pursued in Spain.' 9 6 Charges against General Pinochet pressed
by Judge Garz6n included genocide, terrorism and torture, although for reasons
explained below the torture charges became crucial once the center of legal
activity shifted from Madrid to London.
While universal jurisdiction was indispensable to the Spanish proceedings,
the case against Pinochet did not rely solely on that principle. As noted, the
original complainants comprised seven individuals possessing dual SpanishChilean citizenship. Thus the case against Pinochet initially relied principally on
passive personality jurisdiction, which allows states to exercise jurisdiction over
certain offenses committed against their nationals even if the crimes occurred
abroad. 97 When the investigation broadened to include crimes committed against
victims possessing only Chilean nationality as well as victims from third
countries, jurisdiction had to be justified at least in part on the principle of
universality.
A challenge filed by Spanish public prosecutors" led to a decision sustaining
jurisdiction in respect of the alleged crimes of Pinochet. On November 5, 1998,
judges of the National Court Criminal Division in Plenary Session held that
Spain could try crimes of terrorism and genocide pursuant to the principle of
universal jurisdiction, bolstered by jurisdiction predicated on the nationality of
the Spanish victims:
Spain has jurisdiction to hear the facts, derived from the principle of universal
prosecution of certain offenses categorized in international law which has
been incorporated into our domestic law. Moreover, Spain has a legitimate
interest in the exercise of its jurisdiction, as more than fifty Spaniards were
killed or disappeared in Chile, victims of the repression denounced in the
record. 99

96. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet, supra note 85, at 951 (quoting L.O.P.J. arts. 23.4(a), 23.4(b),
23.4(g)). It was Judge Garz6n who reportedly first invoked this law to investigate a crime that had no
links to Spain-the hijacking of the Achille Lauro within the territorial jurisdiction of Egypt-in 1992.
See Siobhan Morrissey, Universal Prosecutor,87 A.B.A. J. 66, 70 (2001).
97. See supra note 93.
98. See supra text accompanying note 90.
99. Auto de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional confirmando la jurisdiccidn de Espadia
para conocer de los crinenes de genocidio y terrorismocometidos durante la dictadurachilena [Order
of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audencia Nacional affirming Spain's Jurisdiction to Try
Crimes of Genocide and Terrorism Committed During the Chilean Dictatorship], SAN, Nov. 5 1998
(Appeal No. 173/98, Criminal Investigation No. 1/98), availableat http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/
juicio/audi.html, translated in THE PINOCHEr PAPERS 95 supra note 85, at 107 [hereinafter Audencia
NacionalJurisdictional Order]. Although the Organic Law became effective only in 1985, the Spanish
court ruled that it could be applied to charges dating back to 1973. In the court's view, the law "is not a
substantive provision of criminal law" as it "does not define or criminalize any act or omission."
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In effect, then, the court kept one foot planted firmly on the comparatively
secure ground of passive personality jurisdiction while it advanced onto the
more contested terrain of universal jurisdiction.'oo
B.

THE BRITISH PROCEEDINGS: PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

Although Judge Garz6n had made substantial progress in his investigation, he
had not yet filed charges in the Chilean case when he learned of Pinochet's
presence in London.'o' On October 16, 1998, Judge Garz6n issued an international warrant of arrest against Pinochet. 0 2 At approximately 9:00 p.m. that
evening, a London magistrate issued a provisional warrant for Pinochet's
arrest, 03 which was executed later that same evening at a London clinic where
Pinochet was recovering from surgery.'0" A second provisional warrant was
issued on October 22, 1998 upon application by the Spanish Government. 0 5
Both warrants were quashed on October 28, 1998 by the Divisional Court of
the Queen's Bench Division, the second on the ground that, as former head of

Instead, the law's effect "is limited to proclaiming Spain's jurisdiction for trying offenses defined and
punished in other laws." Moreover the "procedural rule in question applies no unfavorable sanction, nor
does it restrict individual rights." Id. at 99.
100. A more recent decision apparently elevated the importance of links to Spain in cases that
involve crimes committed outside of Spain. In a February 2003 decision, Spain's Supreme Court
suggested that universal jurisdiction should be exercised over genocide only when there is "a direct link
to a national Spanish interest." Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre el caso Guatemala por genocidio
[Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court Concerning the Guatemala Genocide Case], STS, Feb. 25,
2003 (No. 327) (Spain), translated in 42 I.L.M. 686, 701 (2003). The same court apparently further
limited the exercise of universal jurisdiction in Spain in a subsequent decision. In a case involving
alleged genocide in Peru, the court concluded that, in view of the initiation of criminal processes
against several of the accused in Peru, it did not appear necessary for Spanish courts to exercise
universal jurisdiction. Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre el caso Per por genocidio [Judgment of
the Spanish Supreme Court Concerning the Peruvian Genocide Case], STS, May 20, 2003 (No. 712)
(Spain), translatedin 42 I.L.M. 1200, 1206 (2003).
101. By one account, Judge Garz6n learned of Pinochet's presence when he read about it in the
London Guardian. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 345 (1999).

By another,

Garz6n was advised of Pinochet's presence in London by Juan Garcds, a Spanish attorney representing
the private parties who instituted the Spanish criminal investigation. Garc6s reportedly was told of
Pinochet's presence in England by a staff member of the London-based human rights organization
Amnesty International. Telephone Interview with Reed Brody, Advocacy Director, Human Rights
Watch (Mar. 9, 2001). For a somewhat different account that is generally consistent with the second,
see Maria del Carmen Mdrquez Carrasco & Joaquin Alcaide Ferndndez, In re Pinochet, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 690, 692 (1999).
102. See Carrasco & Fernhndez, supra note 101, at 692.
103. In re Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68, 76 (Eng. Q.B. Div'1 Ct. 1999).
104. See Clifford Krauss, Britain Arrests Pinochet to Face Charges by Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1998, § 1, at 1.
105. Pinochet was arrested pursuant to the second provisional warrant on October 23, 1998. While
the first warrant apparently covered only the alleged murder of Spanish citizens in Chile, the second
covered torture, conspiracy to commit torture, offenses involving the taking of hostages, conspiracy to
commit the preceding offenses, and conspiracy to commit murder. Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at
76-77.
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state, Pinochet enjoyed immunity from criminal process o0 in England for the
crimes charged.' 07 The Crown Prosecution Service appealed the ruling to the
House of Lords with the leave of the Divisional Court.' 08 The legal issue
warranting review was certified as "the proper interpretation and scope of the
immunity enjoyed by a former head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom in respect of acts committed while he was head of
state."l 0 9 Just as proceedings began before an appellate committee of the House
of Lords, Judge Garz6n signed a request for the extradition of General Pinochet
to Spain." 0
By the slimmest margin-a majority of three on a panel of five judges-the
appellate committee ruled on November 25, 1998 that Pinochet was not immune in respect of conduct that constitutes an international crime."' It was a
stunning reversal, not only of the Divisional Court's ruling but of deeply rooted
expectations.11 2 The ground rules of international law had been upended by a
judicial panel that epitomized law's conservative ethos.
And then, just as unexpectedly as the ruling itself, the decision (to which I
will refer as Pinochet I) was vacated on January 15, 1999 on the ground that the
appellate committee had been improperly constituted.' '3 One of the judges who
formed the majority in Pinochet I, Lord Hoffman, had failed to disclose that he
was a director of Amnesty International Charitable Trust Ltd. Under the circumstances, this was a significant lapse: Amnesty International had been granted
leave to intervene in the proceedings before the law lords, in effect becoming a

106. For purposes of determining the scope of immunity enjoyed by Pinochet, the arrest and
extradition proceedings in England were treated as criminal proceedings. See id. at 85.
107. The first provisional warrant of arrest was quashed on the ground that the crime charged
therein, which involved the murder of Spanish citizens in Chile, did not constitute an extraditable
offense under British law. See id. at 77. This ruling was not appealed. In a judgment joined by his
colleagues, the Lord Chief Justice wrote that, "were a further objection [to the first provisional warrant]
needed," his conclusion that Pinochet was entitled to immunity with respect to the second provisional
warrant would also apply to the first warrant. Id. at 85.
108. The Divisional Court suspended its quashing of the second warrant pending this appeal.
109. Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 89-90.
110. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 191-92 (H.L. 1999) (opinion of Lord
Browne-Wilkinson). In the words of Lord Slynn of Hadley, the request "set out a large number of
alleged murders, disappearances and cases of torture which, it is said, were in breach of Spanish law
relating to genocide, to torture and to terrorism." R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1), [2000] 1 A.C. 61, 68 (H.L. 1998) (opinion of Lord Slynn), reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 1302, 1305 (1998) [hereinafter Pinochet 1].
Ill. Pinochet 1, [2000] 1 A.C. at 108-10 (opinion of Lord Nicholls), 114-16 (opinion of Lord
Steyn), 116 (opinion of Lord Hoffman).
112. See Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of InternationalLaw, 33 INT'L
L. & POL. 527, 531-32 (2001).
113. R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C.
119 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 430 (1999) [hereinafter Pinochet II]. This reportedly was the
first time in British history that a decision of an appellate committee of the House of Lords had been set
aside. See Warren Hoge, Law Lords Again Hear Arguments on Pinochet, Ir'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 19,
1999.
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party to the appeal."14
In the meantime, on December 9, 1998, Jack Straw, then Home Secretary of
the United Kingdom, had issued an authorization to proceed with the extradition
proceedings against Pinochet. His authorization did not, however, cover two of
the charges that had been submitted by Spain, genocide and terrorism." 5
An expanded appellate committee, now comprising seven law lords, was
assembled to rehear the appeal.1 6 On March 24, 1999, the reconstituted panel
rendered its decision, to which I will refer as Pinochet III. Where Pinochet I had
focused principally on the question of Pinochet's immunity, judges on the
reconstituted appellate committee dwelled at some length on a preliminary
question-whether the charges submitted by Spain constituted extradition crimes
under British law. For reasons explained below, this substantially contracted the
scope of their analysis of Pinochet's immunity from extradition.
C. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AFFIRMED, NARROWLY

It fell to the new panel to make legal history in a case that had scant
connection to England save the fortuitous visit of a foreign official. Ruling that
former Chilean president Augusto Pinochet could be sent to Spain to answer
charges of torture, the reconstituted appellate committee swept centuries of
precedent before it." 7 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the senior judge on the panel,
acknowledged as much:
[I1f Senator Pinochet is not entitled to immunity in relation to [certain] acts of
torture ... , it will be the first time .. . when a local domestic court has
refused to afford immunity to a head of state or former head of state on the
grounds that there can be no immunity against prosecution for certain international crimes." 8
As Lord Browne-Wilkinson saw, the law lords' ruling unsettled core tenets of
international law-or at the very least, their judgments revealed that a seismic
shift had already taken place.

114. See Pinochet II, [2000] 1 A.C. at 133-34 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
115. Spanish law defined genocide more broadly than does international or British law. See
Audencia Nacional Jurisdictional Order, supra note 99, translated at 100-04. Home Secretary Straw
apparently determined that the crime charged against Pinochet under the rubric of genocide did not
constitute an extraditable offense because it did not satisfy the definition of genocide under British law.
Straw's ruling made no mention of terrorism, apparently because there is no parallel crime under
British law. See Richard J. Wilson, ProsecutingPinochet in Spain, 6 HUM. RTs. BR. 3, 4 (1999).
116. By the time the case came before the second appellate committee, the charges submitted by
Spain included conspiracy to torture, conspiracy to take hostages, conspiracy to torture in furtherance
of which murder was committed in various countries, torture, conspiracy to murder in Spain, attempted
murder in Italy, and torture on various occasions. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. 147,
193 (H.L. 1999) (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
117. As noted, there were two separate rulings to this effect. The first, Pinochet I, was vacated and
the case was reheard by the newly constituted and expanded appellate committee.
118. Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. at 201.
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On its face, the first issue addressed in Pinochet III seems to be a hypertechnical question of extradition law. Yet it opened a jurisprudential side door
onto highly contested terrain. Through its consideration of extradition issues,
the law lords indirectly affirmed universal jurisdiction, albeit under narrowly
circumscribed conditions." 9
In the terminology of extradition law, the United Kingdom follows the double
criminality rule: It allows extradition only for conduct that constitutes a crime
under British law as well as under the law of the requesting state. In the view of
the Pinochet III panel, this meant that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain to
face charges for crimes committed beyond Spain's territorialboundaries only if,
at the time those crimes were allegedly committed, it would also have been a
violation of British law to commit the same crimes outside of the United
Kingdom.12 0 Applying this rule, a majority of judges concluded that most of the
torture charges pressed by Spain did not constitute extradition crimes.121

119. Portions of several law lords' judgments addressing Pinochet's immunity in respect of charges
that survived application of the double criminality rule provided further affirmation of universal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. at 198 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson)
(asserting that "[tihe jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture justifies states in taking
universal jurisdiction over torture wherever committed"); id. at 275 (opinion of Lord Millett) (expressing view that "crimes prohibited by international law attract universal jurisdiction under customary
international law" if they are "contrary to a peremptory norm of international law" and "are so serious
and on such a scale that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the international legal order").
120. See id. at 188 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson); id. at 206 (opinion of Lord Goff); id. at
224 (opinion of Lord Hope); id. at 249 (opinion of Lord Hutton); id. at 265 (opinion of Lord Saville,
agreeing with reasoning and conclusions of Lord Browne-Wilkinson on this issue); id. at 268 (opinion
of Lord Millett, agreeing with reasoning and conclusions of Lord Browne-Wilkinson except with
respect to certain aspects of his analysis on immunity issue); id. at 279 (opinion of Lord Phillips,
accepting conclusions of Lord Browne-Wilkinson with respect to application of double-criminality
rule).
By requiring that the conduct must have been criminal under British law at the time it occurred, the
Pinochet III majority interpreted relevant law more narrowly than both the Pinochet I majority and the
Divisional Court. Both assumed that the double criminality rule would be satisfied if extraterritorial
torture were criminal under both British and Spanish law at the time Pinochet's extradition was sought,
even if it had not been criminal under both countries' laws when the alleged torture occurred. See In re
Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68, 79 (Eng. Q.B. Div'1 Ct. 1998); PinochetI, supra note 110, [2000] 1 A.C.
61, 87-88 (opinion of Lord Lloyd). Issues concerning application of the double criminality rule had
assumed larger significance during arguments in Pinochet III than in previous stages of the extradition
proceedings. In its arguments in Pinochet III, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), arguing in support
of the Spanish extradition request, emphasized acts of torture committed before Pinochet became head
of state of Chile. In doing so, the CPS elevated the legal significance of the question whether British
legislation criminalizing extraterritorial torture had retroactive effect. See Michael Byers, The Law and
Politicsof the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 415, 435 (2000).
121. The law lords did not take a uniform approach to this question. While a majority believed that
the torture-related charges constituted extradition crimes only as of September 29, 1988, the date that
extraterritorial torture became a crime under British law, Lord Millett believed that all of the torturerelated charges, as well as the charges relating to offenses in Spain, were extradition crimes. See
Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. at 275-79 (opinion of Lord Millett).
The Spanish charges against Pinochet that were considered in PinochetIII included a single charge of
conspiracy to take hostages as well as charges of conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder.
The law lords concluded that the former charge did not constitute an extradition crime because the
conduct described in the extradition request did not satisfy the statutory definition of hostage-taking
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On this issue, the United Kingdom's ratification of the 1984 Convention
Against Torture and its enactment of implementing legislation in 1988 proved
decisive. Under the terms of the Torture Convention the United Kingdom is
subject to a form of mandatory universal jurisdiction: it must either prosecute or
extradite individuals in its territory who are suspected of certain forms of
criminal responsibility for torture, regardless of where the crime occurred or of
the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. 122 Anticipating the entry into force
of this convention for the United Kingdom on December 8, 1988, the British
Parliament enacted Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which became
effective on September 29, 1988.123 As a result of this law and, in the words of
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, "[a]s required by the Torture Convention 'all' torture
wherever committed world-wide was made criminal under United Kingdom law
and triable in the United Kingdom." 24 This was crucial. Lord BrowneWilkinson explained why: "No one has suggested that before section 134 came
into effect torture committed outside the United Kingdom was a crime under

United Kingdom law."l

25

For most of the law lords constituting the Pinochet III majority, the implications of the 1988 law were unambiguous. If universal jurisdiction struck them as
extraordinary, even ill-considered, this was none of their concern. Even so, the
narrow approach taken by a majority of judges in Pinochet III underscored their
reluctance to accord this principle broad scope.12 6 Out of more than two dozen
draft charges relating to torture submitted by Spain, only three survived the
under British law. See id. at 197 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson); id. at 229-32 (opinion of Lord
Hope). Presumably for similar reasons the British Home Secretary had already declined to authorize
extradition proceedings to proceed against General Pinochet with respect to charges framed in terms of
genocide. See id. at 192 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson); id. at 226 (opinion of Lord Hope). The
law lords' application of the double criminality rule to the murder-related charges against Pinochet
produced mixed results; some of these charges survived application of the rule; others did not. See id. at
232-35, 240-41 (opinion of Lord Hope); id. at 196 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, following
analysis of Lord Hope on this issue); id. at 278-79 (opinion of Lord Phillips, agreeing with Lord
Hope's analysis on this issue generally).
122. Pursuant to Article 5 of the convention, each state party is required to "take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over" acts of torture and certain related offenses when the
offenses are committed in its territorial jurisdiction; when the alleged offender is its national; when the
victim is its national if the state considers it appropriate; and "in cases where the alleged offender is
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him . .. to any of the States
mentioned [in the preceding three categories]." Article 7(1) imposes an obligation on each state party in
whose territory an alleged torturer is found either to extradite him or to "submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." Convention Against Torture, supra note 56, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 45.
123. Section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides: "A public official or person acting in
an official capacity, whatever his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom
or elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or
purported performance of his official duties."
124. Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. at 189 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. In this context, "majority" refers to a majority of the six judges who ruled in favor of cutting
back the scope of Pinochet's immunity as former head of state. While most of the six-judge majority
thought that the extraterritorial torture allegations qualified as extradition crimes only as of September
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narrow application of the double criminality rule endorsed by most of the
judges on the panel.1 2 7 Only when bound by the legal straitjacket of Section 134
of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 did a majority conclude that extraterritorial
torture was an extraditable offense (and, afortiori,an offense punishable in the
United Kingdom).
Having concluded that Spain's request included at least a handful of extradition crimes, the law lords had to determine whether Pinochet could nonetheless
avoid extradition on the ground that he was immune from British legal process
for conduct committed while he was Chile's head of state. In the jargon of
international law, the issue at hand was whether Pinochet enjoyed immunity
ratione materiae, an immunity associated with the nature of particular acts, and
not whether he enjoyed immunity ratione personae, an immunity associated
with an incumbent official's status.128 Because Pinochet was no longer head of
state at the time of the extradition proceedings, he was no longer entitled to the
latter.129
D. FORMER HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY

To read the three British decisions that addressed Pinochet's immunity is to
understand that there was nothing inevitable about the determination that General Pinochet could be extradited to Spain for any crimes allegedly committed
while he was president of Chile. Ultimately, of course, a result was reached: six
members of the seven-judge panel concluded that Pinochet was not immune
from criminal process for charges relating to torture occurring at the very least
after December 8, 1988.130 But this should not obscure the strikingly diverse
29, 1988, Lord Millett believed that all of the draft charges relating to torture submitted by Spain
qualified as extraditable offenses. See supra note 121.
127. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. at 196 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson); id.
at 238-41 (opinion of Lord Hope).
128. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 329-332 (4th ed. 1990). Although

immunity ratione materiae operates alongside immunity ratione personae, the former generally
becomes relevant-or at any rate its relevance becomes apparent-when a foreign defendant's official
status comes to an end and he or she is therefore no longer entitled to claim the broader protections
associated with immunity ratione personae. See J. Craig Barker, The Future of Former Head of State
Immunity After Ex parte Pinochet, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 937, 940 (1999).
129. In dicta all seven judges expressed the view or implicitly assumed that, were Pinochet still
president of Chile, he would be immune from British legal process. See Pinochet III, supra note 63,
[2000] 1 A.C. at 201 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson); id. at 210 (opinion of Lord Goff); id. at 249
(opinion of Lord Hutton); id. at 264 (opinion of Lord Saville); id. at 277 (opinion of Lord Millett); id. at
280 (opinion of Lord Phillips). This view was implicit in the opinion of Lord Hope. See id. at 240.
This view was affirmed in a subsequent judgment of the International Court of Justice. In a decision
rendered in February 2002, the Court ruled that Belgium had violated international law by issuing an
international arrest warrant in absentia in respect of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo on charges relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14), at 1 70, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe-ijudgment_20020214.PDF. In dictum, the Court indicated that the same rule would apply in respect of an incumbent foreign head of
state. See id. 58.
130. See infra note 143 and text accompanying notes 139-49.
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approaches taken by the seven judges in Pinochet 111.131
Two flukes of impenetrable draftsmanship made this divergence more likely
than would have been the case had British law provided a clear rule of decision.
The most pertinent British law is a study in ambiguous meaning. The crucial
text is found in Article 20(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978:
Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary modifications,
the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to(a) a sovereign or other head of state;
as it applies to a head of a diplomatic mission ....
The 1964 Act mentioned in this provision incorporates the immunities enjoyed
by diplomatic envoys pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.1 32 The law lords thus had to determine what "necessary modifications" to those immunities Parliament had in mind with respect to former
foreign heads of state.' 3 3
This required an interpretive leap, for the text from which the judges had to
extrapolate was not readily adapted to address former heads of state. The most
pertinent provision, Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, provides:

131. See Barker, supra note 128, at 937; Eileen Denza, Ex parte Pinochet: Lacuna or Leap?, 48
& COMP. L.Q. 949, 952-53 (1999).
132. The law lords interpreted these provisions in light of customary international law. See Pinochet
III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. at 203 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (asserting that Parliament
"cannot have intended to give heads of state and former heads of state greater rights than they already
enjoyed under international law"); id. at 209-10 (opinion of Lord Goff) (asserting that the immunity of
a head of state under the State Immunity Act 1978 should "be construed as far as possible to accord
with his immunity at customary international law"); id. at 240 (opinion of Lord Hope) (asserting that
key provision of State Immunity Act 1978 gave "statutory force in the United Kingdom to customary
international law as to the immunity which heads of state, and former heads of state in particular, enjoy
from proceedings in foreign national courts"); id. at 240 (opinion of Lord Hutton) (expressing view that
relevant provision of State Immunity Act 1978 "gave statutory form to the relevant principle of
international law"); id. at 266-67 (opinion of Lord Saville) (concluding that key provision of State
Immunity Act of 1978 gave "statutory force" to "international law immunities"); id. at 270 (opinion of
Lord Millett) (observing that "any narrow statutory immunity is subsumed in the wider immunity ...
under customary international law"); id. at 279 (opinion of Lord Phillips) (affirming that if the State
Immunity Act 1978 "governs it must be interpreted, so far as possible, in a manner which accords with
public international law").
133. The ambiguity of Article 20(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 was manifestly maddening for
several judges, who might wish to have been spared altogether the task of having to rule on such a
politically charged question as the immunity of General Pinochet. Commenting on the textual ambiguity of this provision, Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed: "It is hard to resist the suspicion that something
has gone wrong." Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. at 203 (opinion of Lord BrowneWilkinson).
INT'L
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When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have
come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall cease at the moment
when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do
so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However,
with respect to acts performed by such person in the exercise of his functions
as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.
With some difficulty, a majority of law lords concluded that the "necessary modifications" would amend this text to read, in effect: "a former head of state has immunity
in relation to acts done as part of his official functions when head of state."l 3 4
Having identified the relevant test, the judges had to determine its meaning.
When it comes to the immunity of a former head of state, what conduct
constitutes "part of his official functions"? It was this question, above all, that
lay at the heart of the British judicial proceedings. By its nature, the question
required British jurists to draw a line. On one side would fall official conduct
beyond the scrutiny of foreign courts; on the other would fall conduct that could
be subject to British criminal process even though the defendant was head of
another sovereign state when the acts occurred.
In view of the enormity of the stakes attaching to this issue, one might have
expected helpful guidance in relevant law. Yet nothing could be farther from the
reality confronting the British jurists. Presented with a question of first impression, they had to resolve profoundly consequential issues with scant guidance
from drafting history or judicial precedent. The result was a jurisprudential
jumble.
134. Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] I A.C. at 203 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
Although the language quoted in the text comes from the opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in
Pinochet III, other Lords adopted substantially similar formulations. See, e.g., Pinochet 1, supra note
110, [2000] 1 A.C. 61, 73 (H.L. 1998) (opinion of Lord Slynn) ("The question then arises as to what
can constitute acts (i.e. official acts) in the exercise of his functions as Head of State."); id. at 108
(opinion of Lord Nicholls) ("[T]he effect of these provisions can be expressed thus: 'A former head of
state shall continue to enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the United Kingdom with
respect to acts performed by him in the exercise of his functions as a head of state."'); id. at 114
(opinion of Lord Steyn) ("[M]y view is that Section 20 of the 1978 Act . .. should be read as providing
that a former Head of State shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
with respect to his official acts performed in the exercise of his functions as Head of State."); Pinochet
III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. at 210 (opinion of Lord Goff) ("The effect is that a head of state will,
under the statute as at international law, enjoy state immunity ratione personae so long as he is in office,
and after he ceases to hold office will enjoy the concomitant immunity ratione materiae 'in respect of
acts performed [by him] in the exercise of his functions [as head of state]."'); id. at 241 (opinion of
Lord Hope) ("The test is whether they were private acts on the one hand or governmental acts done in
the exercise of his authority as head of state on the other."); id. at 250 (opinion of Lord Hutton,
adopting above-quoted formulation of Lord Nicholls); id. at 265 (opinion of Lord Saville) ("[1]n
general . .. a former head of state does enjoy immunity from criminal proceedings in other countries in
respect of what he did in his official capacity as head of state. In my judgment the effect of Section
20(1)(a) of the State Immunity Act 1978 is to give statutory force to these international law immunities."). Lord Phillips interpreted Section 20(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 more narrowly than
other judges. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. at 292 (opinion of Lord Phillips)
(interpreting Section 20(1) to confer immunity on foreign heads of state only in respect of conduct in
the United Kingdom).
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At one extreme, the Divisional Court treated the scope of Pinochet's immunity as virtually absolute. Responding to the argument of the Crown Prosecution
Service that the functions of a head of state cannot include the acts charged, the
Lord Chief Justice asked rhetorically, "If the former sovereign is immune from
process in respect of some crimes, where does one draw the line?"I 3 5 In
sweeping terms, he concluded that Pinochet "is entitled to immunity as a former
sovereign from the criminal and civil process of the English courts."' 3 6
But the point was hardly as plain to the first committee that rendered
judgment on appeal. Two law lords concluded that Pinochet was entitled to
claim immunity in relation to all of the acts charged in the second provisional
warrant of arrest, however odious.' 37 Three others took a profoundly different
approach. In their view, Pinochet's immunity ratione materiaedid not extend to
conduct outlawed by international law.13 8
A broader range of views is represented in the crucial ruling of March 24,
1999. Now, only a single member of the seven-judge committee believed that
135. In re Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68, 83 (Eng. Q.B. Div'1 Ct. 1998) (opinion of the Lord Chief
Justice).
136. Id. at 85. The other judges on the three-judge bench agreed with the conclusions of the Lord
Chief Justice. See id. at 85 (judgment of Justice Collins); id. at 86 (judgment of Justice Richards).
137. Lord Slynn concluded that the acts alleged against Pinochet "were done as part of the carrying
out of his functions when he was Head of State," Pinochet 1, [2000] 1 A.C. at 74 (opinion of Lord
Slynn), but this did not end his inquiry. He identified narrow circumstances, which he concluded were
not present in the case before him, in which the broad immunity normally enjoyed by former heads of
state would be diminished. See id. at 74-79 (opinion of Lord Slynn). Lord Lloyd likewise concluded
that the acts charged against the former Chilean president were committed "in a sovereign capacity and
not in a personal or private capacity," id. at 95 (opinion of Lord Lloyd), and that Pinochet was "entitled
to immunity as former head of state in respect of the crimes alleged against him on well established
principles of customary international law," id. at 98 (opinion of Lord Lloyd). Lord Lloyd recognized,
however, that a former head of state could be prosecuted abroad if "his own country waives state
immunity." Id. at 104 (opinion of Lord Lloyd).
138. In the view of Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman, a former head of state enjoys immunity only
"in respect of acts performed in the exercise of functions which international law recognises as
functions of a head of state, irrespective of the terms of his domestic constitution." And "international
law has made plain that certain types of conduct, including torture and hostage-taking, are not
acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as it
does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international law." [2000] 1
A.C. at 109 (opinion of Lord Nicholls). Lord Hoffmann did not write a separate opinion except to state
that he would allow the appeal for the reasons given by Lord Nicholls. Id. at 118 (opinion of Lord
Hoffman).
Lord Steyn, too, rejected the Divisional Court's approach, which in his view implied "that there is no
or virtually no line to be drawn." This, he reasoned, was unacceptable, for the very "concept of an
individual acting in his capacity as Head of State . . . invites classification of the circumstances of a
case as falling on a particular side of the line." In Lord Steyn's view,
the development of international law since the Second World War justifies the conclusion that
by the time of the 1973 coup d'etat [in Chile], and certainly ever since, international law
condemned genocide, torture, hostage taking and crimes against humanity . .. as international
crimes deserving of punishment. Given this state of international law, it seems to me difficult
to maintain that the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts performed in the
exercise of the functions of a Head of State.
Id. at 115 (opinion of Lord Steyn).
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Pinochet was entitled to virtually absolute immunity from the charges pressed
by Spain.' 3 9 At the other end of the spectrum, Lord Phillips doubted whether
customary law provided former heads of state immunity ratione materiae from
criminal process in general,1 4 0 much less for international crimes. 14 In his
view, the Convention Against Torture confirmed what international law already
established-that "no immunity could exist ratione materiae in respect of
torture, a crime contrary to international law."' 4 2
For present purposes, it is useful to highlight two points that loom large in the
law lords' analysis: the decisive impact of the Convention Against Torture and,
ironically, that treaty's textual silence on the all-important question of head of
state immunity.
The Convention Against Torture played a key role in the analysis of the law
lords who ruled that Pinochet could no longer claim immunity ratione materiae
in relation to charges of alleged torture occurring after December 8, 1988 at the
latest;14 3 for some, it was decisive. Although their reasoning varied,'" the
139. Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. at 206-24 (opinion of Lord Goff). Lord Goff concluded that this
immunity could be overcome through waiver in a treaty only when the waiver is express. See id. at 215,
217 (opinion of Lord Goff). In his view, the Convention Against Torture did not abrogate the immunity
ratione materiae accorded heads of state under international law. See id. at 217-22 (opinion of Lord
Goff).
140. Id. at 205 (opinion of Lord Phillips).
141. Id. at 289 (opinion of Lord Phillips).
142. Id. at 290 (opinion of Lord Phillips). Lord Phillips identified an alternative interpretation of the
legal effect of the Torture Convention-that "States Parties ... expressly agreed that immunity ratione
materiae should not apply in the case of torture." Id. In his view, either one of these interpretations
"must be fatal to the assertion by Chile and Senator Pinochet of immunity in respect of extradition
proceedings based on torture." Id.
143. Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Saville explicitly concluded that Pinochet's immunity ratione
materiae ended as of December 8, 1988, when the United Kingdom's ratification of the Torture
Convention entered into effect (the convention having already entered into force for Spain and Chile).
Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. at 200 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson); id. at 265 (opinion of Lord
Saville). Lord Hutton seemed to agree. See id. at 249 (opinion of Lord Hutton) (observing that since
December 8, 1988 Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom agreed with each other that their former heads
of state cannot claim immunity ratione materiae in respect of alleged official torture). Lord Hope
thought that the effective date for loss of immunity should be October 30, 1988, the date that Chile's
ratification became effective, but was willing to accept the view of Lord Saville that the effective date
was December 8, 1988. See id. at 224 (opinion of Lord Hope).
144. The Convention Against Torture was the pivot on which the opinions of Lord BrowneWilkinson and Lord Saville turned. See Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. at 266 (opinion of Lord Saville);
infra text accompanying notes 145-149 (discussing opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson). For other law
lords constituting the Pinochet III majority, the interplay between customary international law and the
Torture Convention was more complex. Lord Hope treated the Torture Convention as decisive, but
apparently only in respect of torture committed on a scale that would amount to crimes against
humanity under customary international law. In his view, once the Torture Convention put in place the
machinery of extraterritorial jurisdiction over torture, "it was no longer open to any state which was a
signatory to the Convention to invoke the immunity ratione materiae in the event of allegations of
systematic or widespread torture committed after that date being made in the courts of that state against
its officials." [2000] 1 A.C. at 248 (opinion of Lord Hope). Lord Hutton expressed the view that "acts
of torture were clearly crimes against international law" and "that the prohibition of torture had
acquired the status of ius cogens" by September 29, 1988, the date that Section 134 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 came into force. [2000] 1 A.C. at 260 (opinion of Lord Hutton). After that date and

2004]

WHOSE JUSTICE?

1085

opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson best illustrates the central importance of the
treaty to the outcome of PinochetIII.
In Lord Browne-Wilkinson's view, the Torture Convention would be nonsensical if former heads of state could claim immunity from prosecution outside
their state of nationality on charges of torture. Crucial to his reasoning, Article 1
of the convention defines torture "as the intentional infliction of severe pain and
of suffering with a view to achieving a wide range of purposes 'when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity."' 1 4 5 Clearly, in Lord Browne-Wilkinson's view, "the acts alleged against
Senator Pinochet, if proved, were acts done by a public official or person acting
in an official capacity within the meaning of Article 1."l146 This conclusion did
not by itself resolve the question of Pinochet's immunity, 4 7 but Lord BrowneWilkinson thought it inconceivable that the Torture Convention would on the
one hand define torture in a manner that required official action and on the other
hand exempt from prosecution the official "most responsible" for torture "while
his inferiors (the chiefs of police, junior army officers) who carried out his
orders will be liable."1 4 8 Further-and, for Lord Browne-Wilkinson, "decisively"-"if the implementation of a torture regime is a public function giving
rise to immunity ratione materiae, this produces bizarre results." He explained:

"[hiaving regard to the ... Torture Convention," Lord Hutton concluded that acts of torture could not
be considered "functions of the head of state." Id. at 262 (opinion of Lord Hutton). Lord Millett
believed that "the systematic use of torture on a large scale and as an instrument of state policy" was an
"international crime of universal jurisdiction well before 1984"; in his view, it was such a crime "by
1973." Id. at 276 (opinion of Lord Millett). Lord Millett implied that General Pinochet therefore could
not claim immunity ratione materiae in respect of such crimes. See id. at 279 (opinion of Lord Millett)
("For my own part, I would allow the appeal in respect of the charges relating to . .. torture ...
wherever and whenever carried out."). Even so, Lord Millett's key ruling concerning immunity
arguably-but not unambiguously-rested upon the Torture Convention. In his view, the definition of
torture in the convention itself as well as in Section 134 of the 1988 legislation is "entirely inconsistent
with the existence of a plea of immunity ratione materiae." Id. at 277 (opinion of Lord Millett). Yet
Lord Millett went on to suggest that, even apart from the Torture Convention, international law
established official torture as "an offence for which immunity ratione materiae could not possibly be
available." Id. at 278 (opinion of Lord Millett). As noted, Lord Phillips doubted whether customary law
provided former heads of state immunity ratione materiae in respect of any criminal conduct and in any
event did "not believe that state immunity ratione materiae can co-exist with" international crimes; in
his view, torture is a crime under "international law." Id. at 289 (opinion of Lord Phillips). Recognizing,
however, that British courts had jurisdiction over torture committed outside the United Kingdom only
as a result of Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, which gave effect to the United Kingdom's
obligations under the Torture Convention, Lord Phillips concluded that the treaty is "incompatible with
the applicability of immunity ratione materiae." Id. (opinion of Lord Phillips). In somewhat different
ways, then, the conclusions of these four judges rested upon both customary and treaty law.
145. Id. at 199 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (quoting Convention Against Torture, supra
note 56, art. 1).
146. Id. at 200 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
147. See id. ("To my mind the fact that a head of state can be guilty of the crime [of torture, as
defined in the Convention Against Torture] casts little, if any, light on the question whether he is
immune from prosecution for that crime in a foreign state.").
148. Id. at 205 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
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Immunity ratione materiae applies not only to ex-heads of state and exambassadors but to all state officials who have been involved in carrying out
the functions of the state. ... Under the Convention the international crime of
torture can only be committed by an official or someone in an official
capacity. They would all be entitled to immunity. It would follow that there
can be no case outside Chile in which a successful prosecution for torture can
be brought unless the State of Chile is prepared to waive its right to its
officials['] immunity. Therefore the whole elaborate structure of universal
jurisdiction over torture committed by officials is rendered abortive and one
of the main objectives of the Torture Convention-to provide a system under
which there is no safe haven for torturers-will have been frustrated. In my
judgment all these factors together demonstrate that the notion of continued
immunity for ex-heads of state is inconsistent with the provisions of the

Torture Convention.1 4 9

Although the Torture Convention was crucial to the outcome of Pinochet III, the
treaty is textually silent about head of state immunity. Further, as Lord Goff
observed, "nothing in the negotiating history of the Torture Convention ...
throws any light on the proposed .. . term" implicitly waiving Pinochet's immunity ratione materiae.5 0 To the contrary, Lord Goff continued, "the travaux
preparatoires shown to your Lordships reveal no trace of any consideration
being given to waiver of state immunity."' 5 '
E. THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS ...

THAT WERE OMITTED FROM THE TEXT

In light of the profound repercussions of PinochetIII, it is difficult to read its
seven opinions without wondering: Is this any way to make law? Significant

ambiguities surrounded two laws that were crucial in determining Pinochet's
immunity, the State Immunities Act 1978 and the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture. Forced to resolve a question as consequential as whether
the United Kingdom could subject the former head of Chile to criminal process,
British courts had to render judgment with few signposts to guide them.
That a question of this order should not be left to be resolved in the crucible
of a criminal prosecution seems plain. What, then, could account for the failure
of the Convention Against Torture even to address this question? Since the
preparatory work is as silent as the text itself, we can only speculate. But it
seems plausible that the drafters did not focus on this issue because they had
difficulty imagining that the treaty would actually be enforced through universal
jurisdiction.15 2 After all, half a century elapsed before states began to implement
their obligation to prosecute or hand over for trial in another country persons
149. Id.
150. Id. at 219 (opinion of Lord Goff).
151. Id.
152. Universal jurisdiction is not the only, or even the principal, means of criminal enforcement
contemplated by the Convention Against Torture. The treaty assumes that jurisdiction is most likely to
be exercised by (1) the state where the offenses were committed; (2) the state whose national is
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suspected of ordering or committing "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on the laws of war,' 5 3 the most important precedent for the system
of mandatory universal jurisdiction established by the Torture Convention.1 54
In larger perspective, until the 1990s the dominant model for enforcing
post-Nuremberg international criminal law was punishment by national courts
in the territory where the crimes occurred. This approach is exemplified in the
1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,' 5 5 the first postwar treaty designed to transform Nuremberg's lesson in
individual responsibility from a precept of victors' justice into a rule of universal law. Delegates who participated in drafting the Genocide Convention declined to include a provision for universal jurisdiction' 5 6 even though the treaty
"confirm[s] that genocide . .. is a crime under international law."' 5 7 Instead,
Contracting Parties are supposed to punish genocide principally in the territory
where the crime occurred. 5 8

suspected of committing torture; and (3) the state of nationality of the victim of torture. See Convention
Against Torture, supra note 56, art. 5.
153. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 8 (1996) (stating that the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House
of Representatives "has been informed that there has never been a single case of a signatory country to
the Geneva conventions exercising its own criminal jurisdiction over an alleged war criminal on the
basis of universal jurisdiction"). Although this statement was largely true at the time the committee
report was issued, some countries had already exercised universal jurisdiction over war crimes. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. N.N., High Court (Ostre Landsrets) 3d Division (Nov. 25, 1994) (Den.) (conviction
of Bosnian Muslim by Danish High Court for torturing detainees in Bosnian prison camp in 1993;
jurisdiction had been based on grave breaches provisions of Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of
1949 in conjunction with Article 8(5) of Danish Penal Code); see also REDRESS REPORT, supra note 7, at
41-42 (summarizing prosecution before Swiss Military Tribunal of Bosnian arrested in Geneva in 1995
on war crimes charges; although defendant was acquitted because of the "confused evidence and
testimonies at the trial," the Swiss Military Tribunal affirmed its authority to exercise universal
jurisdiction over war crimes). Since 1996, a number of other prosecutions have been instituted on the
basis of the mandatory universal jurisdiction provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See
generally AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 11.

155. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
156. See NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: ITS ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION 13-14
(1949).
157. Genocide Convention, supra note 155, art. I.
158. Article VI of the Genocide Convention, supra note 155, provides:
Persons charged with genocide . .. shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
No international tribunal with jurisdiction over genocide was established until 1993, when the United
Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). See S.C. Res. 827 (1993). The ICTY is not, however, an "international penal tribunal"
established by "Contracting Parties which ... have accepted its jurisdiction" as contemplated by Article
VI of the Genocide Convention. Indeed, immediately following the ICTY's creation, the government of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-whose nationals would be subject to the Tribunal's jurisdictionrejected its authority. See FRY Opposes Setting Up of War Crime Tribunal Exclusively for Yugoslavia,
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In light of this approach, it is hardly surprising that diplomats who drafted the
Genocide Convention settled on language that might now seem overly ambiguous. Some measure of ambiguity could actually facilitate the treaty's adaptation
to national legal systems of diverse states.' 59 And since the drafters envisaged
that the Genocide Convention would be enforced primarily through territorial
jurisdiction, disparities in national legislation defining genocide would be no
more troubling than variations among national laws defining assault and bat-

tery.160
In contrast to the Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture
explicitly provides for universal jurisdiction.16' How, then, could its drafters
have overlooked such basic questions as whether defendants could successfully
plead official immunity? The most likely answer lies in the drafters' expectations. Geoffrey Robertson, a barrister (later appointed judge on an internationalized courtl 6 2 ) who participated in the Pinochet litigation in London, suggests
that the Torture Convention "was ratified as another exercise in cynical diplomacy, without any belief that it would be enforced."l 6 3 As noted, states had long
grown accustomed to non-enforcement of the universal jurisdiction provisions
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Why should it be any different with the
Torture Convention? And yet, as Robertson writes,

BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May 27, 1993.

159. The travaux prdparatoires of the Genocide Convention include numerous statements reflecting
the drafters' assumption that this treaty would be enforced primarily on a territorial basis and that its
terms should therefore be readily adaptable to diverse legal systems. For example, the Swedish
representative to the Ad Hoc Committee, which prepared the second draft of the Genocide Convention,
observed:
The discussion at the beginning of the meeting seems to me to have shown that the
significance of the terms corresponding to the French and English expressions here in
question-incitement, conspiracy, attempt, complicity, etc.-is subject to certain variations in
many systems of criminal law represented here. When these expressions have to be translated
in order to introduce the text of the Convention into our different criminal codes in other
languages, it will no doubt be necessary to resign ourselves to the fact that certain differences
in meaning are inevitable ....
Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm.,
3d Sess., at 4 n.*, U.N. Doc. A/760 (1948).
160. In fact, flexibility in the text of a multilateral treaty can facilitate its adaptation to the legal
cultures of diverse States Parties. See generally Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga:A Comparative
and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
161. Universal jurisdiction has a somewhat distinct meaning in the context of treaties like the
Convention Against Torture, which authorize and require States Parties-not all states-to prosecute
individuals in their territorial jurisdiction suspected of having committed specified crimes.
162. In July 2002, Robertson was appointed to serve on the five-member appeals chamber of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which was jointly established by the United Nations and the
government of Sierra Leone. See U.N. News Centre, Annan, Sierra Leone Appoint Experienced Judges
for Country's Special War Crimes Court, at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=4291
(July 25, 2002).
163. ROBERTSON, supra note 101, at 370.
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[W]hat nobody could have anticipated is that the English judges would
approach this treaty as if it were a contract or a parliamentary statute, without
a trace of the scepticism that affects anyone who knows with what hypocrisy
these conventions are drafted and ratified, by diplomats who never intend
them to have any effect beyond inducing a feel-good factor and a good human
rights rating to waive in front of aid donors. ... With uncanny, uncynical
decency, [the judges] took the Torture Convention to mean what it said.'"
Now on notice that treaties like the Convention Against Torture may be
enforced in accordance with their terms, governments will doubtless take quite
seriously any new commitments they may undertake in respect of universal or
international jurisdiction.' 6 5 And this is likely to inspire more concerted efforts
to clarify states' undertakings when drafting treaty text.
Indeed, a newly serious regard for textual clarity was brought to bear in
preparations for the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). After adopting the Court's statute at a diplomatic conference in July 1998,166 representatives of states met periodically for four years to draft ground rules for the Court.
One of their central tasks was to draft detailed elements of crimes committed to
the Court's jurisdiction.' 6 7 Where judges serving on precursor tribunals had to
work out the meaning of their respective charters case by case, ICC judges will
be guided by a detailed enumeration of the elements of crimes charged before
the Court.' 68
IV. JUDGE-MADE LAw ACROSS BORDERS

But if heightened regard for textual clarity in future treaty-drafting exercises
can alleviate the challenges that bedeviled British law lords, no text can

164. Id.
165. Here (as elsewhere), I use the term universaljurisdiction to refer to the exercise of jurisdiction
by national courts over crimes committed in another state, regardless of the nationality of the
perpetrator or victim, and use the phrase internationaljurisdictionto refer to the exercise of jurisdiction
by an international tribunal.
166. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998), as corrected by the procds-verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998 and July 12, 1999, reprinted in 39 I.L.M.
999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
167. See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, pt. II,
Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). The
elements were adopted by the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC during its first session in
September 2002. See Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, FirstSession, Official Records, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, Pt. II(B) (2002).
168. The first judges of the ICC were sworn into office on March 11, 2003. See Marlise Simons,
World Courtfor Crimes of War Opens in the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at Al0. The Court's
Prosecutor was selected on April 21, 2003, see Associated Press, War Crimes Tribunal Picks Head
Prosecutor,N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 21, 2003, and took office on June 16, 2003, see Associated Press,
War Crimes ProsecutorVows Impartiality,N.Y. TIMEs ONLINE, June 16, 2003.
169. Under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, work is progressing
on a draft convention on enforced disappearance. Such a treaty appears likely to include provisions
establishing universal jurisdiction. See Report Submitted by Mr Manfred Nowak, Independent Expert
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eliminate ambiguity altogether.o7 0 Moreover, treaties already in force that establish a basis for exercising universal jurisdiction are unlikely to be amended with
the aim of banishing textual ambiguities.' 7 1 Thus judges who may be called
upon to decide cases based on universal jurisdiction will inevitably participate
in law-making through adjudication.
It is, of course, commonplace for judges to interpret unclear laws. When a
law is ambiguous (as most are when applied to facts that stretch beyond the
field of coverage foreseen by legislatorsl 7 2 ), the judge's task inevitably shades
into lawmaking. As Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo observed, "judgemade law" is "one of the existing realities of life."' 73
In this Part, I take up the question, when and why should this trouble us? This
inquiry begins by recalling the reasons why judicial lawmaking has been faulted
by some writers in the context of purely national proceedings and then considers how the concerns they raise are addressed in democratic societies. In brief,
the continuous interaction among judges, other institutions of government, and
society at large operates in myriad ways to ensure the democratic accountability
of courts.
This inquiry brings into sharper focus the reasons why universal jurisdiction
presents special challenges to principles of self-government and judicial accountability. The central issue is not, as some critics have suggested, that international law is inherently vague.17 4 While Part III highlighted ambiguities in the
Convention Against Torture, there is no reason to suppose that treaties are
generally more vague than domestic legislation.' 75 Crucially, however, ambiguous domestic laws are normally enforced by judges who are fellow citizens of
those whom they judge-and this provides a vital resource for establishing the
democratic legitimacy of their lawmaking role. The more important question,
then, is whether adequate legitimating resources are available in a transnational
setting.17
Charged with Examining the Existing International Criminal and Human Rights Frameworkfor the
Protection of Persons from Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of
Commission Resolution 2001/46, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/71, 1 96-97, 100; U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, Inter-Sessional Open-Ended Working Group to Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding
Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Working Paper,
3d Sess., arts. 9-11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/WG.22/WP.2 (FUTURE) (2004), available at http://
www.ohchr.org/english/issues/docs/wp2_en.doc.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 172, 185-188.
171. Cf Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 29, at 49-50 (arguing that even the Convention Against
Torture, which addresses one of "the most clearly defined of international crimes," is subject to
divergent interpretations).
172. Cf Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1580
(1988) (noting that "in most cases that are contested vigorously enough to require judicial resolution,
reasonable arguments based upon the text can be made on either side").
173. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 10 (1921).
174. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
175. If anything, the more ambiguous law at issue in the Pinochet proceedings in England was the
United Kingdom's State Immunity Act 1978. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
176. Building upon the analysis developed in this Part, I explore this question in Part IV.
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A. JUDICIAL LAWMAKING INNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS 177
1. The Democratic Critique of Judge-Made Law
Judicial lawmaking has been faulted on two principal grounds. First, there is
the risk that the immediate application of a judge-made rule may effectively
impose law retroactively. While this is troubling in civil cases' 78 as well as in
criminal proceedings, it is especially problematic in the latter. It should be
noted, however, that the proceedings against General Pinochet in England did
not implicate this concern. If Pinochet was astonished to learn that he did not
enjoy lifelong immunity outside Chile, he could hardly plead lack of notice that
torture is a crime. In fact, Chile ratified the Convention Against Torture-the
law that proved pivotal in the British law lords' determination that Pinochet was
not wholly immune from legal process-during Pinochet's presidency.' 7 9 Still,
this concern could come into play if a national court asserted jurisdiction over a
foreign visitor under an idiosyncratic interpretation of international criminal
law. 8 0
The second set of challenges centers on the claim that judge-made law is
fundamentally undemocratic. As framed by some writers, this challenge proceeds from the notion that the legislature is the pre-eminent arena for selfgovernment, at least after a country's constitution has been adopted.' 8 ' From

177. For immediate purposes, "national proceedings" refers to judicial cases involving the interpretation of a national law that has an exclusively domestic application by judges of the same country that
enacted the law.
178. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 84 (1977).
179. Chile's ratification of the Convention Against Torture became effective on October 30, 1988.
See supra note 143. Pinochet was president of Chile from 1973 to 1990.
180. This is not a hypothetical concern. The Spanish magistrate who indicted General Pinochet
charged him with genocide as well as other offenses. The British Home Secretary declined to authorize
extradition for this charge, apparently because Spain's definition of genocide was broader than that
followed in the United Kingdom. See supra note 115.
181. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479,
1498-99 (1987) (summarizing what Eskridge calls a formalist view of Supreme Court's proper role
when it comes to statutory interpretation, which rests upon the premise that all lawmaking power
resides in Congress); Barry Friedman, Dialogueand JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 588 (1993)
(characterizing prevalent view to the effect that "[i]n our system the best reflection of ... majority will
is thought to be legislative judgment"); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimation in Statutory Interpretation,108 HARV. L. REv. 593, 594 (1995) (describing the "canonical"
commitment of "our legal culture[]" to the notion of legislative supremacy); Steven L. Winter, An
Upside/Down View of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 69 Thx. L. REv. 1881, 1925 (noting the
"conventional concern ... that judges will impose their values in contravention of the policy choices of
democratically elected legislatures"). Some versions of the democracy critique of judicial review
include Executive action along with legislation among the measures taken by representative branches of
government that are due judicial deference. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 16-17 (2d ed. 1986) (asserting that "when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
people of the here and now"); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9
(1982) (contrasting the U.S. Supreme Court, "which designedly is not accountable to the electorate,"
with elected representatives and non-elected officials whose term of appointment ensures some measure
of public accountability); Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the PoliticalBranches: Democratic
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this premise the critique derives its core claim: Judges who effectively modify
or invalidate legislation undermine democratic principles by substituting their
own preferences for statutes enacted by the elected representatives of "the

people."'

82

Although this claim continues to shape the aspirations and rhetoric of judges,18 3
scholars and jurists have long questioned key assumptions behind the democracy critique. Understanding its flaws helps us see when and why the peculiar
brand of judicial lawmaking at play in Pinochet may challenge democratic
values and, just as important, when such concerns are misplaced.
Challenges to the democracy critique begin with the claim that it rests upon
an impoverished understanding of textual meaning. Some conservative approaches to judicial interpretation assume that legal codes have an objective
meaning, affixed at the moment they were enacted into law and persisting
across time.18 4 In this view, the judge's role is to ascertain and then apply that
meaning to the dispute before her. A rich literature on the philosophy and
jurisprudence of interpretation suggests why this view is flawed: In law as in
literature, text is the beginning of meaning, not its end.' 85 Some laws are, to be
sure, capable of only one plausible interpretation. How many ways, after all,
can one interpret a provision setting the minimum age for marriage at eighteen
years? But when it comes to text prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishment"or, for that matter, "torture"-it would be nonsensical to insist there is a single,
determinate meaning.' 8 6
Besides, legislators cannot anticipate every possible application of a law;
sometimes they deliberately draft laws ambiguously. 8 7 Gaps in coverage nor-

Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 811 (1974) (noting that when federal courts "declare
unconstitutional legislative, executive or administrative action, they reject the product of the popular
will").
182. Alexander Bickel famously framed the central problem this way: "The root difficulty is that
judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system." BICKEL, supra note 181, at 16. Judge
Robert Bork makes a stronger claim in the context of U.S. constitutional principles. "The Constitution,"
he argues, "preserves our liberties by providing that all of those given the authority to make policy are
directly accountable to the people through regular elections... . [Judges] are, as they must be to
perform their vital role, unelected, unaccountable, and unrepresentative. . . ." ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ThMPTING OF AMERICA 4-5 (1990).
Although constitutional scholars and others have debated the role of judicial review throughout
American history, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43, 70 (1989), Bickel's seminal work spawned a new generation of scholarship addressing the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty." As the following discussion makes clear, the constitutional issues
captured in this phrase represent an important subset of the broader democracy critique developed in
this Part.
183. See Schacter, supra note 181, at 598-99.
184. See Eskridge, supra note 181, at 1480.
185. Here I am paraphrasing Paul Kahn's recapitulation of Robert Cover's position, as elaborated in
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 11
(1983); Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary ConstitutionalTheory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 60 (1989).
186. See supra note 171.
187. Legislation may be ambiguous for a raft of reasons, including legislators' desire to reach
consensus on language vague enough to satisfy conflicting factions. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
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mally widen as time passes and circumstances change. When this happens,
judges must determine how a law enacted perhaps half a century ago should be
applied to facts the lawmakers could not have foreseen.' 8 8 Even civil law
countries, which have a strong commitment to the primacy of legislation,
recognize that the judge's role cannot be confined to a search for legislative
intent when a statute is anachronistic or fails clearly to cover the dispute at
hand.' 8 9 The question, then, is not whether judges may bring interpretive skills
to bear in their work: they must. In view of the inevitability of judicial
lawmaking, the core question is how to ensure its accountability and, thereby,
its democratic legitimacy.' 90
Writing in a domestic setting, a wide range of scholars have tackled this
question by challenging another key premise of the democracy critique-the
view that laws enacted by elected representatives are more democratic than
judgments rendered by courts.' 9 ' Their arguments, several key strands of which
are briefly noted below,19 2 provide a compelling rejoinder to classic critiques of
judge-made law. Yet by emphasizing the relationship between judges and the
societies in which they are embedded, those same arguments tend to reinforce
concerns underlying the conservative critique of universal jurisdiction.
2. The Role of Judgment in Democratic Societies
A major stream of scholarship responding to the democratic critique of
judge-made law challenges its core premise: that the political branches of
government are more representative of majority will, and thus more democratic,
than the judiciary. 193 As ideologically diverse scholars have argued, this premise

Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L.
REv. 275, 288 (1988).
188. See Eskridge, supra note 181, at 1480; Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critiqueof Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1983).
189. See Eskridge, supra note 181, at 1503-05.
190. For a helpful explication of distinct aspects of democratic accountability in this context, see
Jane S. Schacter, Accounting for Accountability in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, 3
IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 5 (2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art5. See also Seidman,
supra note 172, at 1574-79 (discussing the meaning of "accountability" as applied to judges and the
difficulty of holding them "politically accountable to majority sentiment").
191. See Winter, supra note 181, at 1920.
192. This account does not attempt, proverbially, even to scratch the surface of scholarship addressing the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," see supra note 181, which is truly vast. Indeed, scholars
writing on the subject routinely acknowledge that they join generations of constitutional scholars who
have been preoccupied-if not consumed-by the perceived need to reconcile judicial review with
democratic principles. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman,
Birth of an Academic Obsession]; Choper, supra note 181, at 810; Seidman, Ambivalence and
Accountability, supra note 172, at 1573; Friedman, supra note 181, at 578; Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 L. & INEQUALrry 1, manuscript at 6 (forthcoming 2004).
193. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 181, at 815; Hutchinson, supra note 192, manuscript at 17-20;
Winter, supra note 181, at 1920.
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idealizes the legislative process,19 4 underestimates the degree to which courts
reflect and respond to public opinion,' 9 5 and overlooks the democracyenhancing role that courts perform. While the contours of this last set of
arguments range across a broad canvas, many of its leading proponents assert a
common claim: By performing their own role, courts can offset legislative
shortcomings and make a distinctive contribution to democratic processes.'96
For present purposes it is unnecessary to probe the relative merits of various
arguments scholars have deployed in support of this claim. The point that
matters here is the insight common to all of them: in democracies, courts,
legislatures and other actors participate in an ongoing, interactive process of
law-making.
The continuous interaction between courts and the legislature, as well as

194. For example, public choice theorists point to structural factors that produce systematically
biased legislation favoring the narrow interests of certain sectors, as well as incentives for legislators to
avoid tackling important but controversial issues. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 187, at 285-95.
Consider, for example, a phenomenon well known in U.S. politics: the legislative agenda can be set by
leaders of key committees, who may be especially responsive to narrow interest groups. This is likely to
"skew public decisionmaking toward private rent-seeking and away from public interest statutes." Id. at
283. The sort of back-room bargaining at play here is also antithetical to the ideal of public discourse
embraced by devotees of deliberative democracy. In their view, the legislature should be an arena for
public dialogue aimed at discerning a common good, not a forum for ratifying the results of
self-interested bargaining among those who represent powerful factions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 48-49 (1985). On problematic aspects of the
claim that legislative action reflects majority will, see Chemerinsky, supra note 182, at 77-81;
Hutchinson, supra note 192, manuscript at 18-20.
195. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 181, at 590 (asserting that "courts often rely on majoritarian
sources in interpreting constitutional guarantees. . . . [E]ven the most controversial judicial decisions
often enjoy popular support."); Friedman, Birth of an Academic Obsession, supra note 192, at 166
(noting that a "host of scholarly work . .. strongly suggests that legislative enactments often do not
enjoy majority support [while] judicial decisions often do"); Hutchinson, supra note 192, manuscript at
21 (noting that several studies indicate that the Supreme Court's opinions "tend to coincide with public
opinion on matters where an accurate measure of public opinion exists").
196. For example, some public choice theorists have advocated strategies for judicial interpretation
that may compensate for legislative dysfunction without substituting the preferences of judges for
policies enacted into law. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 187, at 295-305. Other views assign to courts
a special role in mitigating legislative tyranny, a perennial threat that looms especially large when
legislation enacted long ago continues in effect across time and changed circumstances. See Tushnet,
supra note 188, at 788. In another view, courts can enhance the deliberative role of the legislature by
reviewing its reason-giving. In this view, the legislature remains the central arena for public deliberation; courts advance democratic deliberation not by usurping the legislature, but by improving its
performance. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
73-179 (1980) (arguing that certain political-process failures may justify correction through judicial
review); Sunstein, supra note 194, at 49-55 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has used constitutional doctrines requiring "rationality" in certain legislative choices to ensure that legislation is not
solely a response to political pressures). Others see the judiciary as the paramount institutional site for
public deliberation in a large democracy, at least in defined circumstances. See, e.g., Bruce A.
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022, 1029-31
(1984) (conceiving the U.S. Supreme Court as the central repository of self-government during periods
of "normal politics"). In another prevalent view, "judicial review enhances democracy because it
safeguards the substantive values that are part of democratic rule"-more particularly, "fundamental
rights." Chemerinsky, supra note 182, at 76.
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between courts on the one side and other public institutions and society on the
other, anchors the democratic legitimacy of judicial review. Through myriad
forms of interaction judges remain publicly accountable in ways that secure and
sustain democratic government. Most obviously (though in practice rarely),
judicial rulings that stray too far from public consensus can be nullified by
legislation.19 7 In jurisdictions that elect judges, candidates whose views range
far afield of public sentiment are unlikely to be elected or re-elected.' 9" Appointed judges whose views are politically unpopular may imperil their prospects for elevation to a higher court. Moreover the role of the political branches
in appointing judges helps ensure that their opinions "will not depart radically
from public opinion."'
But the interaction between judges and society is wider and deeper than the
interplay structured by such formal processes as confirmation hearings and
elections. As Alexander Bickel wrote, judges engage in "a continuing colloquy
with the political institutions and with society at large."200 Bickel's account of
how the U.S. Supreme Court works toward addressing a major issue, from
which the metaphor of a continuing colloquy is drawn, is worth quoting at
greater length:
Over time, as a problem is lived with, the Court does not work in isolation to
divine the answer that is right. It has the means to elicit partial answers and
reactions from the other institutions, and to try tentative answers itself. When
at last the Court decides that "judgment cannot be escaped-the judgment of
this Court," the answer is likely to be a proposition "to which widespread
acceptance may fairly be attributed," because in the course of a continuing
colloquy with the political institutions and with society at large, the Court has
shaped and reduced the question, and perhaps because it has rendered the
answer familiar if not obvious. In these continuing colloquies, the professionthe practicing and teaching profession of the law-plays a major role; the
law .. . is made, not by judge alone, but by judge and company. But in
American society the colloquy goes well beyond the profession and reaches
deeply into the places where public opinion is formed. 2 0'

197. See Eskridge, supra note 181, at 1525-26 (attributing infrequency of legislative correction to
inertia).
198. According to a 2001 report by a committee of the American Bar Association, approximately
80% of state and local judges in the United States are elected. See Schacter,Accounting for Accountability, supra note 190, at 15.
199. Hutchinson, supra note 192, manuscript at 24. Other devices for ensuring democratic control
over the judiciary are assessed in Choper, supra note 181, at 849-55.
200. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 181, at 240. Barry Friedman similarly
describes constitutional interpretation as "an elaborate discussion between judges and the body politic."
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, supra note 181, at 653; see also id. at 655; cf Linda
Greenhouse, Win the Debate, Not Just the Case, N.Y TIMES, July 14, 2002, § 4, at 4 (describing public
debate over meaning that ensues after the U.S. Supreme Court renders a major decision).
201. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 181, at 240.
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The colloquy does not end when judgment is reached. To borrow Martha
Minow's imagery, when the Court renders judgment the legal discourse "reaches
temporary resting points from which new claims can be made."20 2 Meanwhile,
the ground for further debate has been seeded by dissenting opinions that may
some day become the majority view, 2 0 3 the arguments marshaled in majority
opinions, 204 editorials, speeches, 205 and scholarly critiques. The colloquy continues, and through it the law advances.
The dialogue includes plenty of disagreement, too, both within the judiciary
and among the judiciary, the legislature, the executive and society. Thus an
essential element of the judge's craft is her ability to persuade those who resist
her interpretations as well as to manage outright opposition to her rulings.20 6
The persuasive power of judicial rulings turns in large measure on judges'
ability to craft opinions that resonate with widely-shared public values. Not
surprisingly, then, a rich body of scholarship has found that court rulings,
including decisions of the Supreme Court, generally coincide with majority
208
The fact that
public opinion207 or at least with dominant public conceptions.
judges believe they should try to persuade the public that their rulings are
correct by drawing upon arguments likely to resonate with widespread sentiment signifies that the judiciary is a democratically accountable institution,20 9
albeit of a different stripe than the legislature.

202. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1876
(1987); cf Friedman, supra note 181, at 643-48 (challenging a key premise of the "countermajoritarian
difficulty"-that courts, including the Supreme Court, have the "final word" on public issues once they
issue a decision).
203. For an account of a successful long-term strategy of using dissents to shape future court
opinions, see Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2002, at Al.
204. Chief among those whom justices may need to persuade are officials serving in the coordinate
branches of government. See Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1120 (1991) (praising
Justice William J. Brennan for making "every effort" in an opinion to "invite the other branches of
government to participate and collaborate in the program of constitutional reform inspired by the
Court").
205. Members of the same court have sometimes continued their debates outside the text of
opposing opinions. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Judicial Intent; The Competing Visions of the Role of
the Court, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 2002, § 4, at 3 (describing speeches of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Stephen G. Breyer and Antonin Scalia setting forth their respective visions of judicial review).
Inevitably, academic commentators join the debate waged between majority and dissenting opinions
when a major judgment is issued.
206. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 760 (1982).
207. See Friedman, supra note 181, at 672; Hutchinson, supra note 192, manuscript at 21 & sources
cited in id. n.93.
208. See Winter, supra note 181, at 1920, 1925-26.
209. Cf. Schacter, supra note 190, at 5-7 (unpacking the concept of accountability as developed in
literature on the countermajoritarian difficulty, author identifies responsiveness as one of its meanings).
As Barry Friedman has argued, for purposes of countering the charge that judicial review thwarts
self-government, the important point is not whether arguments marshaled in judicial rulings accurately
reflect the motivating reasons behind a judge's conclusions. The key point instead "is that judges find it
necessary to, and can, support their conclusions with sources that appear to reflect the sentiment of the
people." Friedman, supra note 181, at 672.
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When courts are unable to persuade large segments of the public that their
decisions are correct (or even well-reasoned), they must draw upon a reservoir
of institutional authority to secure acceptance of their rulings as binding. 2 10 That
acceptance derives in large part from two key sources, both of which presuppose a court's embeddedness in a political community.
The first is citizens' general commitment to the authority of the government
structure to which courts belong.2 1 1 In a democracy, we accept the authority of
our courts to interpret our laws-and even to render decisions we reckon to be
wrong-because they are our courts. More particularly, in a constitutional
democracy judicial review derives its democratic legitimacy in part from the
public's consent, tacit if not explicit, to judicial review itself.2 1 2
A second basis for accepting decisions we think flawed derives from the
respect that courts earn over time through their performance. While this is a
distinct ground for public acceptance, like others considered already it is linked
to a court's embeddedness in a constitutional democracy. A precious resource in
establishing this brand of legitimacy is the political relationship of the judge to
the law she interprets-the relationship of a judge who is also a fellow
213
When judges interpret legislation in a purely national setting, their
citizen.
decisions are shaped in myriad and imperceptible ways by community values,
expressed through the daily rituals of self-government as well as at formal
moments of legislative enactment.2 14 Thus what may on the surface seem to be
judge-made law derives from a rich, robust, and continuous process of self-

210. Judicial decisions that stray too far from public opinion may, however, elicit outright defiance.
See Friedman, supra note 181, at 608; Hutchinson, supra note 192, manuscript at 22.
211. Fiss describes this conception of authoritativeness as one that stresses "an ethical claim to
obedience-a claim that an individual has a moral duty to obey a judicial interpretation, not because of
its particular intellectual authority (i.e., because it is a correct interpretation), but because the judge is
part of an authority structure that is good to preserve." Fiss, supra note 206, at 756.
212. See Choper, supra note 181, at 848 (citing arguments to the effect that "judicial review has
been institutionally adopted by a continuing consensus of American society as an integral rule of the
system; that, thus, judicial review operates by majority will, with the consent of the governed"); see
also Seidman, supra note 172, at 1587 (asserting that "[t]o the extent ... that the public regularly defers
to the expertise of judges and chooses to follow their judgments-even in cases where they do not fully
understand or accept the reasoning that lies behind them-there is no conflict between judicial
decisionmaking and democratic theory").
213. In somewhat different terms, Paul Kahn has argued that the fact that national judges are
embedded in a political community anchors their legitimacy. Within a state "that maintains informal
norms that distinguish law from politics," Kahn contends, the link between courts and national political
processes "gives assurance that a court will not exercise its independence in a way that is substantially
at variance with the political beliefs and interests of the country. It gives assurance that the public order
set forth in the judicial narrative is the public order of the larger community." Paul W. Kahn,
Independence and Responsibility in the Judicial Role, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 73, at 85 (I. Stotzky ed., 1993).
214. Howard E. Dean captured this notion in his appraisal of the United States Supreme Court:
[T]he Supreme Court is also a piece of the social and political continent, a part of the main.
Thus it must ... be seen in its natural habitat in American society in the context of ...other
aspects of our complex polity. . .. To insist that the Supreme Court should be viewed in its
broadest social setting ... emphasizes what Montesquieu taught two centuries ago, that only
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government. When judges make law, they are not so much writing it for us as
with us. In their decisions we recognize public values we have constructed
together, much of the time through passionate disagreement, 2 15 across our
common history.
As my allusion to disagreement implies, none of this is to suggest that
decisions rendered by judges in democratic societies are accepted because they
embody values uniformly embraced by all or most citizens. Still, the democratic
legitimacy of courts turns, in part, on whether citizens recognize that they share
a common political project embodied in legal commitments. Jirgen Habermas's
notion of a "common political culture . .. rooted in an interpretation of constitutional principles from the perspective of the nation's historical experience" 2 16 is
helpful here. Despite their diversity, Habermas writes, citizens share a "common
horizon of interpretation within which current issues give rise to public debates
about the citizens' self-understanding.

. .

. But the debates are always about the

best interpretation of the same constitutional rights and principles."2 17
A final and important justification of judicial review remains to be noted. As
Michael Klarman has observed, "It is common wisdom that a fundamental
purpose of judicial review is to protect minority rights from majoritarian
overreaching."2 18 This view presupposes that citizens possess fundamental
rights which are entitled to respect and protection whatever the transient wishes
of a political majority. 219

by seeing the legal system of a people as an integral part of their whole social and cultural
order can we hope to understand the spirit of their laws.
E. DEAN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY 156 (1966); see also Winter, supra note 181, at
1884 (asserting that "every aspect of legal reasoning .. . occurs against the backdrop of a massive
cultural tableau which provides the tacit background assumptions that render the legal conceptions
intelligible"); cf Fiss, supra note 206, at 755 (writing of the judiciary's "special competence to ...
render specific and concrete the public morality embodied in" constitutional text).
215. Even law accepted as authoritative is "always 'essentially contested'." Cover, supra note 185,
at 17 (citation omitted).
216. Jirgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in THE
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER 225 (Ciarin Cronin & Pablo de Greiff eds., 1998).
217. Id. (Emphasis omitted.)
218. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV.
1, 1 (1996). Although this justification of judicial review "exercises a powerful hold over our
constitutional discourse," id. at 2, some scholars have challenged its empirical grounding. Klarman and
others have argued that the Supreme Court's tendency to mirror mainstream views has limited its ability
to protect the rights of vulnerable minorities. See generally id.; Hutchinson, supra note 192; Thomas R.
Marshall & Joseph Ignagni, Supreme Court and Public Supportfor Rights Claims, 78 JUDICATURE 146,
151 (1994) (concluding, based on then-recent data, that "public opinion is closely linked to the
Supreme Court's own support for rights claims").
219. In some formulations, the rights-protecting function of judicial review effectuates a fundamental dimension of democracy. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 182, at 76 (asserting that "judicial
review is democratic when it reinforces the fundamental rights that are part of American democracy");
Choper, supra note 181, at 812 (noting that "most contemporary defenders of judicial review...
persuasively contend that the essential values of a democratic society ... assume the existence of
certain inalienable minimums of personal freedom, beyond the political rights of the ballot and free
expression, that guard the dignity and integrity of the individual"). Others reconcile the rightsHOWARD
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In the discourse of constitutional law (as well as of international human rights
law), fundamental rights are typically conceptualized as inherent in our common humanity and as deriving their normative power from a law which is
higher than that embodied in national constitutions and international texts.2 20
But this conception naturally raises the question, how do we know which
(fundamental) rights are entitled to judicial protection even when their exercise
conflicts with democratically-enacted law? Inevitably, authoritative answers are
embodied in positive law-and this "gives their enforcement a legitimating
basis in political consent." 2 2 ' Like other justifications canvassed earlier, then,
the view that judicial review derives its legitimacy from the need to safeguard
fundamental rights-most especially, the rights of vulnerable minorities-links
up with core principles of democratic governance.
If the judicial role of protecting fundamental rights normally finds a basis in
political consent, many legal systems regard this function as one that properly
enjoys heightened insulation from political control-and properly so. 2 2 2 For
reasons further developed in Part V, this point is helpful in explaining the theory
behind universal jurisdiction: by authorizing courts the world over to exercise
jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators of some violations of human rights, states
have acknowledged the utility of insulating prosecutions of these offenses from
the pernicious effects of domestic politics. 2 2 3
In sum, whether a judge's interpretive work strikes us as undemocratic may
turn upon the particular vision of democratic governance to which we subscribe.
Yet across a wide spectrum of views, some measure of judicial lawmaking is
understood to be integral to self-government. This is true even for those who
believe that there is a discernible fixed legislative intent that courts can and

protecting role of judicial review with a majoritarian-centered view of democracy through the claim
that American society has consented to judicial review in order to "preserve immutable and fundamental values against the hasty and ill-considered decisions that the voters and their other leaders will
inevitably make." See id. at 848 (summarizing a claim put forth by others). On another view,
constitutional rights are entitled to judicial protection on their own merits; these rights operate as a
constraint against enforcement of democratically-valid legislation. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 194,
at 56; cf PERRY, supra note 181, at 97-106 (explaining judicial review aimed at protecting human rights
that are not grounded in constitutional or legislative text in terms of religious self-understanding of
Americans).
220. See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1868-69 (2003).

221. Id. at 1866. As Neuman notes, "[p]ositive fundamental rights normally derive their positive
force from some political act that expresses the consent of relevant political actors, or of peoples." Id.
222. See Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the
European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 614 (2002) (noting that it is common for states "to
delegate to insulated authorities, such as constitutional courts, responsibility for the enforcement of
individual or minority prerogatives against the immediate 'tyranny of the majority"'). In U.S. constitutional law, for example, the "suspect class doctrine carves out a space for countermajoritarianism" by
allowing the Supreme Court "to exercise invasive judicial review to protect politically vulnerable and
marginalized" groups. Hutchinson, supra note 192, manuscript at 30.
223. Cf infra text accompanying note 378 (noting that states that have experienced repression are
especially likely to ratify human rights treaties that have rigorous enforcement regimes).

1100

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 92:1057

should strictly enforce; after all, we can not meaningfully govern ourselves if
our courts do not faithfully enforce our law. For those who would allow judges
wider scope for interpretation, the embeddedness of courts in a broader framework of self-government and in the social fabric of their communities is crucial
to the perceived legitimacy of judicial review.
B. JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN A TRANSNATIONAL SETTING

We can now better grasp what is at stake when judges interpret law in a case,
like the attempted prosecution of General Pinochet, that affects citizens of
another country far more than the judge's own compatriots. In a deeply important sense, British and Spanish judges were not making law for Chile by
enforcing the Torture Convention against General Pinochet. By ratifying the
convention, Chile had already made the treaty its law. Through adjudication,
however, British and Spanish judges became co-authors of this law in a case
that would have a more profound effect upon Chileans than on British or
Spanish citizens.22 4 If we believe that citizens should be at least indirect authors
of the law that governs them, 2 2 5 we instinctively shrink from the thought of
Chilean citizens being governed by the law of judges deliberating an ocean
away. How, after all, can judges steeped in British or Spanish legal culture
reflect the public values and aspirations of Chileans?
Yet despite the dissimilarities I have highlighted, cross-boundary lawmaking
processes share important qualities with domestic lawmaking.2 26 Most important, lawmaking at both levels entails the continuous interplay of multiple
law-generating communities. As Harold Koh has noted, "[e]very court in the
United States ... applies law that was not made by its own polity whenever the
court's own choice-of-law principles so direct." 2 2 7 This perspective helps us see
that the fact that lawmaking across borders involves multiple communities does
not hopelessly undermine its democratic legitimacy.
To grasp the significance of this point it is useful to deepen the discussion of
judicial interpretation elaborated so far. Much of my analysis in the previous
section builds upon a core insight of communitarian streams in legal scholar-

224. The lawmaking processes that unfolded in European courts in the Pinochet case affected
Chileans in two principal ways. First, the Spanish effort to prosecute Pinochet was an attempt to judge
conduct that occurred mostly in Chile. In this respect, the proceedings effectively sought to regulate
conduct in another country. Second, the European proceedings had a profound effect on Chilean
society's reckoning with its own past. Both points are developed in greater depth below in Part V.
225. See Pablo De Greiff, Comment: Universal Jurisdiction and Transitions to Democracy, in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 5, at 121, 126 (asserting that, in democratic politics, "it matters a
whole lot ... that we live under laws of which we can consider ourselves to be the authors").
226. My argument so far has, in any event, implicitly invoked an idealized model of domestic
lawmaking. As I argue below in Part V.B, "national" lawmaking does not take place in a hermetically
sealed universe. More than ever before, those processes are shaped by transnational interactions among
states and individuals.
227. Harold Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1852-53 (1998).
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ship: legal meaning is derived from particular socio-cultural matrices.228 So,
too, are the standards we use to assess both the general authority of law-making
institutions and their performance in specific instances. 2 2 9 Even in a purely
national setting, however, the legitimating community is always and inevitably
plural.
The plural nature of discrete political communities is easiest to see when we
think of spatially-defined sub-state units, such as federal states, communes and
municipalities. But these are not the only communities that matter when it
comes to lawmaking processes. Centrally important here is the kind of community captured in Robert Cover's notion of a nomos-a normative universe.2 30
Nomoi-religious sects, secular communities committed to common principles,
professional communities, and so forth-generate multiple, interdependent meanings for every law. 2 3 ' And so while national law, including law established
through judicial interpretation, is authoritative and official, its meaning is not
unitary. Rather, law that is accepted as authoritative establishes common ground
for multiple meanings. What this tells us is modest but important: the fact that
multiple states and an eclectic assortment of actors participate in transnational
lawmaking-diplomats who draft international treaties, legislators who adopt
national implementing legislation, investigating magistrates in Spain, law lords
in England, and others-does not irremediably doom the democratic legitimacy
of these lawmaking processes.
Nor, however, does the multiplicity of actors who participate in transnational
lawmaking demonstrate the legitimacy of these processes. To the contrary, the
multi-state nature of judicial enforcement of transnational law presents qualitatively different challenges to democratic values than does judge-made law in a
purely national setting. How, then, should we assess the democratic legitimacy
of the kind of lawmaking processes at play in the Pinochetcase?
C. ASSESSING THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF TRANSNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

As a first cut at this question, the preceding account of adjudication in a
purely national setting points to three benchmarks for appraising the legitimacy
of lawmaking in a transnational context. The first is general acknowledgment of
the authority of relevant lawmaking institutions, including courts, by those who
are subject to the law these bodies generate.2 32 Deriving from the democratic
principle of consent, this criterion is essentially normative.
At least in well-functioning democracies, the institutional authority of courts

228. See supra note 214; see also Cover, supra note 185, at 38 (asserting that "the community [is]
the source and sustenance of ideas about law"); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
1601, 1602 n.2 (1986).
229. Cf Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,supra note 206, at 745 ("Rules are not rules unless they
are authoritative, and that authority can only be conferred by a community.").
230. Cover, supra note 185, at 4.
231. See id. at 33.
232. See supra note 212 and text accompanying notes 211-212.
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is generally accepted by citizens. Their tacit acceptance of the authority of their
nation's courts underpins citizens' willingness to accept judicial rulings they
consider wrongly decided.2 33 In contrast, the notion of tacit acceptance has
scant meaning when it comes to the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign or
international court. 2 3 4 In this setting, international law requires specific acceptance of a court's exercise of authority, whether expressed through treaty, 2 3 5 an
ad hoc declaration, 2 3 6 national law, 2 3 7 or the more diffuse process of establishing customary international law.238
A second quality associated with adjudicative lawmaking widely accepted as
democratically legitimate is the respect that lawmaking institutions earn over
time by virtue of their performance. 239 In contrast to the first criterion, this
benchmark of legitimacy is more descriptive than normative; that is, it reflects
conditions in which citizens tend to accept the legitimacy of judge-made law.24 0
Ordinarily, this type of respect derives in large measure from judges' ability to
craft decisions that resonate with the deepest commitments of their own political
communities 24 1-although a judge's "own" political community is always plural.

233. See supra text accompanying notes 210-212.
234. The need for consent is not readily obviated by the fact that universal jurisdiction in principle is
available only with respect to atrocious crimes, which by their nature transcend any state's parochial
concerns. As Gerald Neuman has observed, a common feature of international human rights and
national constitutional rights is that both rest upon the legitimizing condition of consent alongside a
sense that the rights "have normative force independent of their embodiment in law, or even superior to
the positive legal system." Neuman, supra note 220, at 1868.
235. The United States government has grounded its opposition to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) in part on the claim that the Rome Statute impermissibly permits the Court to assert jurisdiction
over nationals of non-party states. See Diane F. Orentlicher, UnilateralMultilateralism: United States
Policy Toward the InternationalCriminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 415, 419 (2004). Proponents of
the ICC counter that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states only when
consent to jurisdiction has been provided by the state in which the crimes occurred. See, e.g., Philippe
Kirsch, The Rome Conference on the InternationalCriminal Court: A Comment, ASIL NEWSL. (Am.
Soc'y of Int'l L., Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 1. Despite their differences, both sides acknowledge
that the legitimacy of ICC jurisdiction is grounded in state consent.
236. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 59 art. 38(1)(a).
237. By presidential decree, Argentine President N6stor Kirchner consented to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction over former Argentine junta leaders sought by a Spanish magistrate. See Larry
Rohter, Argentina: Arrests of Ex-Officers Ordered, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at A6; see also infra note
255.
238. The most authoritative (if somewhat laconic) contemporary definition of customary international law is set forth in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38, which defines
sources of law that the Court may apply in resolving disputes, includes "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note
59, art. 38(l)(b). For a somewhat more helpful definition, see infra text accompanying note 302 (citing
RESTATEMENT definition of customary international law).
239. See supra text accompanying note 213.
240. In some theories justifying judicial review on grounds of tacit consent, see, e.g., supra note
212, what I have termed a descriptive benchmark of democratically legitimate process might be seen as
empirical evidence that the normative benchmark previously noted-consent-has been satisfied.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 207-208, 213-215.
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A third benchmark of legitimacy is the belief by those who may be subject to
judge-made law that adjudicators are accountable to them. The fact that judges
participate in a continuous colloquy with other institutions of self-government,
as well as with society at large, helps foster and sustain this sense of accountability within the bounded community of well-functioning democracies.24 2
The exercise of universal jurisdiction raises the question whether these last
two sources for legitimation in particular are available in a transnational context.243 Using the Pinochet case as paradigm, Part V assesses the lawmaking
processes associated with universal jurisdiction in light of these three indices of
legitimacy.
V. LEGITIMIZING TRANSNATIONAL LAWMAKING
Like all complex legal cases, the European proceedings against Augusto
Pinochet involved multiple laws, addressing subjects ranging from extradition
to the scope of official immunities. Among these, one source of legal obligation
in particular-the Convention Against Torture2 4 4 -raises the concerns addressed in this Part, and so my discussion will focus on that law.
A. LEGITIMATION THROUGH TREATY PARTICIPATION
As previously noted, Articles 5(2) and 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture
explicitly require States Parties to initiate criminal prosecutions against individuals in their territory suspected of having committed torture unless they extradite
the suspects.24 5 Since adjudication plays a significant role in lawmaking processes, 2 4 6 these treaty provisions effectively authorize national courts of States
Parties to "make law" governing conduct that occurs in other states.
By adhering to this convention in 1988,247 Chile accepted the regime established in these articles. In doing so it signed on to the possibility that national
courts of other States Parties, including Spain (which had ratified the Convention Against Torture in 1987), could prosecute acts of torture committed in
Chile.2 4 8 In contrast to the treaty's textual silence on the question of official
immunities,24 9 the basic duty to extradite or prosecute alleged torturers within

242. See supra text accompanying notes 200-209.
243. While the first criterion-onsent-is more readily satisfied in a transnational setting by, for
example, a state's adherence to relevant treaties, the question of meaningful consent to a regime of
universal jurisdiction is not wholly unproblematic. See infra Part V.A.
244. Supra note 56.
245. See supra note 122 and text accompanying notes 62 and 122.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
247. See supra note 143.
248. Under the terms of the convention, Chilean nationals suspected of committing torture could
theoretically be prosecuted by States Parties to the Convention Against Torture even if Chile had not
adhered to that treaty. I examine the issues of democratic legitimacy raised by this feature of the
convention below, in text accompanying notes 374-76.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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the jurisdiction of States Parties is unambiguous.25 0
Chile's adherence to the Convention Against Torture satisfies a bedrock
condition of the democratic legitimacy of the lawmaking processes at play in
the Pinochet case-consent to the regime of universal jurisdiction established
by the treaty.25 1 In this respect, the Pinochet proceedings are a model of
democratically legitimate reliance on universal jurisdiction.
Even so, in light of the peculiar challenges to democratic governance presented by the exercise of universal jurisdiction,2 52 it may be helpful to deepen
our understanding of what meaningful consent to such a treaty regime might
entail.
1. Consenting to Multilateral Treaties: General Considerations
Setting aside for now the special questions raised by treaties that authorize or
require States Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction, multilateral treaties in
general present their own peculiar brand of challenges to democratic processes.
By the time states decide whether they will adhere to such a treaty, its text has
already been adopted, often after years of multi-state negotiations. Unless
citizens of adhering states are able to participate in shaping the treaty's text,
their choice is limited: each country's decision about adherence is largely
(though by no means entirely 2 5 3) an "up or down" choice. 2 5 4
In principle, citizens should be able to participate more meaningfully in
national legislative processes aimed at making treaties legally effective in their
countries. 25 5 But this is not even a theoretical possibility in many countries,

250. This is not to say that Articles 5 and 7 raise no issues of interpretation. The Supreme Court of
the Netherlands has, for example, addressed the question whether national legislation implementing the
Convention Against Torture requires, as a precondition to the exercise of universal jurisdiction over
torture, some point of contact with Dutch jurisdiction. See Bouterse Case, CW 2323, at 1 8 (Sept. 18,
2001).
251. Cf supra text accompanying notes 211-12 and 233 (developing the claim that citizens' tacit
consent underpins the perceived democratic legitimacy of judicial review by national courts).
252. See generally supra Part III.
253. There are significant variations in the degree to which multilateral treaties allow States Parties
to adapt their treaty commitments to accord with national preferences. Some treaties explicitly allow
States Parties to choose among the provisions they will accept. See, e.g., European Charter for Regional
or Minority Languages, art. 2(2), June 5, 1992, E.T.S. No. 148.
254. An important qualification relates to states' ability to enter reservations to multilateral treaties,
subject to restrictions on permissible reservations that may apply to a particular treaty. The effect of a
reservation is to modify the terms of the convention for that State Party. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 21 (1). Addressing concerns similar to those considered in this
section, Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have argued that the United States practice of accepting
human rights treaty obligations subject to reservations, understandings, and declarations helps reconcile
features of the contemporary international legal system with continuing fidelity to American constitutional lawmaking processes. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (2000); see also Neuman, supra note 220, at 1888-90
(exploring the use of reservations as a technique for reducing the dissonance between a state's human
rights treaty obligations and its national constitution).
255. Participation in domestic processes pertaining to treaty implementation has more immediately
obvious relevance in legitimizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the consenting state's own
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where some or all treaties are automatically incorporated into domestic law.
Even in countries where treaty obligations are made legally effective through
implementing legislation, it would be a mistake to suppose that the process of
adopting such laws provides the same opportunity for citizen participation as
the enactment of other legislation (although, as political scientists have repeatedly found, citizen participation in the latter is more an ideal than an accurate
account of reality 2 5 6 ). When a state ratifies a treaty it commits itself to take
whatever steps are necessary to meet its treaty obligations, and this often
includes enacting domestic law. For the most part, then, implementing legislation is less a vehicle for meaningful self-government than a process for following through on commitments already undertaken.
2. Enhancing Participation in Treaty-Drafting Processes
One technique that may partially address these challenges is to ensure that
relevant government officials participate in shaping the text of multilateral
treaties. If a proposed multilateral treaty is likely to have a significant regulatory
impact within states, it makes sense for government delegations at international
drafting conferences to include, in addition to foreign service professionals,
national legislators and government officials who are responsible at home for
the relevant subject area.25 7 Also, national parliaments can hold hearings before
key treaty-drafting sessions, thereby providing a forum for public deliberation at
a time when the government's negotiating position is still being formed and
when it may still be possible to shape the treaty's text.2 5 8
Another strategy for legitimation advocated by some commentators focuses
on the direct participation of non-state actors in supra-national lawmaking
processes, including treaty-drafting exercises. In brief, some have claimed that
the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) goes a long way

courts than its exercise by foreign courts. But domestic legal processes that facilitate implementation of
a state's international obligations are also relevant to the latter, as recent developments in Argentina
exemplify. Until recently, an executive decree barred the extradition of Argentine nationals to face
human rights charges in foreign courts. In August 2003, the President of Argentina repealed this decree.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ARGENTINA FACES ITS PAST (2003), available at http://hrw.org/update/2003/
08/. At that time, a Spanish magistrate had requested the extradition of forty-five former military
officers and a civilian accused of torture and enforced disappearances to stand trial in Spain. See id.
256. See Schacter,supra note 190, at 8-9.
257. Joseph Nye makes a similar proposal in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO):
"If people believe that WTO meetings do not adequately account for environmental standards, they can
press their governments to include environment ministers or officials in their WTO delegations." Joseph
S. Nye, Jr., Globalization'sDemocratic Deficit: How to Make InternationalInstitutions More Accountable, FOREIGN AFF. July-Aug. 2001, at 2, 5. To some extent this approach is already reflected in U.S.
practice. For example, the United States delegation to the diplomatic conference that adopted the Rome
Statute for an International Criminal Court included representatives of the Department of Justice and
the Defense Department as well as career diplomats. Concededly, however, this approach has greater
relevance for comparatively wealthy countries than for developing nations, whose delegations at
diplomatic conferences convened to draft treaties-when present at all-are typically understaffed and
underresourced.
258. See Nye, supra note 257, at 5.
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toward ensuring the legitimacy of transnational lawmaking processes, including
their democratic legitimacy. In this view the involvement of NGOs serves as a
counterweight to the dominant role of government representatives, ensuring that
human values and the concerns of under-represented peoples are reflected in
these processes.2 59
An appealing feature of this approach is that it maps neatly onto the distinctive nature of contemporary transnational lawmaking processes. A defining
feature of this phenomenon is the broad spectrum of actors who participate in
making transnational law, extending well beyond the traditional cast of diplomats and other foreign service professionals. Particularly noteworthy is the role
of NGOs and other non-state actors. 2 6 0 Although non-state actors have long
participated in developing international law, 2 6 1 their influence has soared in
recent years.2 62 Epistemic communities2 63 of lawyers, legal scholars, human
rights advocates and others have had a significant impact on the development of
human rights law in particular,2 64 as well as on the emergence and growing use
of transnational and international mechanisms for enforcing that law. The
Convention Against Torture exemplifies this phenomenon: representatives of

259. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation:NGOs and International Governance,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 274 (1997).
260. Some writers use the term "transnational" to avoid the emphasis on state-to-state interactions
implied in the word "international" and to capture the interplay between state and non-state actors. See
LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS 35 (1989).
261. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 259.
262. Think about the land mines campaign, for example. A global network of activists sidelined a
cumbersome state-controlled treaty process and spearheaded the development of a new treaty to ban
land mines in record time. See Stephen D. Goose, The Ottawa Process and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty,
1998 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 269. The influential role of NGOs in international lawmaking is
acknowledged across a broad range of approaches within both legal and international relations
scholarship. Recognition of the influential role of NGOs in transnational lawmaking processes is central
to liberal international relations theory, see Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory,
InternationalLaw, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361,
367 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503, 508 (1995), and is one of the main tenets of Harold Koh's theory of transnational legal process, see
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996). On the rising
influence of NGOs as transnational actors generally, see Peter J. Spiro, The Decline of the Nation State
and Its Effect on Constitutionaland InternationalEconomic Law: New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizationsand the "Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOzo L. REV. 957 (1996); Peter J.
Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in InternationalDecision-Making
Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45 (1995) [hereinafter Spiro, New Global Communities]; Jessica T. Mathews,
Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 50.
263. Although this term has been defined in various ways, its usage here follows Peter Haas's
definition of an epistemic community as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain or issue area." Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and InternationalPolicy Coordination,
46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
264. On the role and impact of transnational human rights activists, see Kathryn Sikkink, Human
Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993); see
also MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIvisTs BEYOND BORDERS (1998).
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NGOs that promote human rights played a leading role in its development.2 6 5
Human rights activists also provided crucial impetus for the creation in 1993 of
the first international war crimes tribunal since the immediate aftermath of
World War II, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.26 6
If anything, NGOs were even more influential in the process that led to the
creation of a permanent international criminal court several years later.2 67
Does the participation of NGOs enhance the democratic legitimacy of transnational lawmaking processes? The short answer is surely yes: NGOs have often
provided an uplink from national communities 2 68 in transnational lawmaking
settings, ensuring that perspectives other than those of government officials feed into
lawmaking processes. Moreover, just as expert groups help bridge the gap between
domestic legislators and citizens, specialized NGOs can narrow the distance between
citizens of national communities and transnational lawmakers.269
This is not to suggest, however, that the simple fact of NGO participation
assures the legitimacy of international lawmaking processes. The same concerns
about NGOs that arise in a domestic political setting-such as the lack of
accountability of many, the pernicious aims of some, and the phenomenon of
capture by well-financed interest groups-are also relevant in transnational
settings.270 The most influential NGOs operating transnationally tend to be

265. The important contribution of human rights NGOs is acknowledged in a book co-authored by
two government representatives who played key roles in drafting the Convention Against Torture. See
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 59, at 19-22, 24-29.
266. See ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
120-21, 124 (1998).
267. Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss write that a global civil society "made itself nearly indispensable to the negotiating process" during the diplomatic conference in Rome that finalized and adopted
the text of the Court's statute. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creationof a Global Peoples
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 202 (2000). Falk
and Strauss describe how highly mobilized non-state actors were able to influence the positions of state
representatives:
Because civil society's representatives to the Rome Conference included respected academic
experts and former government policymakers, its representatives could address the many
highly technical issues with great authority. Many governments relied on these expert assessments of specific problems, thereby giving civil society a tremendous influence on framing the
overall discussion.
Id.
268. I borrow this phrase from Peter Spiro, who uses it in a somewhat different context. See Spiro,
New Global Communities, supra note 262, at 53 (arguing that providing NGO representatives formal
participation in intergovernmental fora would "create an additional (and arguably more direct and
responsive) uplink from the citizenry in a context where parliamentary-type representation remains
impractical").
269. See Charnovitz, supra note 259, at 274.
270. Thomas Carothers explodes romantic visions of "international civil society":
Civil Society Is Warm and Fuzzy. That depends on whether you like snuggling up to the
Russian mafia and militia groups from Montana as well as to your local parent-teacher
association. They're part of civil society too. Extrapolating from the courageous role of civic
groups that fought communism in Eastern Europe, some civil society enthusiasts have
propagated the misleading notion that civil society consists only of noble causes and earnest,
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supported by financially privileged sectors and staffed by professional elites. 2 7 1
And, one observer cautions, "very few of even the larger international NGOs
are operationally democratic" themselves.27 2
These cautionary observations hardly negate the important contributions of
NGOs and other private actors in ensuring the accountability of transnational
lawmaking processes and institutions; their participation has often been invaluable. Raphael Lemkin's role in making genocide an international crime stands
out, 2 7 3 along with the more recent accomplishments of coalitions mobilized to
protect civilians against the indiscriminate violence of land mines and to secure
affordable treatment for the ravages of AIDS. If NGOs cannot unproblematically
claim to represent their societies, they can and often do enhance public deliberation by
contributing expert analyses. And so of course we want to see NGOs remain in the
picture. Still, we cannot assume that their involvement is all that is needed to ensure
the democratic legitimacy of international lawmaking processes.
3. Informed Public Deliberation
While the preceding sections have considered issues that are generally pertinent to states' adherence to widely-ratified multilateral conventions, further
considerations come into play when a state adheres to a treaty that constitutes its
consent to a substantial delegation of sovereign authority. In these circumstances, a state's adherence should be approved under procedures likely to
maximize informed and attentive public deliberation.
Although the analogy between treaties authorizing States Parties to exercise
universal jurisdiction and conventions establishing trade regimes should not be
overdrawn, Laurence Tribe's assessment of the democratic challenges posed by
U.S. participation in the latter helps illuminate the general issue. A heightened
level of domestic deliberation is in order, Tribe argues, when the United States
enters into a treaty that entails a substantial surrender of sovereignty "and submits
United States citizens or political entities to the authority of bodies wholly or partially

well-intentioned actors. Yet civil society everywhere is a bewildering array of the good, the
bad, and the outright bizarre.
Thomas Carothers, Civil Society: Think Again, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1999-2000, at 18, 20.
271. See Mathews, supra note 262, at 52. As Peter Spiro suggests, "[a]rguably, it is more often
money than membership that determines [the] influence [of NGOs], and money more often represents
the support of centralized elites, such as the major foundations, than that of true grass roots." Spiro,
New Global Communities, supra note 262, at 52.
272. Spiro, New Global Communities, supra note 262, at 51. David Rieff charges that human rights
activists sometimes speak as though their movement were "an emblem of grass-roots democracy. Yet it
is possible to view it as an undemocratic pressure group. . . ." David Rieff, The PrecariousTriumph of
Human Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 37. On the role of NGOs in instituting
cases based on universal jurisdiction, Australian Justice Michael Kirby writes, "While it is true that
well-motivated NGOs can constitute a counterweight to political and institutional complacency, judges
may sometimes view them as irresponsible, effectively unaccountable, and prone to cause wildfires that
imperil orderly legal process and foreign relations." Kirby, supra note 28, at 253.
273. See SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 17-78
(2002).
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separate from the ordinary arms of federal or state governments."274
If it seems obvious that a state's decision to surrender lawmaking authority to
foreign courts merits attentive and well-informed public deliberation, the prospects for this are concededly rather inauspicious. Assessments of Member
States' participation in the European Union (E.U.) have highlighted how challenging it is to engage broad public participation in decision-making processes
concerning acceptance of treaties, even when the surrender of lawmaking
authority entailed in adherence is far more consequential than that entailed in
acceptance of treaties establishing a regime of universal jurisdiction. E.U.
member states have surrendered a vast measure of decision-making authority to
E.U. institutions without appreciating the implications of their delegation.2 7 5
4. Clarifying the Scope of Authorized Jurisdiction
Recent cases highlight the potential importance of providing courts clearly
defined mandates within which they are authorized to exercise universal jurisdiction.27 6 Without clear mandates, the ground rules for universal jurisdiction will
continue to be defined in large part through piecemeal adjudication. 27 7 While
their most obvious effect is to constrain judges, clearly-framed mandates also
empower courts to assert universal jurisdiction. 2 78 Faced with uncertainty about
how far their authority runs, courts have at times rendered overly narrow
interpretations of relevant law, 2 7 9 dismissing cases properly founded on univer274. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1268 (1995). This is not to suggest that the
occasional exercise of universal jurisdiction involves the same degree of delegation of rulemaking
authority entailed in the type of multilateral trade regimes addressed by Tribe.
I have not attempted to identify the particular form that domestic processes for approving new usages
of universal jurisdiction should take because the appropriate process turns in substantial part on the
peculiarities of each country's political system. In a number of European countries, decisions relating to
delegation of substantial authority to EU institutions are put to vote by plebiscite; in the United States
heightened deliberation may entail acceptance of treaty commitments by the whole Congress rather
than just the Senate. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFFA Constitutional?,108 HARv. L.
REv. 799 (1995). But see Tribe, supra (arguing that Senate ratification assures special safeguards for
federal states). Further, in countries that utilize more rigorous processes of approval for some categories
of legal commitment, the appropriateness of resorting to those procedures may depend upon the degree
of judicial delegation authorized by a particular treaty. Thus my principal claim is modest: countries
that approve treaties authorizing or requiring the exercise of universal jurisdiction in circumstances not
previously authorized should ensure that their consent is predicated on due deliberation.
275. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 68, at 219-20. See also CHRISTOPHER LORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 16-17 (1998).
276. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 280.
277. A case now pending before the International Court of Justice will likely address some basic
legal issues concerning universal jurisdiction. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Rep. Congo v.
Fr.), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/iprpencof.html.
278. An initiative sponsored by the Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction provides one model
for constraining the exercise of universal jurisdiction within principled limits. As previously noted, see
supra note 48, a group of international jurists developed guidelines for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. See THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 48, at 21-25.
279. See, e.g., Irwin Cotler, InternationalDecisions: Regina v. Finta, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 460 (1996)
(discussing Canadian Supreme Court's flawed decision in Fintacase).
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sal jurisdiction.
Notably, the most controversial recent developments relating to the exercise
of universal jurisdiction have involved efforts by courts and prosecutors to
expand the writ of bystander justice beyond clearly established law. Belgium,
for example, was ahead of global consensus when it applied its universal
competence law to pursue criminal cases against incumbent senior officials of
foreign states-and was forced to alter this practice after it was successfully
challenged before the International Court of Justice. 280
Strict regard for existing law would inevitably limit the ability of domestic
legislatures and courts to contribute to the development of universal jurisdiction
in the same way they contribute to other areas of customary international law.
For it is precisely through the emergence of state practice that at first represents
a departure from established norms that new rules of customary law are
established. Circumscribing the ability of national courts and legislatures to
contribute in this way to the further development of universal jurisdiction may
seem ill-considered in light of recent progress in international law advanced in

part by progressive state laws: when Bavarian and Swiss courts ruled that
serious violations of the laws of war governing non-international armed conflicts gave rise to universal jurisdiction in their respective countries, and when
the Belgian legislature established universal jurisdiction over those same offenses,2 8 1 they were arguably out ahead of established law. Yet along with other
developments, these countries' laws may have contributed to a development in
international law that has been widely supported by other states. In late 1995,
the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia found that serious violations of the laws of war committed during

280. See Ratner, supra note 21, at 890 (noting that Belgian Cour de Cassation dismissed a case
against the incumbent foreign leader of Israel approximately one year after the International Court of
Justice ruled that a Belgian magistrate's issuance of an international arrest warrant against the
incumbent foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violated international law).
281. The Belgian legislature extended universal jurisdiction to serious violations of the rules
governing the conduct of non-international armed conflicts even though it was aware that Belgium was
not required to do so under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 or Additional Protocol II. Considering
the number of violations of international humanitarian law that are committed during non-international
conflicts, two Belgian writers explain, "the Belgian legislator [sic] found it wise to extend the
application of 'grave breaches' to violations of the laws of war committed during internal conflicts."
Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Introductory Note; Belgium: Act Concerning the Punishment of
Grave Breaches of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 38 I.L.M. 918, 920 (1999). The Belgian law was
enacted in June 1993, five months before the United Nations Security Council created the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and vested it with jurisdiction over war crimes committed in the context
of a non-international armed conflict. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, between I
January 1994 and 31 December 1994, art. 4, S.C. Res. 955, Annex (1994), amended by S.C. Res. 1165
(1998); S.C. Res. 1329 (2000); S.C. Res. 1411 (2002), and S.C. Res. 1431 (2002), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html.
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non-international armed conflicts are international crimes. 2 8 2 Its ruling was, in
turn, reaffirmed by diplomats who drafted the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which includes serious violations of the laws of war committed
in non-international armed conflicts in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
Court. 283
Still, it may be preferable for states to find other ways to express their support
for an expansion of existing law than asserting universal jurisdiction over
offenses not yet generally accepted as international crimes (absent the relevant
state's consent to the exercise of jurisdiction). There are plenty of ways for
states to contribute to the development of customary international law concerning universal jurisdiction, including the development of treaties that make
explicit provision for its exercise 2 8 4 and adoption of non-binding principles that,
through widespread acceptance, attest to state practice and opinio juris.28 5
B. INDIRECT DEMOCRATIC SUPERVISION OF FOREIGN COURTS

The thrust of the inquiry pursued in Part III is that the integration of domestic
courts in a bounded political community helps ensure the responsiveness of
judges to citizens who are effectively governed by judge-made law. 2 8 6 Moreover, the continuous dialogue between judges and fellow citizens enhances the
ability of domestic courts to earn the type of institutional respect that underpins
general compliance with their rulings 2 87 and which arguably reflects continuing
(if tacit) consent to judicial review itself.28 8 Similar resources for legitimation
are self-evidently more elusive in a transnational setting. The question, then, is
whether adequate and context-appropriate analogues are available.
In approaching this question, it is useful to keep sight of the fact that, by
hypothesis, states concerned in the exercise of universal jurisdiction have
already consented to its exercise in respect of certain crimes committed in their

282. See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, No. IT-94-I-AR72, at n 96-134, 105 I.L.R. 453, (Int'l. Crim. Trib.
former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) (decision dismissing defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction), at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.
283. Rome Statute, supra note 166, art. 8(2)(c) & (e) in conjunction with art. 5(l)(c). An alternative
account of the developments summarized above (in text accompanying notes 281-82) is that Belgium's
approach to serious violations of the laws of war applicable in non-international armed conflicts
reflected principles of international law that had been developing for some time. Essentially this view
was taken by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in
the Tadid decision cited above, supra note 282.
284. As noted above in note 169, work is now under way for the adoption of a treaty on enforced
disappearances, which appears likely to include provisions establishing a treaty regime of universal
jurisdiction.
285. As noted previously, customary international law derives from (1) the practice of states (2)
followed by them out of a sense of legal obligation. See supra note 238; see also infra text
accompanying note 302. The phrase opiniojuris refers to the second, subjective, element.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 197-214.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 200-13.
288. See supra note 212.
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territory and/or by their nationals. 2 8 9 These countries have, therefore, judged
universal jurisdiction to advance their interests and values, at least when its
exercise is confined to the circumstances encompassed in their consent. The
present inquiry is concerned, then, with the ongoing accountability of courts
whose authority to dispense bystander justice has already been established.2 9 0
To place this challenge in proper perspective, it is helpful to refine the
analysis developed in Part III. When courts exercising universal jurisdiction
operate within the defined limits of their delegated competence, the politicocultural distance between the forum state and the state(s) with substantial links
to the crimes in question is not so vast after all. Courts authorized to implement
a treaty such as the Convention Against Torture enforce a common code of
humanity, embodying values shared across national boundaries. 2 9 ' Equally
important is a point developed in greater depth in Part VI: While questions of
justice belong especially to the political community that endured past depredations, it would be a mistake to assume that national deliberations are or should
be insulated from transnational legal and normative processes. In myriad ways,
Chileans participated in developing and enforcing the legal norms that were
brought to bear in the Pinochet proceedings in Europe.2 92 With these considerations in mind, the question at hand is how to further enhance the accountability
of courts exercising universal jurisdiction in relation to comparatively remote
political communities.
To begin, when courts exercise universal jurisdiction they should be receptive
to requests by states especially affected by the proceedings to present submissions setting forth their governments' views. 2 9 3 Beyond this, courts exercising

289. See supra text accompanying notes 232, 245-51. In Part VI, I consider some of the reasons
why countries have consented to universal jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying note 378.
290. One dimension of the issue addressed here is analogous to a familiar question of legal and
political philosophy-whether a community's past consent to a constitutional framework does the work
of constituting its consent to contemporary rule-making processes. For citations to views that emphasize the importance of community consensus in support of judicial rulings as an indicator of ongoing
consent to judicial review, see supra note 212.
291. Thus, as I have argued, values associated with self-government may be imperiled when legal
authorities in one nation attempt to advance international law beyond the sphere of genuine global
consensus or specific state consent. Besides the previously-noted example of Belgium's attempt to
prosecute the incumbent foreign minister of another state, see supra text accompanying note 280,
another instance of this brand of legal overreach is a Spanish magistrate's attempt to prosecute former
Chilean president Augusto Pinochet on genocide charges. Relying on an expansive definition of
genocide, Judge Garz6n-as well as the national court that upheld Spanish jurisdiction on the genocide
charges advanced by Garz6n-apparently overstepped the bounds of global consensus condemning
genocide as an international crime. See supra notes 115 and accompanying text. To the extent, however,
that Spanish authorities may seek to enforce their national law's definition of genocide against Spanish
citizens for conduct occurring in Spain, the concern raised here is not implicated.
292. See infra text accompanying notes 352-65.
293. The Chilean government actively participated in the extradition proceedings against General
Pinochet in London. See Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 192 (H.L. 1998) (opinion of
Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (noting that the Republic of Chile, which initially urged that Pinochet's
immunity be recognized, later applied for and was granted leave to intervene in the extradition
proceedings against its former president).
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universal jurisdiction should be receptive to participation, at the very least as
amici curiae, of victims' groups from the countries most concerned in the
prosecution as well as other non-governmental organizations representing their
interests.
More generally, courts exercising universal jurisdiction should operate with
maximum transparency. 294 In most democratic countries and in most circumstances, trials are public.2 95 But national legal systems vary in the degree to
which their courts explain publicly the reasoning behind their judgments.
Courts that exercise universal jurisdiction in particular should provide a public
and reasoned explanation for their rulings. At a time when foreign decisions are
readily accessible on the Internet, reasoned opinions can bridge the distance
between courts exercising universal jurisdiction and societies that are specially
affected by their rulings. Aware that their judgments will be closely scrutinized
abroad, judges exercising universal jurisdiction, in fact, have special incentive
to justify their decisions in terms capable of persuading their distant audiences. 296
Moreover, the discipline of providing publicly reasoned decisions operates as
a significant restraint on the misuse of judicial power.2 9 7 Writing in the context
of domestic lawmaking, legal scholars have noted that a judge's "need to
explain and justify her interpretations to the interpretive community of other
jurists, legislators, scholars, and lawyers" operates as a key constraint on
adjudication.2 9 8 While the accountability provided by professional elites should
not be confused with the responsiveness of courts to the general public in
democratic societies, the former becomes all the more important in a transnational setting.
Notably, an interpretive community of jurists now plays a disciplining role in
transnational adjudication. One need look no farther than the Pinochet case for

294. Cf Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-SelfExecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2003) (noting that concerns about accountability "may be
heightened by the lack of transparency associated with some international decisionmaking, which in
turn may increase monitoring costs and the potential for what economists call 'rent-seeking"'). See also
James Bacchus, Open Up the WTO, WASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 2004 (urging that dispute-settlement
procedures of World Trade Organization be open to the public).
295. There are exceptions. Many countries allow or require courts to bar the public from proceedings that involve juvenile defendants, victims of sexual assault, or the introduction of evidence whose
disclosure may threaten national security.
296. With these considerations in mind, it was doubtless politically useful, as well as legally
relevant, for British judges to remind their Chilean audience that Chile itself had accepted the treaty
obligations underpinning the law lords' judgment that former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet was
not wholly immune from legal process. See supra note 143.
297. See Seidman, supra note 172, at 1574.
298. Eskridge, supra note 181, at 1537; see also Fiss, supra note 206, at 744-47 (asserting that the
authority of rules disciplining judicial interpretations is derived from an authoritative interpretive
community comprising jurists). In Fiss's conception, "[jiudges do not belong to an interpretive
community as a result of shared views about particular issues or interpretations, but belong by virtue of
a commitment to uphold and advance the rule of law itself. They belong by virtue of their office." Id. at
746.
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evidence. As previously noted, key decisions by British judges cited judgments
by other national courts, regional courts, and international tribunals. 2 9 9 This
phenomenon is emblematic of contemporary transnational lawmaking: courts
enforcing international humanitarian law are talking to each other, shaping each
other's understanding of the law, critiquing each other and, together, constructing a common code of humanity.30 0 Not only are national courts citing decisions
from other jurisdictions, but international and regional courts are doing the
same.30 1
In fact, the methodology of international law fairly requires intensive interjurisdictional communication. As any student who has taken an introductory class in
public international law knows, the principal source of international legal
obligation other than treaties is customary international law, which "results from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."30 2 Faced with the question whether a particular practice
constitutes custom, a court applying international law must canvas the actions
of states the world over; for this purpose, relevant state practice includes the
decisions of national courts.30 3 The methodology of treaty interpretation is
somewhat different than that associated with customary law, but here, too,
courts have reason to canvas the views of other states-to be precise, other
States Parties. Although national courts are not bound to follow the views of
other States Parties' courts in interpreting the same treaty, 304 classic rules of
treaty interpretation make such views relevant in ascertaining a treaty's meaning.305 If applied with appropriate rigor, the methodology of international law

299. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
300. For further discussion of cross-fertilization among courts belonging to different legal systems,
see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004); Amnon Reichman, 'When We Sit to
Judge We Are Being Judged': The Israeli GSS Case, Ex parte Pinochet and Domestic/Global Deliberation, 9 CARDOzo J. INT'L & Comp. L. 41 (2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,40 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000). Even the famously insular U.S. Supreme Court has recently evinced a
receptivity to cross-fertilization. See Charles Lane, Thinking Outside the U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 4,
2003 (noting that recent rulings of the Supreme Court "reflect the influence of international legal
norms, as well as rulings by courts in foreign countries").
301. For example, U.N. ad hoc tribunal decisions have repeatedly drawn upon case law of national
courts, including courts exercising universal jurisdiction, as well as decisions rendered by human rights
treaty bodies. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, at T 153 n.170 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (citing five decisions of United States federal courts); id. 160
nn.179-80 (citing decisions of European Court of Human Rights and U.N. Human Rights Committee);
Prosecutor v. Tadid, No. IT-94-1-AR72, at 57, 105 I.L.R. 453 (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugoslavia
App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) (decision dismissing defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction) (citing decision of the Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann case).
302. RESTATEMENT, supra note 93, § 102(2).
303. See id. at 19.
304. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 504 n. I (Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds., rev. ed.
2001).
305. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 31(3)(a)-(b) (providing that
subsequent agreement between parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty or subsequent practice
establishing such an agreement shall be taken into account in treaty interpretation). The Vienna
Convention cites an additional source of interpretive guidance-"any relevant rules of international law
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brings significant constraints to the process of transnational enforcement of
international law; national judges are not free to impose their own country's
idiosyncratic approach upon non-consenting states under the guise of enforcing
international law.
In recent years, the type of transjurisdictional communication fostered by
international legal adjudication has operated, in practice and not just in theory,
to constrain the development and exercise of universal jurisdiction. For example, in several cases tried in the 1990s, German courts imposed a judiciallydeveloped requirement that there be a legitimizing point of contact between the
particular case and Germany. German courts' application of this requirement
was inconsistent,3 0 6 and in any event the requirement does not appear on the
face of Germany's 2002 Code of Crimes Against International Law, at least in
respect of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 3 0 7 Even so, citing
the earlier German decisions as well as recent amendments to Belgium's law on
universal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Spain indicated in February 2003
that Spanish courts should exercise jurisdiction over genocide only when there
is a "point of connection" with Spain.os
There is growing evidence that the discipline imposed by transjudicial communication can serve to legitimize as well as constrain courts. As Joseph Weiler
has observed, the dialogue between courts speaking a common language of law
helps account for the prestige of the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.). In
Weiler's view, a key source of the E.C.J.'s "compliance pull" is "the legal
language itself: the language of reasoned interpretation, logical deduction,
systemic and temporal coherence-the artifacts that national courts would
partly rely on to enlist obedience within their own national orders." 3 " Weiler's
insight suggests that courts exercising universal jurisdiction may, through wellreasoned opinions, earn the respect of disparate and distant political communities through the mediating influence of a transnational community of jurists. 310
VI. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIONS

The final plank in the conservative critique of universal jurisdiction is the

applicable in the relations between the parties" to a treaty. Id. art. 31(3)(c). Thus, the methodology of
customary international law is often relevant in treaty interpretation.
306. These cases are described in AMNESTY REPORT, supra note I1, at 96-101.
307. See REDRESS & FIDH REPORT, supra note 10, at 17.
308. See Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre el caso Guatemala por genocidio [Judgment of the
Spanish Supreme Court Concerning the Guatemala Genocide Case], STS, Feb. 25, 2003 (No. 327/
2003) (Spain), translatedin 42 I.L.M. 686, 698 (2003).
309. J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26
COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 521 (1994).

310. Reinforcing Weiler's conclusions, a study distilling the insights of judges, lawyers and political
scientists who have closely followed the work of supra-national courts concluded that the quality of a
supra-national court's judicial reasoning was a key factor accounting for the relative effectiveness of the
court. Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 318-23 (1997).
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charge that its exercise undermines democracies newly emerging from repressive governance. This claim has two principal strands. First, some commentators argue that foreign prosecutions could have a destabilizing effect in the
country that endured atrocious crimes, potentially reversing tenuous progress in
its transition to democracy.3 1' This concern loomed large in critical commentary
following the arrest of General Pinochet in London; not a few observers warned
that his detention might revive the Chilean military's penchant for political
intervention and deepen divisions within Chilean society. 3 12
Second, some argue that prosecutions by bystander states upend processes of
democratic deliberation that properly belong to the political community directly
affected by the crimes in question. John Bolton seemed to have something like
this in mind when he denounced the European proceedings against General
Pinochet on the asserted ground that, "[m]orally and politically, what Pinochet's
regime did or did not do is primarily a question for Chile to resolve." 3 1 3 To
subject Pinochet to prosecution abroad when his own country has accepted his
self-amnesty, the argument runs, is to usurp Chilean society's own decisions
about crimes of the Pinochet era.314 This critique proceeds from the premise
that questions of punishment belong not to humanity writ large, but to particular
communities-above all, to the society most deeply affected by the crimes in
question.
This view directly challenges a core justification of universal jurisdiction,
which emphasizes the universality of interest in and responsibility for repressing atrocious crimes. To understand this point, it is helpful to return to the
moment when universal jurisdiction was first made widely applicable to human
rights crimes, the aftermath of World War II. Justifying its jurisdiction, a U.S.
Military Tribunal operating in Germany emphasized that the defendants were
accused "[n]ot [of] crimes against any specified country, but against humanity."3 15 It followed that "humanity" itself could summon perpetrators to account
through universal jurisdiction: "[T]he inalienable and fundamental rights of
common man need not lack for a court... . Humanity can assert itself by law. It
has taken on the role of authority.... Those who are indicted .. . are answering
to humanity itself, humanity which has no political boundaries and no geographical limitations. , 3 16

311. See Goldsmith and Krasner, supra note 29, at 51; Rabkin, supra note 43, at 33. Against this
claim, human rights advocates assert that it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify a situation in which
a country has been destablized by prosecutions for human rights crimes. See supra note 30.
312. See David Bosco, Dictatorsin the Dock, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 4, 2000, at 26, 29.

313. American Servicemembers' ProtectionAct: Hearing on H.R. 4654 Before the House Committee
on International Relations, 107th Cong. (2000) (testimony of John R. Bolton, Senior Vice President,
American Enterprise Institute).
314. See Kissinger, supra note 46, at 86, 90-91.
315. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW

316. Id. at 498.

No.

10, at 411, 497 (1950).
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With the Nuremberg precedent, the Tribunal continued, "it is inconceivable
that . .. the law of humanity should ever lack for a tribunal. Where law exists, a
court will rise. Thus, the court of humanity ... will never adjourn." 3 17 When an
Israeli court rendered judgment against Adolf Eichmann in 1961 it, too, invoked
the interests of mankind: "The abhorrent crimes defined in [Israeli] Law are not
crimes under Israel [sic] law alone. These crimes, which struck at the whole of
mankind and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offences against the
law of nations itself. ..
If a core justification for universal jurisdiction is a claim of universal conscience and responsibility, an important corollary emphasizes practical concerns: by their nature, crimes against universal conscience are unlikely to be
punished in the state where they occurred. This justification had strong resonance in the aftermath of Hitler's crimes; German courts were not to be trusted
to prosecute major Nazi war criminals. Thus, one U.S. military tribunal operating in Germany observed that surrendering the Nazi defendants before it for
prosecution by German authorities would have been the "equivalent [of] a
passport to freedom." 3 19
More recently, this rationale for universal jurisdiction has been amplified by a
related consideration. In many countries recently scourged by mass atrocity, the
judicial system is in a state of wholesale collapse. Decades after the Khmer
Rouge were routed from power, for instance, Cambodia was bereft of seasoned
judges and lawyers, who had been targeted for extermination in the 1970s.32 0 In
these circumstances, the state where atrocities occurred may not be able to bring
perpetrators to account.
In sum, legal justifications for universal jurisdiction over atrocious crimes
comprise two core claims: (1) certain crimes offend humanity writ large-a
claim that translates into a global entitlement to bring perpetrators to account;
and (2) unless every state assumes responsibility to prosecute the perpetrators of
such crimes, many will likely elude the net of justice. Beneath the second

317. Id. at 499.
318. Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 26 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jm. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R.
277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962). Of course, in prosecuting Eichmann Israel was not acting as a disinterested state.
In fact, jurisdiction was predicated on the principle of passive personality and the protective principle
as well as on universal jurisdiction. See supra note 93.
319. United States v. List (The Hostages Trial) (U.S. Mil. Trib. Nuremberg 1948), in 8 LAW REPORTS
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 55 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n ed., 1949); see also United States v.
Klein (The Hadamar Trial) (U.S. Mil. Comm'n Wiesbaden 1945), in I LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 46, 53 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n ed., 1947) (sustaining a U.S. Military Commission's
jurisdiction in part on the basis of "'universality of jurisdiction over war crimes,' . . . according to
which every independent State has, under International Law, jurisdiction to punish . .. war criminals in
its custody, regardless of the nationality of the victim or of the place where the offence was committed,
particularly where, for some reason, the criminal would otherwise go unpunished").
320. In recognition of enduring deficiencies in Cambodia's judicial system, the United Nations has
concluded an agreement to participate in a special judicial process, organized under Cambodian law, to
try surviving leaders of Khmer Rouge-era atrocities. See Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer
Rouge Trials, U.N. Doc. A/57/769 (2003).
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rationale is an implied claim: Universal jurisdiction provides an antidote to the
impunity that accomplished despots are likely to enjoy in the countries that
endured their crimes.
Against these claims, critics say that universal jurisdiction has gone too far. If
Nuremberg was justified, they argue, contemporary prosecutions push a noble
effort "to extremes that risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of
governments." 3 2 ' Later I will introduce considerations that call for considerable
refinement of this critique. But first I want to make clear why I believe it merits
serious consideration.
A.

UPENDING DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIONS?

Whether one subscribes to a deterrence, retributivist, expressive or other
theory of punishment, such questions as what behavior should be criminalized
and whether or how individuals should be punished matter deeply to the
community in whose territory the conduct in question occurs. These issues are
thus commonly recognized as ones that ought to be addressed through processes
of self-governance. This is not to say that unanimity on matters of criminal
punishment is either achievable or desirable for any political community; robust
debate about such questions as the appropriateness of severe or mandatory
penalties is the daily fare of a vibrant democracy. Nor is it to suggest that
questions of punishment are committed to the exclusive province of local
jurisdiction. Far from it. 3 2 2 But self-government would have thin meaning if it
did not include the right of political communities to debate-and determinethe code of lawful behavior within their territorial jurisdiction, as well as the
consequences that may attach to breaches.
The claim that questions of punishment belong to particular communities has
special significance when the crimes in question arise from a pattern of severe
repression. In the aftermath of mass atrocities, the question "what should be
done about the guilty?" 3 2 3 becomes a defining issue for the society in which the
crimes occurred. Whether a country tries to bury past depredations in a grave of
silence and denial, examine and condemn them through the work of an officiallysanctioned truth commission, 324 purge from public office those determined to
have been culpable for their roles in systemic repression, provide reparations to
321. Kissinger, supra note 46, at 86.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 315-19.
323. The phrase comes from Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKs, Feb. 1, 1990, at 34.
324. There is no standard definition of truth commissions, of which over thirty have been established
in the past quarter-century. A leading expert on the phenomenon defines truth commissions as
bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) truth commissions focus on the past; (2)
they investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific event; (3) a
truth commission is a temporary body, typically in operation for six months to two years, and
completing its work with the submission of a report; and (4) these commissions are officially
sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the state (and sometimes also by the armed
opposition, as in a peace accord).
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victims, and/or punish the perpetrators, the path it chooses is constitutive of its
political community.
Tellingly, the phrase transitionaljustice has become a term of art for policies
of justice devised by societies emerging from repressive governance.3 2 5 The
words connote the hope that justice can be transformative, delivering a society
from the past it now condemns to a future rooted in its devotion to human
dignity and the rule of law. Governments that succeed brutal regimes may see
criminal trials and other programs as vehicles for the "construction of a permanent, unmistakable wall between the new beginnings and the old tyranny." 3 26
Through the work of truth commissions, prosecutions and other measures,
societies recently scourged by ghastly crime affirm foundational values and
reconstitute their political community based upon a common commitment to
those values. At these moments, the social contract conjured by political
philosophers as an analytic tool becomes incarnate in politics.
The deliberations surrounding a society's program of transitional justice are
not the sort that should be displaced by the paternalistic judgment of international law (though I want to reserve for now the question whether universal
jurisdiction has this effect). It is not simply the case that reckoning with past
crimes is a matter of unique interest to the community that endured abominations. Societies that have been governed though wholesale repression bear a
special burden of reckoning, deriving from both moral and functional imperatives.
Morally, their burden stems from what Karl Jaspers called political guilt. 3 2 7
In Jaspers' lexicon, political guilt, "involving the deeds of statesmen and of the
citizenry of a state, results in my having to bear the consequences of the deeds
of the state whose power governs me and under whose order I live."3 28 In his
view, German citizens bore collective political (though not criminal) guilt by
virtue of their "unconditional political surrender" to Hitler.3 29 Jintaro Ishida, a

PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 14 (2001).

325. Excerpts from various writings on the subject of transitional justice filled three large volumes
published in 1995.

See UNITED

STATES INSTITUTE

OF PEACE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:

How EMERGING

DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). The literature has expanded
considerably since then. See, e.g., Run G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
326. Oro KIRCHHEIMER, POLTCAL JUSTICE 308 (1961). While Kirchheimer was writing about

criminal trials undertaken by a new government to judge the policies and practices of a predecessor
regime, the same point applies to truth commissions. As Priscilla Hayner has noted, reports produced
by several truth commissions have become the founding documents of democratic governments that
emerged from the ashes of dictatorship. See Interview with Priscilla Hayner, Weekend Edition Saturday: Truth Commissions (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 25, 2001), available at http://
www.npr.org/features/feature.phpwfld= 1127966.
327. Writing in the aftermath of the Holocaust, Jaspers identified four types of guilt pertaining to
Nazi crimes, only one of which was the criminal guilt for which individuals were held to account in
postwar prosecutions. KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 25-26 (1947) (E.B. Ashton trans.,

Fordham Univ. Press 2000).
328. Id. at 25.
329. Id. at 72.
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Japanese historian who has chronicled his country's responsibility for World
War II atrocities, evokes a related notion-the continuity of political responsibility for past crimes of state. "Even if you were born after the war," he told a
reporter, "you still shoulder the history of your country."3 30
The functional aspect of transitional justice relates to its role as a vehicle of
social and political transformation. It is easy to see a country's process of
reckoning with past crimes as a retrospective exercise. But that misses a crucial
point: societies that have instituted programs of transitional justice typically see
the undertaking as laying a foundation for their collective future. The notion
behind their aspirations is enigmatic and multilayered. I have already touched
on one dimension: Through programs of transitional justice, societies emerging
from dictatorship seek to draw a line between the values and policies of the
ancien riegime and their own. By instituting criminal trials or pursuing other
policies of transitional justice, the new government condemns brutal policies of
its predecessor and signals the dawning of a new era.
In larger perspective, programs of transitional justice may aim at repairing
societies that have endured unspeakable crimes. That individual survivors of
torture may need special care is a point we can readily grasp. A more elusive
point is that whole societies must be repaired after they have endured epic
evil.3 3' Reporting on two countries' efforts to come to terms with past systems
of politically-motivated torture, Lawrence Weschler captured the point this way:
I began to realize that there are societies-entire polities-which might
themselves be considered torture victims, in every bit as great a need of
rehabilitation as the individuals persisting in their midst. Indeed, torture itself,
during repressive regimes, has a dual role: the expunging of the capacity for
subjective aspiration in specific individuals, and through their example (the
whiff of terror their fate spreads), the expunging of that capacity in the wider
society as well. When individuals are being tortured and everyone knows
about it and no one seems able to do a thing to help, primordial mysteries at
the root of human community come under fundamental assault as well.
Intersubjectivity is laid to waste. 33 2
Thus as Weschler suggests, programs of transitional justice may help restore
citizens' capacity to be citizens in a democratic society. 3 3 3 Pablo de Grieff takes
330. Seth Mydans, Japanese Veteran Writes of Brutal Philippine War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, at
A8.
331. Scholars of transitional justice have frequently invoked therapeutic models and adapted them to
a social context. But as Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein have cautioned, the assumptions behind
this approach may not always be warranted. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence
and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 Hum. RTs. Q. 573,
593-95 (2002).
332. LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 241 (1998).
333. Cf TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND xviii (1996) (asserting that victims of past atrocities
"can truly heal and resume their contributions to society only when their dignity and suffering have
been officially acknowledged").
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the point farther: a key aim of programs of transitional justice is "to return (or,
in some cases to establish for the very first time) the status of citizens to
individuals." 3 34 Integrally related to this aim, transitional justice seeks to establish or restore civic trust among citizens and between citizens and their government.33
If national processes of reckoning with the past are deeply concerned with
victims, they may be "just as important for the collaborators. Preventing
dictatorship's return requires a full understanding of the mechanisms of dictatorship."336 This, at any rate, is a deep article of faith among proponents of
transitional justice.33 Of course there is no way to prove its truth. For that, we
would need to know the results of paths not taken as well as the reality that
unfolded in the wake of an enacted program of transitional justice. But we can
know that some programs of transitional justice have had a palpable effect on
societies' understanding of the factors that led to past atrocities and bolstered
their resolve to prevent a recurrence.
By common agreement, for example, the work of South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) breached the fortress of denial that many
white South Africans had erected around themselves in respect of apartheidrelated atrocities. 3 Although those atrocities had been documented in chilling
detail across decades, many white South Africans regarded these reports as
untrustworthy until they heard perpetrators confess to their crimes before the
TRC's amnesty committee. 9
In common with many other truth commissions, the TRC adopted recommendations aimed at preventing a recurrence of past abuses as well as repairing the
harm suffered by apartheid's victims. Learning from the past was, in the view of
at least some members of the TRC, all about the future.34 0 In myriad ways, then,
a nation's reckoning with past atrocities may help restore its civic health.

334. Pablo de Grieff, Reparations Efforts in InternationalPerspective; What Compensation Contributes to the Achievement of Imperfect Justice, in REPAIRING THE UNFORGIVABLE: REPARATIONS AND

RECONSTRUCTION INSOUTH AFRICA (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Erik Doxtader eds., forthcoming 2004).
335. Id.; see also Pablo de Grieff, Justice and Reparationsin Repairing the Past: Compensationfor
Victims of Human Rights Abuse (forthcoming 2004).
336.

ROSENBERG, supra note 333, at xviii.

337. The author of a book that disclosed previously unknown facts about a 1968 massacre in Mexico
expressed the importance of confronting past atrocities in terms that emphasize the responsibilities of
citizenship: "How can we be citizens," she asked, "if we do not know what happened before, if we
don't know why political and economic decisions were made - if we don't understand anything?" Tim
Weiner, Mexico Digs at Last for Truth About 1968 Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A3 (quoting
Claudia Sierra Campuzano).
338. See, e.g., HAYNER, supra note 324, at 25.
339. The statute establishing the TRC vested the body with authority to confer amnesty for
politically motivated crimes provided the perpetrator fully confessed to his crimes. With the inducement of amnesty, some perpetrators confessed to their crimes in nationally televised hearings.
340. As Audrey Chapman and Patrick Ball have chronicled, TRC members did not share uniform
perspectives, perhaps accounting for inconsistent approaches within their final report. See Audrey R.
Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South
Africa, and Guatemala,23 Hum. RTs. Q. 1, 30-32 (2001).
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Although I have focused on considerations that have special relevance during
periods of transition from systemic repression to consolidated democracy, these
considerations link up to theories of moral autonomy that are central to some
strands of democratic theory. Robert Dahl, for instance, suggests that a basic
justification for self-government derives from the intrinsic value of moral
autonomy. 34 1 The "reasons for respecting moral autonomy," in Dahl's view,
"sift down to one's belief that it is a quality without which human beings cease
to be fully human and in the total absence of which they would not be human at
all." 3 4 2 Democratic government furthers moral autonomy by maximizing "the
feasible scope of self-determination for those who are subject to collective
decisions." 3 4 3 If, with Dahl, we believe that democratic government is desirable
because it maximizes the scope for moral self-determination, we must take
seriously the charge that bystander justice can sideline a society's process of
collective deliberation about abuses committed in its name and against members
of its polity.
John Stuart Mill also emphasized the intrinsic importance of moral autonomy,
not only for each individual but also because of the social benefits that accrue
from ensuring a protected sphere of personal sovereignty in which character can
develop. For Mill, participatory politics was important in large part because of
its educative effect and its role in fostering public spiritedness. In his conception, a key aim of democratic governance was to inculcate in citizens a
commitment to the general interest, and not just each individual's personal
interest.344 Of course, Mill was thinking mainly of "normal" politics, rather than
the extraordinary politics of societies emerging from dictatorship. But the
values he cherished have special resonance for societies recovering from a
protracted period of brutal governance. As suggested by the preceding account,
many believe that a key test of the success of programs of transitional justice is
whether they lead citizens to understand and accept their own responsibility for
their countries' moral descent, if only through their silent complicity. 34 5 Through
such acceptance, citizens may be inoculated against the temptation to remain

341. Dahl defines a morally autonomous person as "one who decides on his moral principles, and
the decisions that significantly depend on them, following a process of reflection, deliberation, scrutiny,
and consideration." ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 91 (1989).

342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See JOHN STUART MILL, Considerationson Representative Government, in UTILITARIANISM 188,
224 (Geraint Williams ed., new ed. 1993) (1863).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 336-339. Some aspects of this notion call to mind Karl
Jaspers' conceptions of metaphysical and political guilt. In his typology, metaphysical guilt is based
upon the responsibility that humans bear for one another, particularly if crimes are committed in a
person's presence or with her knowledge. "If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent [such crimes],"
Jaspers wrote, "I too am guilty. If I was present at the murder of others without risking my life to
prevent it, I feel guilty in a way not adequately conceivable either legally, politically or morally."
Political guilt involves the responsibility of citizens for depredations of the state. See supra text
accompanying notes 328-330. This type of guilt is based upon the responsibility that citizens share for
the actions of their leaders, even if the former opposed the latter. JASPERS, supra note 327, at 26.

2004]

WHOSE JUSTICE?

1123

silent if, in the future, the rights of others are threatened.
In sum, principles of self-government are deeply implicated in the way a
country confronts its own legacy of mass atrocities. Measures of transitional
justice are constitutive political acts, ideally restoring to full citizenship those
who in the past were denied the protection of law. Further, we may be most
confident that a country will not once again descend into the abyss of wholesale
repression if it addresses past abuses through home-grown policies of reckoning
and repair.
B. ENHANCING DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIONS?

If the conservative critique of universal jurisdiction finds support in core
values of political community, it nonetheless suffers from deeply flawed analysis. To begin, we should not uncritically accept the claim that post-Pinochet
Chile was exercising the prerogatives of a full-fledged democracy when its
government accepted Pinochet's self-amnesty. After all, while preparing to
relinquish power, Pinochet credibly threatened military force in the event his
self-amnesty was challenged." To deliberate under the threat of destabilizing
force is hardly an ideal exercise in self-government.
More fundamentally, the critique of universal jurisdiction framed by leading
exponents falsely assumes that political communities decide how to confront
past atrocities in a hermetically-sealed universe. From this premise the critique
proceeds to its principal charge: enforcement of international law through the
exercise of universal jurisdiction improperly disturbs policy choices resulting
from domestic deliberations. To see why the assumptions underlying this critique are unsound, it is useful to deepen the account of transnational legal
process set forth earlier.34 7
As legal and international relations scholars have recognized, domestic and
transnational political and social processes are constitutive of the values that
shape both international and domestic law. 3 4 8 The rules of international law
that result from these processes may in turn reinforce and even significantly
(re)shape values within discrete political communities, as well as across national boundaries. It is not simply the case that domestic politics define state
preferences, which are then advanced by a state's diplomatic representatives in

346. See AMERICAS WATCH, CHILE IN TRANSmON 1988-1989, at 73 (1989) (quoting Pinochet saying,
"No one is going to touch my people. The day they do, the state of law will come to an end.").
347. See supra Parts II and IV.
348. On the importance of values in shaping transnational political processes, see generally IDEAS
AND FOREIGN POLICY (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993). See also ERNST B. HAAS,
WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER 2 (1990) ("Interests cannot be articulated without values.... The interests
to be realized by collaborative action are an expression of the actors' values"). On the importance of
ideas in shaping human rights policy in particular, see Diane F. Orentlicher, The Power of an Idea: The
Impact of United States Human Rights Policy, I TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1991); Kathryn
Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western
Europe, in GOLDSTEIN AND KEOHANE, supra, at 139.
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their negotiations with representatives of other countries. 34 9 Rather, interactions
across borders often shape participants' values in ways that define their international negotiating positions. In turn, the international norms constructed through
these processes loop back into domestic political and lawmaking processes.
Harold Koh describes the legal dimension of these phenomena in terms of
transnational legal process:
Transnational law transforms, mutates and percolates up and down, from the
public to the private, from the domestic to the international level and back
down again.

. .

. From this process of interaction, new rules of law emerge,

which are interpreted, internalized, and enforced, thus beginning the process
all over again. Thus, the concept embraces not just the descriptive workings
of a process, but the normativity of that process. 350
Thus norms embodied in international law, such as the notion that torturers
should be punished,3 5 ' may at first percolate up from national law and political
processes. Once embodied in international law, at least some norms seep back
into domestic settings, reshaping or reinforcing values of domestic political
communities.
Nonstate actors play key roles in lawmaking and other normative processes
that transcend domestic boundaries. In the Pinochet case, the court room
became a focal point for this phenomenon. As previously noted, it was private
actors, not a public prosecutor, who activated the criminal proceedings in Spain
that led to Pinochet's indictment.3 2 Significantly, the petitioners were Chilean
victims of Pinochet-era human rights violations (some possessing dual SpanishChilean citizenship), whose efforts to secure justice were backed by a transnational coalition of human rights activists that included Chilean NGOs, Spanish
lawyers, European and American human rights advocates, and Chilean exiles in
Europe.
The Pinochet proceedings also exemplified the significant role that sub-state
actors play in transnational legal processes. States do not always participate in
transnational processes as unitary actors; sometimes their participation can be

349. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 128 (1996) ("States do
not always know what they want. They and the people in them develop perceptions of interest and
understandings of desirable behavior from social interactions with others in the world they inhabit.");
cf ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 128 (1999) ("constructivists
believe that the interests and identities of states are created-at least in part-through interaction and
can change through interaction"). By recognizing that political processes shape-and therefore reshapestate preferences, these and other writers depart from the realist approach, which tends to assume that
state preferences are "exogenous and fixed." Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of
Liberal States, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 503, 507 (1995).
350. Harold Hongju Koh, supra note 262, at 184.
351. This notion is codified in the Convention Against Torture, which played a key role in the
Pinochet proceedings in Europe. See supra note 144 and text accompanying notes 143-149.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
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meaningfully explained only by disaggregating the state.35 3 Inevitably in light
of formal guarantees of judicial independence in both Spain and the United
Kingdom, the role of courts in both countries was distinct from that of the
executive.3 54 Less obviously but of greater relevance here, the communication
among judicial officials in Spain, the United Kingdom, Chile and elsewhere 3 5 5
helped transform values and expectations transnationally, with particularly profound effect in Chile.
The decisions of judges in both Madrid and London had a transformative
impact on judges and prosecutors elsewhere, exemplifying what Harold Koh
calls the normativity of transnational lawmaking processes.3 5 6 That Pinochet
was arrested in a country whose legal culture epitomizes conservative tradition
seemed to inspire the legal imagination of judicial officials across Europe. On

353. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 519 (1997) (asserting that while states may act in a largely unitary fashion
in some areas of foreign policy, with respect to others "the state may be 'disaggregated,' with different
elements-executives, courts, central banks, regulatory bureaucracies, and ruling parties, for exampleconducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests").
354. Although public prosecutors in Spain initially approved the criminal investigation of Pinochet
(which, as noted, was activated by private parties), they actively opposed its continuation following
Pinochet's arrest in London. See supra text accompanying note 90. The Prime Minister of Spain at the
time, Jos6 Maria Aznar, told Chilean officials that he disapproved of the investigation by magistrate
Baltasar Garz6n but could not stop it. In Aznar's view, Garz6n's inquiries complicated Spain's
diplomatic and trade relations with Chile. See Marlise Simons, Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer:Magistrate
of Explosive Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at Al.
In England, too, the executive and judicial branches acted independently of each other in key
respects, although their respective roles were not ostensibly opposing. One of the first crucial decisions
about Pinochet's fate following his arrest had to be made by Jack Straw, then British Home Secretary,
and it also fell to Straw to decide at various later stages how to respond to Spain's request for
Pinochet's extradition. Up until the law lords issued their crucial ruling in Pinochet III, Straw took the
position that the issues surrounding Spain's extradition request should be left to judicial resolution. See
David Sugarman, From unimaginable to possible: Spain, Pinochet and the judicializationofpower, 3 J.
SPANISH CULTURAL STUD. 107, 114 (2002). For their part, the law lords who concluded that Pinochet was
not wholly immune from criminal process signaled in their opinions that this ruling need not preclude
the Home Secretary from declining to extradite Pinochet to Spain. Indeed, virtually every law lord who
concluded that Pinochet was liable to extradition included a "back to Jack" invitation in his opinion.
See, e.g., Pinochet III, supra note 63, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 260 (H.L. 1998) (opinion of Lord BrowneWilkinson) (noting that when the Secretary of State issued an authority to proceed pursuant to British
extradition law, he assumed that a "whole range" of torture and murder charges would be the basis of
extradition proceedings; since the present decision "exclude[d] from consideration a very large number
of those charges," this would "obviously require the Secretary of State to reconsider his decision .. . in
the light of the changed circumstances"); see also id. at 248 (opinion of Lord Hope); id. at 264 (opinion
of Lord Hutton); id at 267 (opinion of Lord Saville); id. at 279 (opinion of Lord Millett). Each branch,
then, seemed to regard the Pinochet matter as a proverbial hot potato and sought relief from the other
branch. Ultimately, Straw brought the British proceedings to an end when he decided, based upon a
review of Pinochet's health, that the former Chilean leader could return home. See Clifford Krauss,
Freed by Britain, Pinochet Is Facinga Battle at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at Al.
355. I do not mean to imply that there was direct communication among these officials, although
there has been some of this. Rather, I am referring to indirect communication through the impact on
judicial officials in one country of decisions taken or issued by judicial officials in another. See infra
text accompanying notes 356-65.
356. See supra text accompanying note 350.
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the heels of Pinochet's arrest in London, several other European countries lined
up behind Spain seeking Pinochet's extradition. 5 Pinochet's arrest in London
seemingly legitimized across Western Europe the idea that the former Chilean
leader was an appropriate subject of transnational criminal proceedings.
For his part, Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garz6n reportedly was emboldened
to pursue Pinochet by recent international efforts to prosecute perpetrators of
"ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda. 5 The
unexpected success of Garz6n's seemingly quixotic quest-no one, after all,
expected his investigation to lead to Pinochet's arrest in London-has in turn
inspired judges throughout Latin America, 3 5 9 as well as Europe and Africa,3 O to
pursue dictators previously thought to be legally untouchable. An astute Chilean
observer, Jos6 Zalaquett, calls this the "Garz6n effect." Zalaquett explains:
The initiative of the now world famous Spanish investigative judge who
sought Pinochet's extradition was soon emulated by judges from other European countries who likewise petitioned the United Kingdom to have him
extradited. Garz6n seems also to have inspired judges and prosecutors in
many other countries. . .. He seems to have ushered into the world arena a
new figure-the international judge (or more properly, the international prosecutor). ... He will probably be remembered for having foreshadowed a
period of international judicial activism ... . 36 1
The most profound reverberations of the European proceedings were in
Chile. On December 1, 2000, Chilean Judge Juan Guzmin formally charged
Pinochet with the kidnapping of political opponents in the aftermath of the 1973
coup that brought Pinochet to power and placed the former president under
house arrest. 3 6 2 To be sure, even before Pinochet was arrested in England,
357. See Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
316, 330 (1999).
358. According to the New York Times, Judge Garz6n "felt encouraged not only by support from
international legal scholars and a United Nations committee, but also by the new efforts of Western
powers to insure trials and punishment for those responsible for grave human rights violations in
Rwanda and the Balkans." Marlise Simons, Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer: Magistrate of Explosive
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at Al.
359. See Anthony Faiola, "Pinochet Effect" Spreading; Case Opens Way to Other Prosecutions,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 5, 2000, at A I (reporting that arrest of Pinochet inspired efforts to bring to justice
former dictators in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay who had long been thought beyond the reach of
justice).
360. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
361. Jos6 Zalaquett, The Pinochet Case: International and Domestic Repercussions, in THE ASPEN
INSTITUTE, THE LEGACY OF ABUSE 53 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 2002).
362. See Clifford Krauss, Pinochet's Arrest Ordered by Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2000, at Al. As
noted, legal proceedings against Pinochet in Chile were later halted when the former president was
found mentally unfit to stand trial. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78. More recently, however,
an appeals court in Santiago ruled in favor of removing the former president's immunity from
prosecution in a case involving disappearances in the 1970s; its ruling was upheld by Chile's Supreme
Court in August 2004. See supra note 78.
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Chilean society had made significant progress in its national process of reckoning with his crimes. 363 Even so, proceedings against Pinochet in Spain, England
and other countries had a catalytic effect in Chile. In the words of Chilean
journalist Patricia Verdugo, the 503 days that Pinochet spent under arrest in
London "changed Chilean politics. The 'untouchable' had been touched. ...
The fog of fear began to dissipate in the deepest recesses of [Chile]." 3 The
New York Times reported that the case that led to Pinochet's house arrest in
Chile "began to gain currency in Chile only after General Pinochet [had been]
arrested two years [earlier] in London on a Spanish warrant." 3 6 5
Far from displacing Chile's internal project of addressing its past, then, the
arrest abroad of General Pinochet re-energized Chile's process of recovering
from dictatorship, fortifying its democratic transition. The possibility that Pinochet could be prosecuted outside Chile did not diminish or circumvent that
country's democratic deliberations, but rather enlarged the space within which
Chilean society could address its past.
Nor is Chile an isolated example. In August 2003, for example, both houses
of Argentina's Congress voted to annul two 1980s-era amnesty laws. This action
has been attributed in part to Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garz6n's issuance of
warrants seeking the extradition of 45 Argentine military officers and one
civilian.3 66
Against these developments, the conservative critique of the Pinochet case
363. See Richard A. Falk, Assessing the Pinochet Litigation: Whither Universal Jurisdiction?,in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 5, at 97, 103 (Stephen Macedo, ed. 2003); Zalaquett, supra note

361.
364. PATRICIA VERDUGO, CHILE, PINOCHET, AND THE CARAVAN OF DEATH 195 (Marcel Montecino trans.,

rev. ed. 2001). In similar terms a journalist wrote, "Pinochet's disgrace abroad has largely set Chileans
free of deep-seated fears of their old master." Anthony Faiola, On Pinochet'sTrail, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26,
2000, at Al.
365. Krauss, supra note 362, at Al; see also Reed Brody, Justice: The First Casualtyof Truth?; The
Global Movement to End Impunityfor Human Rights Abuses Faces a Daunting Question, THE NATION,
Apr. 30, 2001, at 25, 25-26 (noting that after Pinochet's arrest and detention in England, "[p]reviously
timid Chilean judges began looking for chinks in the dictator's legal armor. .. . The number of criminal
cases against Pinochet jumped to dozens, then hundreds"); Faiola, supra note 364, at Al (reporting that
although prosecution seemed "impossible" when the first case against Pinochet was filed before Judge
Guzmin in 1998, "Chile-along with Guzman's case-has changed in profound ways since the arrest
of Pinochet"); Clifford Krauss, High Court Voids Chargesfor Pinochet; Sets New Date, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2000, at All ("A trial would have been unthinkable [in Chile] until General Pinochet was
arrested two years ago in London on a Spanish warrant."); Tina Rosenberg, Editorial Observer: In
Chile, the Balance Tips Toward the Victims, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 2000, at A20 (stating that the
"catalyst" for Chilean judges' "new assertiveness was the arrest of Mr. Pinochet in Britain on a Spanish
warrant in 1998").
366. See Diane Orentlicher, Independent Study on Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to
Assist States in Strengthening Their Domestic Capacity to Combat All Aspects of Impunity, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/88,
30, 51, available at http://www.unhchr.chlHuridocda/Huridoca.nsf/O/
94b45b7493a558cac I 256e6e005a6d Id/$FILE/GO411355.pdf [hereinafter UN Study on Impunity]. Ellen
Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink explain the general phenomenon these developments exemplify in terms of a
"justice cascade"-a rapid normative transformation rooted in transnational phenomena-affecting
Latin America in particular. See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution
and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
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seems not so much implausible as impoverished. John Bolton's account of "a
Spanish magistrate operating completely outside the Chilean system" seeking to
"impose[] his will on the Chilean people"36 7 is, at the very least, descriptively
inadequate in light of the central role of Chileans in driving the European
proceedings against Pinochet. In larger perspective, it would be a mistake to
suppose that Chilean society exists, deliberates, and determines its democratic
destiny in isolation from transnational processes. As Martha Finnemore has
observed, "[tihe fact that we live in an international society means that what we
want and, in some ways, who we are are shaped by the social norms, rules,
understandings, and relationships we have with others."3 68 How members of
Chilean society define their values is inevitably influenced by the multiple
communities to which they belong, some of which transcend national boundaries. 3 69 Thus to suggest that Chile should determine Pinochet's fate without
hindrance from outsiders misses a crucial point: how Chileans exercise their
moral autonomy is partly a function of their participation in transnational
normative processes. 370
Universal jurisdiction thus presents a paradox. As conservative critics have

367. Bolton, supra note 313.
368. FINNEMORE, supra note 349, at 128. Even when they coalesce on a temporary basis to advance a
specific goal, such as the prosecution of General Pinochet, transnational coalitions can play a significant
role in generating, reinforcing, reconstructing and diffusing values. See Patricia Chilton, Mechanics of
Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the Transformation Processes in Eastern
Europe, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN 189, 196 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995)
("Specific coalitions may not be durable,... but their capacity to generate ideas which are picked up by
other groups is crucial.").
369. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF 99 (1999) ("What is emerging ...

is a global

system increasingly characterized by overlapping communities and multivariegated personal loyalties
yielding more complex personal identities."); cf Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues, Constitutional
Community, REV. POL. 215, 221-23 (1988) (writing that within countries, there are multiple, overlapping and cross-cutting communities that play significant roles in shaping the values of their members
and that the views and even configuration of these communities may change as a result of debates over
political morality).
370. South Africans would readily appreciate the point. Although their country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was conceived by South Africans, it drew inspiration from other countries
that had already experienced political transitions. Twice in 1992, individuals who played a key role in
shaping South Africa's post-apartheid policies traveled to Eastern Europe to observe societies in
transition from authoritarian to democratic government. Anticipating South Africa's first democratic
elections in 1994, Alex Boraine, who later became Chairman of the TRC, organized a conference in
South Africa examining experiences of other countries that had recently emerged from periods of
protracted abuse "in order to assist South Africans towards a better appreciation of the . .. problem and
to narrow the options which might be open to us." ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED 16 (2000).
Years later Boraine reflected on the conference's impact:
The contribution made by [the foreign participants] cannot be overestimated. Anyone who
reads the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act which was written months later
will detect their influence. . . . [L]et me emphasize how fortunate South Africa has been in
receiving guidance from people who have had particular experience in their own countries or
in international human rights, which gave us a road map with which to pursue our own quest.
Id. at 17. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act established South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
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cautioned, its exercise at least theoretically risks displacing democratic deliberations in societies that have endured atrocious crimes. Yet as the Pinochet case
and other recent examples demonstrate, bystander justice may have just the
opposite effect: it may energize domestic processes of reckoning in countries
most directly affected by atrocious crimes.
Insights provided by international relations theory go some way toward
resolving the paradox. The national debate in Chile over "what should be done
about the guilty" has not transpired in isolation from the transnational lawmaking phenomena that led to Pinochet's arrest in London. In fact, Chileans
(ironically including Pinochet himself) actively participated in constructing the
norms and institutions-the building blocks of a new architecture of transnational justice-that led to Pinochet's arrest.3 7 ' In turn, the universal code that
Chileans helped draft has reinforced Chile's national values, enhancing rather
than undermining national processes of self-government. Core features of the
emergent system of transnational lawmaking mean that judges in, say, England
or Spain are not quite as far removed from Chilean society as we may
instinctively suppose.
To recognize that Chile's national process of reckoning with its past plays out
in a broader frame of transnational normative and legal processes is not the
same thing as asserting that it hardly matters where Pinochet is prosecuted. As I
have argued, democratic values are deeply implicated by questions of punishment for past crimes; these belong specially if not exclusively to particular
communities.37 2 The challenge, then, is to ensure that universal jurisdiction is
exercised in a fashion likely to enhance rather than undermine democratic values.
C. A FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILING DEMOCRATIC PARTICULARISM AND UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION

With this challenge in mind, my aim in this section is to identify principles
that may ground the legitimate exercise of universal jurisdiction in light of
democratic principles, building upon conclusions derived from previous sections.
First, a state's exercise of universal jurisdiction satisfies a key test of legitimacy when the defendant's state of nationality (or, if different, the state where
the crimes took place) has provided its consent, whether through general
acceptance of established rules of customary international law, ratification of a
treaty that establishes a regime of universal jurisdiction, or by providing ad hoc
consent. Countries can and frequently do surrender a substantial measure of
sovereignty to supranational and transnational legal regimes; when predicated
upon meaningful domestic processes of democratic deliberation, such choices

371. As noted earlier, Chile ratified the Convention Against Torture, which proved to be crucial in
stripping away Pinochet's immunity from ciminal process in relation to charges of torture, while he
was president of Chile. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Part VI. A.
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are a perfectly legitimate exercise of self-government. 73
But if democratic consent goes a long way toward legitimizing universal
jurisdiction, it is necessary to ask whether its legitimacy invariably requires the
consent provided by the suspect's state of nationality or, if different, the state
where the crimes occurred. Notably, the Convention Against Torture and several
other treaties authorize States Parties to assert universal jurisdiction over anyone in their jurisdiction suspected of having committed certain offenses, even if
the suspect's state of nationality has not ratified the convention. 3 7 4 If we believe
that law has legitimate authority only over persons who were able to participate
in its adoption as law for them,3 75 applying the Torture Convention to citizens
of non-consenting states may seem problematic.
Proponents of bystander justice would likely counter that it is perfectly
legitimate for a national court to assert universal jurisdiction over conduct that
has been recognized as an international crime3 76 under customary international
law; what the Torture Convention adds to the right to exercise universal
jurisdiction over torture that states already possess is a duty on the part of States
Parties to exercise their established authority under circumstances defined in the
treaty. For present purposes it is enough to note that the particular issue of
consent just raised would be obviated if universal jurisdiction were exercised, in
the absence of treaty-based or ad hoc consent by the relevant state, only in
respect of offenses that states generally agree are indeed subject to universal
jurisdiction.
If a state has generally consented to the exercise of universal jurisdiction in
defined circumstances through, for example, its participation in a treaty regime,
but nonetheless objects to another state's exercise of universal jurisdiction over
its national in a particular case, is the presumption of democratic legitimacy
vitiated by the later objection? The question poses a variant on a conundrum

373. See supra Part II.B.
374. See supra note 248. The provisions of the Torture Convention establishing universal jurisdiction were modeled on similar provisions in multilateral treaties concerned with acts of terrorism. See,
e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, arts. 5(2), 8, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, arts. 3(2), 7, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
arts. 5, 7, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, arts. 4 and 7, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
375. See supra note 225 and text accompanying note 251.
376. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has
observed that universal jurisdiction is "nowadays acknowledged in the case of international crimes."
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, No. IT-94-1-AR72, at IT 59, 62, 105 I.L.R. 453 (Int'l. Crim. Trib. former
Yugoslavia App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) (decision dismissing defense motion for interlocutory appeal
on jurisdiction), at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm; see also Prosecutor v.
Kallon, No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), and Prosecutor v. Kamara, No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, 70 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Mar.
13, 2004) ("One consequence of the nature of grave international crimes against humanity is that States
can, under international law, exercise universal jurisdiction over such crimes"). But see id. 68 ("[N]ot
every activity that is seen as an international crime is susceptible to universal jurisdiction.").
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that has vexed generations of political and legal philosophers. One writer,
seeking to justify judicial review in a domestic context, invokes a metaphor that
is helpful here:
Suppose that before the invention of anesthesia a patient needed to have a
limb amputated. One can imagine a rational patient telling a doctor prior to
the operation to disregard the patient's own anticipated preference, once the
excruciating pain begins, for not going forward. A doctor who then proceeds
with the operation despite the patient's protestations might be treated as
following, rather than violating, the patient's desires.
An analogous form of precommitment arguably supports judicial nonaccountability. Perhaps a previous majority, fearful of its own inability to choose
sensibly in the future, wished to bind itself to have at least certain kinds of
questions decided by judges who were not accountable. If so, then the
argument from majoritarianism can be made to support rather than undermine
judicial independence. 377
Research undertaken by political scientist Andrew Moravcsik suggests that
this metaphor is relevant in explaining why many states have accepted transnational regimes for enforcing human rights. Moravcsik has found that societies
that have experienced protracted periods of repressive government are particularly likely to consent to treaties establishing strong judicial enforcement mechanisms.37" The reasons are not hard to fathom: having endured the depredations
of dictatorship, citizens of new or newly-restored democracies may be determined to lock in their gains through guarantees of external enforcement in the
event that dictatorship once again threatens their liberty and security. As Moraycsik's research suggests, such decisions may be integral to a society's program
of democratic consolidation rather than a circumvention of democratic pro-

cess. 3 7 9

377. Seidman, supra note 172, at 1588 (citations omitted). Professor Seidman credits Thomas
Schelling with the medical analogy. See id. at 1588 n.54 (citing THOMAS SCHELLING, CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE 83 (1984)).
378. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 220 (2000) (concluding that the "primary proponents of
reciprocally binding human rights obligations" in Europe were "the governments of newly established
democracies . . , which have the greatest interest in further stabilizing the domestic political status quo
against nondemocratic threats"). Subsequent research undertaken by Moravcsik in relation to international, African and inter-American treaties reinforces this conclusion: "Once a country ... makes the
transition to democracy, then the probability that it will support mandatory or general enforcement is
inversely proportional to its age as a democracy (as well as its likely future stability)." Private
communication from Andrew Moravcsik to Diane Orentlicher (Oct. 15, 2001) (on file with author)
(summarizing results of unpublished research). Lutz and Sikkink suggest that Moravcsik's thesis is not
fully borne out by patterns of treaty adherence in the Americas, but it is not clear that they are applying
the same criteria as Moravcsik. See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 366, at 12.
379. In recent years some states have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals
when the prospect was no longer hypothetical. The Bosnian government did not object to Germany's
exercise of universal jurisdiction over Bosnian nationals in several cases prosecuted in the 1990s. See
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If consent that takes the form of pre-commitment validates the exercise of
foreign jurisdiction, courts that can exercise universal jurisdiction should nonetheless respect the right of the "home state" to prosecute offenders if its courts
are willing and able to bring them to justice. By averting or dispelling a culture
of impunity, in-country justice provides the surest guarantee that human rights
will be respected in the future, provided there are sufficient guarantees of fair
process. Moreover, justice at home can more surely advance a wounded nation's
recovery in the wake of mass atrocity than the remote justice dispensed by
foreign courts. Provided that they enjoy legitimacy, trials in the state most
affected by human rights abuses are more likely than prosecutions conducted a
world away to inspire ownership by societies that have endured mass atrocity.
Thus, unless there is reason to doubt the fairness or capacity of their courts, the
claims of states that endured such crimes should be honored.
This principle has been reflected-if sometimes problematically-in the law
and practice of several countries that have recently exercised universal jurisdiction. In December 2000, a Spanish court dismissed without prejudice a criminal
complaint against Guatemalan military officials on the ground that there was no
reason to believe the complainants could not find justice in Guatemalan courts;380
its ruling was later upheld by Spain's Supreme Court.3 8 ' Before Belgium
repealed its "universal competence law" in August 2003,382 its Parliament
amended the law to allow criminal complaints based on universal jurisdiction to
be forwarded to democratic countries deemed capable of handling the cases in
their own legal systems.38 3
Still, deference to the claims of societies ravaged by atrocious crimes must be
tempered by a keen awareness of the constraints they face. Victims rarely if ever
seek justice abroad if they can find it at home.38 4
CONCLUSION

More than six years after the arrest of Augusto Pinochet in England, it is now
clear that the criminal proceedings against him were the leading edge of a
profound transformation. In recent years a raft of countries have practiced

UN Study on Impunity, supra note 366, at T 50. More recently, the Government of Chad has cooperated
with a Belgian magistrate's investigation of Chad's former president. See id.
380. See Amnesty International, Spain/Guatemala: Universal Jurisdiction Should Apply to Crimes
Against Humanity, Al Index EUR 41/15/2000-News Serv. No. 236 (Dec. 14, 2000), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR410452000 (expressing disappointment in the Spanish
court's decision).
38 1. See supra note 14.
382. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
383. See Patrick Lannin, Belgium to Scrap War Crimes Law, REUTERS, July 12, 2003; Stefaan Smis
& Kim Van der Borght, Belgian Law Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International
HumanitarianLaw: A Contested Law with Uncontested Objectives, ASIL INSIGHTS (July 2003), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh112.htm.
384. This consideration may have a bearing on questions such as who bears the burden of proving
that the state where atrocities occurred will indeed dispense justice.

